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Time is a fundamental dimension of cognition and motor control. Preparation for 
imperative events, choosing the appropriate time to act if there are no external 
triggers, or deciding between action alternatives if their outcome depends on 
accurate timing, requires accurate estimates of time. Typically, the accuracy of such 
estimates is limited and we experience temporal uncertainty. I here distinguish 
between two types of temporal uncertainty: (a) external temporal uncertainty (ETU), 
which arises when the timing of imperative events is variable and (b) internal 
temporal uncertainty (ITU), arises as a consequence of “noisy” internal clocks. I 
present behavioural and neurophysiological studies on the effects of ETU and ITU on 
human cognitive motor control. A series of experiments first addressed how 
participants prepare for action in the face of ETU and ITU. Second, I explored the 
interaction between ETU, ITU, and uncertainty about the type of motor response 
(event uncertainty). Using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), two experiments 
probed the neurophysiology of preparation for action under condition of ETU. One 
experiment aimed at offering a functional account of changes in cortico-spinal 
excitability (CSE), a measure of motor preparation, prior to imperative events by 
manipulating ETU. In a second experiment I then further explored the functional role 
of GABAA and GABAB receptor-dependent intracortical inhibitory circuits for action 
preparation using paired-pulse TMS protocols. Two final studies explored the effects 
of ETU and ITU on two classic areas in human information-processing: first, the 
ability to estimate and respond to ETU and ITU on a reward-based decision making 
task, and second whether multiple cues, informative about the correct time for action, 
increase precision in action timing through cue integration (thus reducing ITU). 
Results reveal that ETU and ITU are two qualitatively different types of constraint on 
action. They differ in their effects on action preparation and their interactions with 
event uncertainty. In choice situations, participants estimate ITU accurately but are 
biased regarding ETU. When there are multiple cues informative about action timing, 
participants use the most informative cue only. There are thus important differences 
between how people respond to temporal uncertainty arising from the external world 
and temporal uncertainty intrinsic to the generative processes within the action. 
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Chapter 1: Time & Temporal Uncertainty in Cognition & 
Motor Control 
Abstract: Time is a fundamental dimension of cognition and motor control. Limited 
information about the timing of future imperative events, or the appropriate time for 
motor action, induces temporal uncertainty and affects performance and expected 
action outcome. There are two types of temporal uncertainty distinguished by origin. If 
temporal uncertainty is due to a unpredictable world then there is external temporal 
uncertainty (ETU). Internal temporal uncertainty (ITU) arises due to humans’ limited 
ability to estimate time at high accuracy. We first introduce ETU and ITU, highlight 
their differences, and putative differential effects on cognition and behaviour. Second, 
we discuss the general role of timing in cognition and motor control, in particular (i) 
different temporal scales, (ii) neural substrates and (iii) implicit versus explicit 
perceptual and motor timing. In subsequent sections, which introduce the questions 
pursued in the individual chapters of this thesis. We address first the effects of ETU 
and ITU on temporal expectation and action preparation and then the possible 
interaction between ETU, ITU, and uncertainty about the type of forthcoming motor 
action (event uncertainty). Third, we discuss effects of ETU and ITU on changes in 
corticospinal excitability (CSE) measured by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), 
which is a neural measure of motor preparation. We also give brief general 
introduction to TMS and single- and paired-pulse techniques to measure CSE and 
intra-cortical inhibition. We conclude the chapter with a brief introduction to the role of 
ETU and ITU in decision-making and how one may reduce ITU and improve timing by 
combining information from multiple temporal cues.  
Keywords: temporal uncertainty, external temporal uncertainty, internal temporal 
uncertainty, event uncertainty, action preparation, foreperiod paradigm, choice 
reaction time, decision-making under uncertainty, cue combination 
Cassandra and Nostradamus are known, revered, perhaps even feared for 
their alleged ability to see into future. Predicting the future, however, is not as rare an 
ability as one might initially think. In fact, we all do it (Nobre, Correa, & Coull, 2007). 
The ability to prepare for future events, or to make decisions guided by their 
expected outcome, relies on our ability to predict such events, their timing, and their 
outcome. Advance information about the timing of future events induces temporal 
expectation and allows for temporal preparation (Coull, Cheng, & Meck, 2011; Nobre, 
Correa, et al., 2007). If such information is limited or absent, then one experiences 
temporal uncertainty (Klemmer, 1956, 1957). Temporal uncertainty affects temporal 
expectation, preparation (Niemi & Naatanen, 1981), and decision-making (Hudson, 
Maloney, & Landy, 2008).  
This thesis is concerned with how we extract and use advance information 
about future events or forthcoming action to predict their timing under conditions of 
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temporal uncertainty. In other words, we here explore how temporal uncertainty 
affects temporal expectation, temporal preparation, the timing of actions, and 
decision-making. We here limit ourselves to the investigation of time interval 
durations ranging from several hundred milliseconds up to a few seconds (500ms – 
5s), typically known as interval timing (Buhusi & Meck, 2005; Mauk & Buonomano, 
2004). 
Importantly, there are two different types of temporal uncertainty (Klemmer, 
1956, 1957): external temporal uncertainty (ETU) and internal temporal uncertainty 
(ITU). ETU arises when the timing of events varies from one instance to the next. 
Under such conditions, their timing can be predicted with limited accuracy only. We 
refer to this type of temporal uncertainty as external because it is due to variability 
arising from the external world. ITU, by contrast, has an internal origin. ITU arises as 
a consequence of limited accuracy in time perception, or put differently, a noisy 
internal clock(s). 1  Accuracy in time perception decreases in proportion to the 
increase in time interval duration, also known as the scalar property of time, a strong 
form of Weber’s law applied to interval timing (Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon & Allan, 1984; 
Lejeune & Wearden, 2006, 2006; Lewis & Miall, 2009). Typically, this decrease in 
accuracy (i.e. this increase in variability) is directly proportional to time interval 
duration, although one study has reported disproportionally high inaccuracy for short 
(< 500 ms) time interval durations (Lewis & Miall, 2009a). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 By referring to and ‘internal clock’, we do not want to express a commitment to either the pulse 
accumulator model (Allman & Meck, 2011), the striatal beat frequency model (Buhusi & Meck, 2005), or 
any other dedicated single (neural) mechanism that measure time (as opposed to intrinsic and / or 
distributed; Ivry & Schlerf, 2008). ‘Internal clock’ here refers to the ability to keep track of, measure, and 
perceive time, which is limited in accuracy. 
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ETU and ITU often occur in conjunction. Whenever participants prepare and 
respond to imperative events that vary in time (ETU), then they are often also 
required to measure and estimate time interval duration, which is intrinsically 
associated with ITU. Consequently, previous studies have predominantly looked at 
combined effects of ETU and ITU on temporal expectation and preparation 
(Bertelson, 1967; Bertelson & Tisseyre, 1968; Los, Knol, & Boers, 2001; Vallesi & 
Shallice, 2007) and their neural correlates (Correa & Nobre, 2008; Coull, Frith, 
Büchel, & Nobre, 2000; Cui, Stetson, Montague, & Eagleman, 2009; Miniussi, 
Wilding, Coull, & Nobre, 1999; Praamstra, Kourtis, Kwok, & Oostenveld, 2006; 
Tandonnet, Burle, Vidal, & Hasbroucq, 2003; Vallesi, McIntosh, Shallice, & Stuss, 
2009; Vallesi, Shallice, & Walsh, 2007) with two notable exceptions (Klemmer, 1956, 
1957). We here distinguish between ETU and ITU to explore their differential 
contribution to behaviour, in particular temporal expectation, temporal preparation, 
timed action, and decision-making. 
Introduction to external and internal temporal uncertainty  
Both ETU and ITU limit the extent to which one can predict the timing of 
future imperative events, or the appropriate time for action in case such events are 
missing as action-triggers. ETU and ITU are equivalent in their contribution towards 
the overall temporal uncertainty and, if action outcome depends on temporal 
uncertainty, expected reward. As such, they are both likely to influence temporal 
expectation, temporal preparation, and timed action: high temporal uncertainty, 
regardless of origin, is likely to interfere with temporal preparation (see Chapter 2 to 
5) and / or accurately timed motor action (see Chapter 6 and 7). But ETU and ITU 
are fundamentally different in their origin. As a consequence, they also differ with 
regard to the following three aspects: first and foremost, ETU and ITU differ in type 
and number of informative cues that can be used to reduce either ETU or ITU. ETU 
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can be reduced through learning statistical regularities inherent in one’s environment. 
There may be non-imperative events (i.e. events that do not require a motor 
response) that are informative about the timing of future imperative events (i.e. 
endogenous cues; Coull et al., 2000; Rohenkohl, Coull, & Nobre, 2011). For 
example, ‘ready’ and ‘set’ inform a sprinter about the impending imperative ‘go’-
signal. Learning the informational ‘value’ of endogenous cues reduces ETU and is 
likely to improve temporal preparation and / or accurately timed motor action. In 
addition, imperative events themselves may be predictive about the timing of 
subsequent imperative events (i.e. exogenous cues; Coull et al., 2000; Rohenkohl et 
al., 2011), for example, when the time interval in between two subsequent imperative 
events is constant (Bertelson & Tisseyre, 1968) or follows an otherwise predictable 
pattern (Praamstra et al., 2006; Sakai et al., 2000). Finally, the mere passage of time 
may serve as a cue for temporal preparation (Nobre, Correa, et al., 2007). Typically, 
the probability of imperative events changes over time. For example, the probability 
of a red traffic light turning green rises over time. Changes in the probability of 
imperative events over time are commonly referred to as the hazard function (Coull 
et al., 2011; Nobre, Correa, et al., 2007). Learning the hazard function may 
contribute to a reduction of ETU and is likely to improve temporal preparation and 
accurately timed actions (Bueti, Bahrami, Walsh, & Rees, 2010; Janssen & Shadlen, 
2005). Taken together, endogenous and exogenous cues as well as the hazard 
function reduce ETU and are likely to have beneficial effects on temporal preparation 
and accurately timed motor action in the face of temporal uncertainty. 
ITU by contrast arises due to limited accuracy in time interval perception: it 
has an internal origin. ITU can be reduced by supplementing noisy internal clocks 
with more accurate external clocks (Borst & Cohen, 1987, 1989; Carlsen & 
Mackinnon, 2010). If a bus is scheduled to arrive in ten minutes time, then having a 
watch will allow for a more precise prediction about its time of arrival. Alternatively, 
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multiple events presented sequentially may reduce ITU by sub-dividing otherwise 
long time intervals, thereby effectively shortening time interval duration (Requin & 
Granjon, 1969). Finally, multiple cues, all informative about the time to respond, may 
reduce ITU if their information is combined (Elliott, Wing, & Welchman, 2010; Ernst & 
Banks, 2002; Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004; Wing, Doumas, & Welchman, 2010); a 
possibility which we explore in the final chapter of this thesis (Chapter 7). Otherwise, 
if no measures are taken to remove ITU, then there will be ITU potentially impacting 
on performance, in particular whenever performance critically depends on the 
estimation of time interval duration, either implicitly or explicitly (Coull & Nobre, 2008; 
Nobre, Correa, et al., 2007). Whereas ETU has to be induced by the experimental 
design (i.e. by adding variability), the experimental design has to be intentionally 
modified to remove ITU. Consequently, many studies have looked at effects of ETU 
and ITU in conjunction only (Bertelson & Tisseyre, 1968; Coull et al., 2000; Los & 
van den Heuvel, 2001; Los & Agter, 2005; Los & Heslenfeld, 2005; Los & Schut, 
2008; Los et al., 2001; Miniussi et al., 1999; Steinborn, Rolke, Bratzke, & Ulrich, 
2008; Vallesi & Shallice, 2007; Vallesi, Mussoni, et al., 2007; Vallesi, Shallice, et al., 
2007) with a few notable exceptions (Borst & Cohen, 1987, 1989; Carlsen & 
Mackinnon, 2010). 
Second, ETU and ITU may differ in familiarity. ITU depends on the precision 
of one’s time keeping abilities. Plenty of experience, throughout the course of one’s 
lifetime, in having to measure and estimate time interval duration may have allowed 
participants to form accurate estimates of ITU. Consequently, participants may have 
developed strategies to cope with ITU to form temporal expectations and to prepare 
in time for imperative events despite ITU. In contrast, ETU is a property of the 
environment and has to be learned anew for each novel environment. Differences in 
familiarity may lead to different behavioural strategies in coping with ETU and ITU. 
For example, high familiarity may lead to overconfidence, which may cause an 
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underestimation of ITU (Mamassian, 2008). Also, ETU and ITU may differentially 
interfere with non-temporal aspects of performance, perhaps due to differences in 
familiarity. For example, high ETU may interfere with using advance information 
about, for example, the type of forthcoming motor response (event uncertainty) while 
participants may have learned to cope with high ITU, due to prolonged experience, to 
avoid such interference. 
Third, as a property of the environment, ETU may change over time. 
Changes in ITU are less likely, occur over larger time scales (e.g. ageing, see 
McAuley, Miller, Wang, & Pang, 2010; Turgeon, Wing, & Taylor, 2011) or only in 
pathological status (Allman & Meck, 2011; Coull et al., 2011). Consequently, 
participants may choose different strategies to cope with ETU compared to ITU. 
Participants may rely on relatively recent information about ETU, for example, the 
timing of the last preceding imperative event, to detect and respond to changes in the 
temporal structure of one’s environment flexibly. Such strategies to cope with ITU are 
unlikely. 
And finally, ETU and ITU may interact in their effects on behaviour. For 
example, learning about temporal regularities in one’s environment requires a sense 
of time sufficiently accurate to pick up on the temporal structure of events. In other 
words, high ITU may interfere with attempts to reduce ETU. Also, an underestimation 
of ITU, due to high familiarity, may in turn lead to exaggerated estimates of ETU 
(perhaps to preserve a correct estimate of overall temporal uncertainty: ETU + ITU).  
While the effects of ETU and ITU have previously been studied in conjunction, here 
we explore differential effects of ETU and ITU on behaviour: first, to highlight the 
importance of this theoretical distinction, second, to encourage further research into 
their differential effects on various areas in human information processing, and third 
to call attention to the fact that ITU may affect temporal and non-temporal aspects of 
behaviour on many tasks and paradigms if not explicitly controlled for. 
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Introduction to the multi-faceted nature of time 
Carefully distinguishing between types of temporal uncertainty is important 
because time is a fundamental dimension of behaviour. Perceptions, actions, and our 
understanding of the world unfold over time (Wittmann, 2011). “Timing” is used to 
refer to not only when an event is going to happen (temporal prediction) but also, 
how long it is going to take (duration estimation), or whether it occurred before or 
after some other temporal reference (order judgement; Coull et al., 2011), thus 
highlighting the many different areas in which timing is important. Duration estimation 
and temporal prediction require a metrical representation of time whereas an ordinal 
scale suffices to establish temporal order (Coull et al., 2011). We are here primarily 
concerned with behaviour that requires a metrical representation. Such 
representations of time are important for a wide range of behaviour that develop over 
different time scales: from hours, to minutes, seconds, and milliseconds. 
Timing across difference temporal scales 
Based on relevant time scales, and presumed underlying neural mechanisms, 
temporal processing can be categorised into four different time scales: circadian 
rhythms, interval timing (i.e. second processing), sub-second (i.e. millisecond), and 
microsecond processing (Buhusi & Meck, 2005; Mauk & Buonomano, 2004). 
Circadian rhythms operate over 24 hour cycles and control sleep and wakefulness as 
well as metabolic and reproductive fitness. In mammals, the clock that drives 
circadian rhythms is located in the suprachiasmatic nucleus of the hypothalamus 
(Morse & Sassone-Corsi, 2002). This clock modulates behaviour according to, for 
example, light input (Rongmin Chen, Seo, Bell, von Gall, & Lee, 2008; Reppert & 
Weaver, 2002) or social information (Levine, Funes, Dowse, & Hall, 2002). 
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Interval timing, by contrast, operates over a much smaller time scale, ranging 
from a couple of hundreds of milliseconds (> 500ms – 1s; Gutyrchik et al., 2010; 
Mauk & Buonomano, 2004) to a few seconds or minutes (Buhusi & Meck, 2005). 
Interval timing is important for a wide range of behaviour, from foraging (Kacelnik & 
Brunner, 2002) and decision making (Balci, Freestone, & Gallistel, 2009; Hudson et 
al., 2008), to arithmetic performance (Sohn & Carlson, 2003), and several aspects of 
motor control (Bertelson, 1967; Bertelson & Tisseyre, 1968; Carlsen & Mackinnon, 
2010; Cui et al., 2009; Drazin, 1961; Los et al., 2001; Vallesi & Shallice, 2007). The 
neural correlate of interval timing it a matter of debate, despite numerous 
neuroimaging (Correa & Nobre, 2008; Coull et al., 2000; Coull & Nobre, 2008; 
Harrington, Castillo, Fong, & Reed, 2011), neuropsychological (Artieda, Pastor, 
Lacruz, & Obeso, 1992; Pastor, Artieda, Jahanshahi, & Obeso, 1992; Vallesi, 
Mussoni, et al., 2007), and neuropharmacolgical studies (Rammsayer, 1993; 
Rammsayer & Vogel, 1992).  Most likely, interval timing depends on the basal 
ganglia, in particular the striatum, and intact dopaminergic neurotransmission 
(Jahanshahi, Jones, Dirnberger, & Frith, 2006; Jahanshahi et al., 2010; Jones & 
Jahanshahi, 2009; Jones, Malone, Dirnberger, Edwards, & Jahanshahi, 2008). 
Further, the supplementary motor cortex (SMA; Mita, Mushiake, Shima, Matsuzaka, 
& Tanji, 2009; Wencil, Coslett, Aguirre, & Chatterjee, 2010) in conjunction with the 
pre-SMA (Macar, Coull, & Vidal, 2006) have been implied in interval timing, in 
addition to the right prefrontal cortex, in particular the right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (rDLPFC; Jones, Rosenkranz, Rothwell, & Jahanshahi, 2004; Vallesi & 
Shallice, 2007; Vallesi, Mussoni, et al., 2007; Vallesi, Shallice, et al., 2007). 
Sub-second (< 1s), or millisecond timing (< 500ms) is crucial for motor control 
(Schlerf, Spencer, Zelaznik, & Ivry, 2007), speech generation and recognition 
(Schirmer, 2004), playing music and dancing (Thaut et al., 2009). The cerebellum 
may underlie sub-second timing (Buhusi & Meck, 2005), in particular when tasks 
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require discretely timed motor responses (Schlerf et al., 2007), or estimation of 
absolute (i.e. how long?), as opposed to relative, time interval estimation (i.e. longer 
or shorter?; Grube, Lee, Griffiths, Barker, & Woodruff, 2010; Teki, Grube, Kumar, & 
Griffiths, 2011). Microsecond timing underlies sound localisation and echolocation 
and depends on axonal conduction delays (Heinrich, Warmbold, Hoffmann, Firzlaff, 
& Wiegrebe, 2011).  
While there is thus abundant evidence that circadian rhythms and 
microsecond timing are supported by distinct neural mechanisms, the distinction 
between interval timing and millisecond timing is less clear-cut. It is supported by, for 
example, neuropsychological studies: Parkinson disease (PD) patients show 
impaired interval timing, compared to healthy controls, on a variety of tasks (Artieda 
et al., 1992; Jurkowski, Stepp, & Hackley, 2005; Koch et al., 2008; Pastor et al., 
1992; Smith, Harper, Gittings, & Abernethy, 2007). By contrast, in the millisecond 
range, performance of PD patients is comparable to that of healthy controls 
(Wearden et al., 2008). Further, neuropharmacological studies have revealed that 
remoxipride, a dopamine antagonist more selective for D2 receptors, impairs 
temporal processing on temporal scales of one second and above while temporal 
processing below one seconds is largely unaffected (Rammsayer, 1997). Similarly, 
benzodiazepines affect temporal processing on timescales of one second and 
beyond whereas millisecond timing is largely preserved under pharmacological 
challenge (Rammsayer, 1999; Rammsayer & Vogel, 1992). Finally, a recent study 
has found that left hand dominance is associated with underestimation of supra- but 
not sub-second intervals (Vicario, Bonní, & Koch, 2011). 
In line with these findings, Wing and Kristofferson have reported a 
discontinuity in timing behaviour suggestive of two timing mechanisms for different 
temporal scales: accuracy in time perception does not change for time intervals 
below 250ms, a violation of Weber’s law applied to interval timing (Wing & 
18 
Kristofferson, 1973). Others, however, have tried and failed to find such 
discontinuities in timing behaviour (Lewis & Miall, 2009a). Further, the cerebellum, 
typically associated with millisecond timing, is co-activated also during interval timing 
(Coull & Nobre, 2008). Similarly, the basal ganglia, typically associated with interval 
timing, have been implied in millisecond timing (Shih, Kuo, Yeh, Tzeng, & Hsieh, 
2009). The distinction between interval and millisecond timing remains a matter of 
debate. 
 Some have suggested that differences in behaviour, in clinical populations or 
under neuropharmacological challenge, arise due to a higher recruitment of working 
memory and / or attention for longer versus shorter time intervals (Coull et al., 2011). 
If, for example, a certain drug interacts with working memory, and if working memory 
is more strongly recruited for supra-second timing, then behaviour will be impaired 
for supra- but not sub-second timing. Interestingly, Lewis and Miall prevented 
participants from using cognitive strategies for longer versus shorter time intervals 
(e.g. spontaneous ‘counting’) thus reducing possible effects of working memory or 
attention. In contrast to Wing and Kristofferson, they did not find a discontinuity in 
behaviour suggestive of a distinction between sub- and supra-second timing (Lewis 
& Miall, 2009a). Further studies are need that tightly control for differences in working 
memory and attention for long versus short timescales to elucidate the neural 
substrate of sub- versus supra-second timing. 
We here limit ourselves to the study of interval timing, in particular the 
influence of ETU and ITU on interval timing as important for accurately timed motor 
preparation or reward-based choice. The time intervals, employed in the research 
presented here, range from 500ms up to 5s. We acknowledge that shorter time 
intervals may be entirely, or partially, supported by different mechanisms or neural 
substrates than longer time intervals. But crucially, the scalar property of time interval 
duration, the origin of ITU, holds for short (500 – 1000ms), intermediate (1000 – 
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3000ms) and long (3000ms – 6000ms) time intervals (Lewis & Miall, 2009a). In 
studying the effects of ETU and ITU on behaviour (or a neural measure of motor 
excitability using TMS), we remain impartial to the debate whether or not different 
neural substrates support sub- versus supra-second timing. 
Perception of time & clocks in the brain 
While we are able to perceive time, we lack a dedicated sense it. So how do 
we measure time? The predominant model for interval timing has been the pulse-
accumulator model (also Scalar Expectancy Theory or Scalar Timing Theory). This 
model divides temporal processing into clock, memory, and decision processes. The 
clock component, an accumulator, measures time by collecting pulses or ‘clock ticks’, 
emitted from an oscillator. The number of accumulated pulses thus represents time. 
A ‘switch’ closes at the onset of a to-be-timed signal, which allows pulses to 
accumulate in the accumulator. Once the signal ends, or acquires some other 
significance (e.g. positive feedback), the accumulated pulses are transferred from the 
accumulator to reference memory for future use. If the duration is presented or 
experienced again, then the current contents of the accumulator are compared 
against the pulse-trains stored in reference memory. The reference memory contains 
a distribution of pulse-trains for each given interval duration. A ration-decision rule 
operates to determine whether the current pulse-train is sufficiently similar to a 
randomly chosen reference pulse-train of a given duration. This distribution of pulse 
trains in reference memory, in combination with the ratio decision rule, gives rise to 
the scalar variability in interval timing and thus ITU. 
The striatal beat frequency theory is essentially a neural instantiation of the 
pulse-accumulator model (Allman & Meck, 2011). According to the striatal beat 
frequency theory, time interval estimation is based upon coincidence detection (the 
decision component), carried out by medium spiny neurons in the striatum (i.e. the 
20 
main input station / cells of the basal ganglia), of patterns of oscillatory neurons in the 
cortex. Populations of cortical neurons phase re-set (i.e. synchronise) at the onset of 
a to-be-timed signal and start oscillating at their endogenous frequency (the clock 
component). At the same time, the level and activity of medium spiny neurons is 
reset by phasic dopaminergic input from the ventral tegmental area and substantia 
nigra pars compacta. If the to-be-timed signal ends, or acquires some other 
significance, a pulse of dopamine strengthens the cortico-striatal synaptic weights 
that are activated by the specific oscillatory pattern of cortical neurons at that specific 
moment in time (the memory component). Thereby, medium spiny neurons become 
tuned to specific patterns of oscillatory activity, which come to represent time interval 
duration. Later, medium spiny neurons compare current oscillatory patterns to the 
ones that were reinforced previously. If there is a match between current and 
previously reinforced oscillatory patterns, medium spiny neurons signal coincidence 
of oscillatory patterns, or, in other words, sufficient similarity of to-be-timed intervals, 
and indicate hereby, e.g. the appropriate time for a response (Buhusi & Meck, 2005). 
The pulse-accumulator model, and its neural instantiation, the striatal beat 
frequency theory, are instances of dedicated models of time perception, as opposed 
to intrinsic models. Dedicated models entail specialised mechanisms that measure or 
represent temporal information. Some dedicated models of time perception also 
entail neural structures that are specialised to represent temporal information, for 
example the cerebellum (Ivry, Spencer, Zelaznik, & Diedrichsen, 2002) and / or the 
basal ganglia (Buhusi & Meck, 2005). However, a dedicated time system may also 
involve activity in a widely distributed network of neural regions (Ivry & Schlerf, 
2008). Within these models, some areas may be involved in representing temporal 
information only (e.g. pulse accumulation), whereas others might sub-serve more 
general functions (e.g. memory components). 
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Intrinsic models, by contrast, do not assume that there are specialised 
mechanisms or brain structures that measure or represent temporal information. 
Intrinsic models entail that time is inherent in neural dynamics. For example, 
neuronal populations that can sustain activity in the absence of sensory information 
may encode temporal information, for example in the motor and pre-motor cortex 
(Lebedev, O’Doherty, & Nicolelis, 2008; Renoult, Roux, & Riehle, 2006). Similarly, 
memory strength may underlie temporal processing: time interval duration may be 
inferred from the decay in memory strength over time (Staddon, 2005). 
The debate about dedicated versus intrinsic models of time perception is not 
yet resolved. The ability to compare time interval duration across modalities supports 
models that entail an amodal representation of time (S Grondin & Rousseau, 1991; 
Ulrich, Nitschke, & Rammsayer, 2006). Also, individual difference in accuracy of time 
perception and reproduction correlate between perception and action (Keele, 
Pokorny, Corcos, & Ivry, 1985) suggesting an amodal timing mechanism. In contrast, 
neuroimaging studies that show differential activation for time interval perception in 
the visual, auditory, or motor domain support modality specific models (for a 
comprehensive meta-analysis, see (Wiener, Turkeltaub, & Coslett, 2010). 
Interestingly, a recent study revealed impaired performance on a visual time 
estimation task when the auditory cortex was stimulated using repetitive TMS. This 
suggests a supra-modal role of the auditory cortex during time interval perception 
(Kanai, Lloyd, Bueti, & Walsh, 2011). 
Here, we do not commit to a specific model of time perception. We study the 
effects of ETU and ITU on cognition and motor control. We address the issue of 
modality specific versus supra-modal clocks only in the final chapter of this thesis 
(Chapter 7), when we explore whether one can reduce ITU by integrating temporal 
information from multiple cues. When assessing the neurophysiology of preparation 
under conditions of ETU, we measure neural activity in the primary motor cortex as 
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an index of motor preparation (Chapter 4 & 5). This does not imply, however, that we 
assume that time perception takes place in the primary motor cortex exclusively. 
Other brain areas, close or distal, may drive the changes in activity in the primary 
motor cortex. Importantly, the term “internal clock” is used here to refer to the 
capacity to perceive and measure time (see footnote 1). By using the term “internal 
clock”, we do not express a commitment to a dedicated model of time perception, 
such as the pace-accumulator model. 
Explicit timing versus implicit temporal expectations  
Some tasks require explicit estimates of time interval duration whereas others 
rely on implicit time interval estimates to achieve high levels of performance (for an 
overview, see Figure 1.1). Explicit interval timing is recruited whenever the accurate 
estimation of time is the main goal of the current task: explicit timing thus requires 
overt estimates of stimulus or time interval duration. In experimental settings, 
participants may be required to perceptually discriminate time intervals of various 
durations, for example, when performing an explicit perceptual timing task (e.g. time 
interval reproduction). Alternatively, participants may be asked to reproduce time 
intervals on explicit motor timing task (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Lewis & Miall, 
2009a). In these tasks, the stimuli that participants respond to can occur in any 
modality: visual, auditory, or tactile. Time perception is typically more accurate in the 
auditory compared to the visual or tactile modality (Elliott et al., 2010; Wing et al., 
2010). For that reason, sound dominates timing of audio-visual stimuli on explicit 
timing tasks (Burr, Banks, & Morrone, 2009). 
By contrast, implicit interval timing is recruited when accurate estimates of 
time interval duration contribute to improved performance related to some non-
temporal goal. For example, a sprinter benefits from being able to predict the timing 
of the ‘go’-signal, because this prediction allows her to optimise and align motor 
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preparation with the imperative event. There are implicit perceptual and motor timing 
tasks. On implicit perceptual timing tasks, participants are typically required to 
respond to visual, tactile, or auditory stimuli, for example on foreperiod tasks (for a 
review, see (Niemi & Naatanen, 1981). Participants are able to prepare more 
efficiently and respond more quickly if they can predict the timing of the imperative 
sensory event. On motor timing tasks, estimates about time interval duration may 
contribute to the regularity of motor output (e.g. on continuous circle drawing tasks). 
The scalar property of interval timing, first reported for explicit timing tasks (Lewis & 
Miall, 2009a), is engaged also in implicit timing (Piras & Coull, 2011). Time 
perception decreases in accuracy with increasing time interval duration. ITU 
increases with increasing time interval duration for both explicit and implicit timing. 	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Figure 1.1: Time is a fundamental dimension of behaviour. Tasks that require overt estimates of time interval duration recruit explicit timing. If accurate 
time perception contributes to non-temporal performance, then participants engage in implicit timing. Stimuli that demarcate time intervals on explicit timing 
tasks, or that prompt participants to respond on implicit timing tasks, can be delivered in the auditory, visual or tactile modality. On implicit perceptual 
timing tasks, participants can use three different types of cues to reduce external temporal uncertainty (ETU). Exogenous cues are stimuli that, while 
prompting a motor response, are informative about the timing of future responses. Endogenous cues do not prompt a response but provide information 
about the timing of future imperative stimuli. The passage of time can serve as a cue because the probability of imperative events usually changes across 
time: when waiting at a traffic light, the switch to green gets increasingly more likely the longer one waits. Finally, tasks can be distinguished by the time 
interval duration that they predominantly employ. Some postulate different mechanism and neural correlates for sub- versus supra-second timing. 	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The neural correlate of timing may depend on whether participants perform 
an explicit versus implicit timing task (Coull & Nobre, 2008). Explicit interval timing 
specifically activates the basal ganglia, with co-activation of prefrontal, premotor, and 
cerebellar areas. By contrast, implicit timing recruits cortical action circuits, such as 
inferior parietal and premotor areas (Coull & Nobre, 2008). Thus, the neural correlate 
of timing may not only depend on the timescale (sub- versus supra-second), modality 
(auditory, visual, etc.) but also on the goal of the task that participants engage in. In 
the work presented here, we use a variety of explicit and implicit timing tasks. Explicit 
timing tasks allow estimation of participant’s variability in time perception and 
consequently the level of ITU they experience associated with particular time interval 
durations. We use implicit timing tasks, by contrast, to study effects of ETU and ITU 
on temporal expectation and preparation. 
Preparation for action under conditions of ETU and ITU 
Temporal uncertainty lowers the predictability of the timing of imperative 
events and detrimentally affects motor preparation and execution. Effects of temporal 
uncertainty on temporal preparation have been studied with the foreperiod paradigm 
(for a review, see Hackley, 2009; Niemi & Naatanen, 1981). In this paradigm, a 
warning signal (WS) is followed by an imperative signal (IS), which prompts a motor 
action. The time interval between the WS and the IS is called the foreperiod (FP). 
Below, we summarise the main features and behavioural signatures of two frequently 
used variants of the FP paradigm, the constant and the variable FP paradigm. 
Constant and variable foreperiod paradigms to study action preparation 
In constant FP paradigms, one fixed FP is used across all the trials of a single 
block (Niemi & Naatanen, 1981). In this case, ETU is eliminated because the timing 
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of the IS in relation to the WS does not vary. The duration of the FP determines the 
level of ITU: the longer the FP, the higher the level of ITU. Studies using constant FP 
paradigms show that reaction times increase with increasing FP duration (Bertelson 
& Boons, 1960; Klemmer, 1956, 1957). This suggests that participants cannot remain 
optimally prepared for long periods of time (Gottsdanker, 1975) and that preparation 
is a limited resource that should be ‘spent’ wisely (Steinborn et al., 2008). Due to 
noisy internal clocks, predicting the timing of the IS becomes more difficult when ITU 
is high (Klemmer, 1957). Consequently, it becomes more difficult to optimally align 
action preparation with the IS. 
In variable FP paradigms, several FPs occur across the trials of a single 
block. This inter-trial variability in FP duration introduces ETU, in addition to ITU. 
Previous studies using variable FP paradigms have demonstrated three ways in 
which variable FP duration affects action preparation. First, they have shown an 
increase in reaction times with increasing FP variability (Drazin, 1961; Klemmer, 
1957). Higher variability makes it more difficult to learn and predict the timing of the 
IS (Klemmer, 1956, 1957), which will impair the alignment of action preparation with 
the timing of the IS. Second, previous work has revealed that reaction times 
decrease with increasing FP duration (Bueti, Bahrami, Walsh, & Rees, 2010; Drazin, 
1961; Los & van den Heuvel, 2001; Requin, 1969; Vallesi & Shallice, 2007), a feature 
commonly referred to as the foreperiod (FP) effect. Third, reaction times are 
influenced by the FP of the immediately preceding trial (Alegria & Delhaye-Rembaux, 
1975; Los & Agter, 2005; Steinborn et al., 2008; Vallesi & Shallice, 2007; Van der 
Lubbe, Los, Jaśkowski, & Verleger, 2004), a feature referred to as sequential 
effect(s) (Drazin, 1961; Los & van den Heuvel, 2001; Los & Agter, 2005; Los & 
Heslenfeld, 2005; Los & Schut, 2008; Los et al., 2001; Steinborn et al., 2008).  
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Strategic and conditioning accounts of temporal preparation 
The FP effect and sequential effects have been explained by three alternative 
and competing accounts (for an overview, see Figure 1.2): there are two strategic 
accounts, which explain these effects as consequences of deliberate adjustments in 
action preparation (Bertelson, 1967; Drazin, 1961; Vallesi et al., 2009), and one 
conditioning account (Los et al., 2001).  
One of these strategic accounts suggests that the decrease in reaction times 
with increasing foreperiod duration (i.e. the FP effect) is due to an increase in the 
probability of IS occurrence over the course of a trial if the IS has not yet occurred 
(hazard function). In other words, participants may use the passage of time, and 
associated changes in conditional IS probability, for temporal preparation. Stronger 
FP effects with steeper FP distributions (in which the likelihood of the IS increases 
more quickly) support this suggestion (Los & Agter, 2005). Similarly, there is no 
decrease in reaction times with increasing FP duration when non-ageing FP 
distributions are employed (in which the conditional likelihood of the IS does not 
change; Trillenberg, Verleger, Wascher, Wauschkuhn, & Wessel, 2000). These 
findings suggests that participants adjust preparation according to changes in 
conditional IS probability. In case of optimal preparation, the decrease in reaction 
time should thus be directly proportional to the increase in conditional IS probability 
(i.e. the hazard function). 
The second strategic account seeks to explain sequential effects and, as a 
by-product, the FP effect. It suggests that participants’ default expectation is a FP 
repetition. Consequently, they are optimally prepared if such a repetition actually 
occurs. However, if the FP is shorter and the IS occurs unexpectedly early, 
participants are sub-optimally prepared and reactions will be slow. By contrast, if the 
IS occurs later than expected, then re-preparation is possible and no reaction time 
decrements are incurred from incorrectly assuming a FP repetition (Alegria, 1974; 
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Drazin, 1961; Vallesi & Shallice, 2007). As a by-product, responses will be faster for 
longer FPs than for shorter FPs because the latter are more negatively affected by 
the expectation of FP repetition than the former. 
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   Figure 1.2: Three alternative and competing accounts explain behavioural effects on variable 
foreperiod (FP) reaction time tasks. Reaction times are affected in two ways: first, reaction times 
decrease with increasing FP duration (FP effect). Second, the duration of the foreperiod of an 
immediately preceding trial affects the reaction times on the subsequent trial as a function of the 
duration of the subsequent trial’s FP (i.e. sequential effects). For example, if the subsequent trial’s 
FP is shorter compared to the FP of the preceding trial, then reaction times increase. Two accounts 
explain these effects as strategic adjustments in preparation while the remaining third one explains 
the reaction time effects in terms of trace conditioning. The first strategic account states that the 
decrease in reaction times is due to an increase in the probability of the imperative stimulus with 
increasing FP duration (i.e. the conditional probability of the imperative stimulus). In the ideal case, 
reaction times should decrease in direct proportion to the increase in conditional probability of the 
imperative stimulus (i.e. hazard function). Note that this account explains the FP effect only. The 
second strategic account postulates that participants expect a repetition of just experienced 
foreperiod duration. If the foreperiod is shorter, then participants, in expecting a longer foreperiod, 
are not yet prepared to respond: reactions are slower. By contrast, if the foreperiod is longer than 
expected, then participants re-prepare and responses do not suffer from the incorrect assumption of 
foreperiod repetition. This account, designed to explain sequential effects, also accounts for the FP 
effect. The trace conditioning account explains both sequential effects and the FP effect. 
Preparatory activity is shaped by reinforcement and extinction. If the imperative event occurs some 
time after the warning stimulus, then that moment in time is reinforced and preparatory activity is 
higher at and around that moment in time on the subsequent trial. This explains the sequential 
effects. All moments in time before the imperative event are subjected to extinction. By contrast, 
preparatory activity associated with moments in time after the imperative event remains unaffected. 
This asymmetry in reinforcement and extinction explains the FP effect. The strategic accounts 
predict that explicit cues informative about the timing of the imperative event remove effects of 
temporal uncertainty. According to the trace conditioning account, effects should persist. 
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By contrast, the conditioning account explains temporal preparation as 
consequences of trace conditioning rather than strategic adjustments in response to 
(changing) information about the timing of the imperative event (e.g. Los et al., 2001; 
Los & van den Heuvel, 2001; Los & Heslenfeld 2005). Put simply, the IS is thought to 
act as an unconditioned stimulus that elicits a motor response. The WS acts as a 
conditioning stimulus that prompts preparatory activity. The time course of this 
preparatory activity following the WS is shaped by reinforcement and extinction 
determined by when the IS has occurred in the past. Central to this idea is that the 
moment of IS occurrence is reinforced, and preparatory activity on the following trial 
is therefore higher at and around that time. At the same time, moments before the IS 
are subject to extinction (Los, 2004), whereas preparatory activity for moments after 
the IS is not affected. Preparatory activity for earlier moments therefore decreases, 
but remains unchanged for later ones. Thus, there is an asymmetry between 
reinforcement and extinction for short versus long FPs: long FPs are subject to 
reinforcement only, short FPs are subject to both reinforcement and extinction. 
Finally, the conditioned response is assumed to have the scalar property (Los et al., 
2001).  
The single-process conditioning account can explain both the FP and the 
sequential effects (Los et al., 2001): reinforced preparatory activity from previous 
trials carries over to the next trial giving rise to the sequential effects. The FP effect is 
explained by the asymmetry in reinforcement and extinction. Responses for long FP 
are faster because they are subjected to extinction to a lesser extent than short FPs.  
 
In principle, all three accounts may hold at the same time: participants may 
keep track of the conditional probability of the IS whilst being influenced by the FP 
duration of the previous trial (Alegria & Delhaye-Rembaux, 1975; Los & Agter, 2005). 
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A part of preparatory adjustments over time may be deliberate and a part conditioned 
and automatic. Because the conditioning account explains FP and sequential effects 
as consequences of trace conditioning, explicit and reliable cues informative about 
FP duration should not eliminate these effects (Los & van den Heuvel, 2001; Los & 
Heslenfeld, 2005). Indeed, several studies have reported attenuated but not 
eliminated FP and sequential effects when information about the duration of the FP 
was provided (Los & van den Heuvel, 2001; Los & Heslenfeld, 2005) supporting the 
single-process conditioning account. 
By contrast, using the logic of double dissociation, recent neuropsychological 
studies (Vallesi, Mussoni, et al., 2007), developmental studies (Vallesi & Shallice, 
2007), and work applying transcranial magnetic stimulation in a cognitive lesion 
paradigm (Vallesi, Shallice, et al., 2007) provide evidence that that sequential effects 
and the FP effect have a different origin and are supported by different neural 
substrates. Moreover, Los and colleagues could recently show that sequential effects 
can be reversed through different cognitive strategies (Los & Horoufchin, 2011). 
Collectively, these results suggest that the FP effect cannot be a mere consequence 
of the processes underlying the sequential effects (Vallesi, Mussoni, et al., 2007; 
Vallesi & Shallice, 2007; Vallesi, Shallice, et al., 2007), and favour the proposal that 
preparatory adjustments are, at least in part, due to changes in IS probability.  
Taken together, previous studies on temporal preparation, using the constant 
or variable FP paradigm, have revealed how temporal uncertainty shapes temporal 
preparation. While different accounts can explain changes in preparation over time, 
they differ regarding the cues that are used for temporal preparation and underlying 
mechanisms. Importantly, however, neither explicitly addressed the role of the 
different sources of temporal uncertainty (i.e. ETU and ITU), and how these may 
affect the foreperiod or sequential effects, respectively. We single out effects of ETU 
and ITU on temporal expectation and preparation (Chapter 1). Further, we remove 
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ITU selectively to study effects of ETU in isolation (Chapter 1). Designed primarily to 
explore effects of ETU and ITU on temporal expectation and preparation, we aim to 
put the strategic and the conditioning account to the test. 
Interaction between ETU, ITU and event uncertainty  
ETU and ITU may not only affect temporal expectation and preparation. 
These two types of temporal uncertainty may also interact with the use of advance 
information about the type of the forthcoming imperative event, and consequently, 
the preparation of the appropriate motor response (event preparation). In other 
words, ETU and ITU may interact with uncertainty about the type of the forthcoming 
motor response prompted by the imperative event (event uncertainty). 
Action preparation typically benefits from low event uncertainty. Choice 
reaction times, for example, are lower when there are only a few possible alternative 
responses compared to when there are many (Fitts, 1954; Fitts & Peterson, 1964; 
Hick, 1952; Hyman, 1953; Schneider & Anderson, 2011). There is evidence that 
event and temporal uncertainty independently affect action preparation. First, 
advance information about when to act is beneficial even if the response required by 
the environment does not correspond to the action that was prepared. For example, 
Holender and Bertelson found that frequent (75%) and infrequent (25%) responses 
prompted by imperative events benefit to the same extent from low temporal 
uncertainty (Holender & Bertelson, 1975) but see (Bertelson & Barzeele, 1965). 
Further, even when participants do not know what action to prepare, when action 
alternatives are equally likely, preparation still benefits from information about when 
to act (Bertelson & Boons, 1960).  
Second, information about when to act improves action preparation even if 
the imperative event is incompatible with the motor response prompted by it. For 
example, Spijkers and Walter manipulated semantic stimulus-response compatibility, 
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foreperiod duration, and movement duration (Spijkers & Walter, 1985). Imperative 
stimuli, after a constant foreperiod, instructed short or fast sliding movements. 
Participants were instructed to respond to an imperative stimulus that instructed a 
fast movement with a fast (compatible) or slow sliding movement (incompatible) or 
vice versa. The effects of stimulus-response compatibility, foreperiod duration, and 
movement duration were strictly additive (see also Meulenbroek & Van Galen, 1988; 
Spijkers, 1990). 
Third, two neuroimaging studies suggest that the beneficial effect of knowing 
when to act does not depend on knowing what action to prepare. For example, Sakai 
et al. instructed participants to respond to auditory or visual stimuli with index or 
middle finger responses (Sakai et al., 2000). In one condition, the order of stimuli 
alternated; impending actions were fully predictable and event uncertainty was thus 
fully removed. In another condition, the order of stimuli was random and event 
uncertainty thus high. In addition, stimuli occurred after constant (i.e. low temporal 
uncertainty) or variable (i.e. high temporal uncertainty) foreperiods. Similarly, Cotti et 
al. used a variable foreperiod 2-choice reaction time task and removed event or 
temporal uncertainty by explicitly cueing either the motor action, or the duration of the 
foreperiod (Cotti, Rohenkohl, Stokes, Nobre, & Coull, 2011). Both studies report 
additive effects of event and temporal uncertainty. In addition, these studies report 
separable neural correlates for preparation for what to do and preparation for when 
to do it (Cotti et al., 2011; Sakai et al., 2000). 
These studies taken together thus suggest that preparation for what to do and 
preparation for when to do it are supported by two independent processes (Holender 
& Bertelson, 1975) which may take place at different and discrete processing stages 
(Sanders, 1990; Spijkers, 1990; Spijkers & Walter, 1985). Separable neural 
correlates for preparation for what to do and for when to do it are in agreement and 
further support this proposal. However, both Sakai et al. and Cotti et al. have also 
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reported shared neural correlates for preparation under temporal and event 
uncertainty (Cotti et al., 2011; Sakai et al., 2000). This suggests that the processing 
of temporal and event uncertainty for action preparation may not be entirely 
independent. More fundamentally, one problem of previous work is that the 
distinction between ETU and ITU was neglected. At the behavioural level, putative 
interaction effects between event and temporal uncertainty may cancel out when 
both ETU and ITU are experienced in conjunction (Bertelson & Boons, 1960; Sakai 
et al., 2000). For example, participants may benefit more from low ETU when event 
uncertainty is low, because they are then able to prepare the appropriate action at 
the appropriate time. By contrast, participants may be able to compensate for high 
ITU when they are not also simultaneously hampered by high event uncertainty. In 
chapter 3, we present a study on the interaction between ETU, ITU, and event 
uncertainty and demonstrate that indeed, the relation between event and temporal 
uncertainty depends on the origin of temporal uncertainty. 
The neurophysiology of action preparation under temporal 
uncertainty 
Effects of temporal expectation and preparation may be due to either sensory 
or motor preparation (Rolke & Ulrich, 2010). In the first case, knowing the timing of 
imperative events would positively influence the perception of imperative stimuli. In 
the latter case, motor preparation would benefit from advance information about 
action timing. Of course, advance information may affect both, sensory and motor 
processes. While there is some evidence that advance information about the 
forthcoming event and its timing affects sensory processing (Rolke & Ulrich, 2011), 
there is ample evidence for a contribution of motor preparation to the effects of 
temporal expectation. Using Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) to probe 
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neural excitability of the primary motor cortex, we explore the contribution of the 
motor system to temporal preparation. 
Introduction to Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) 
TMS is a powerful technique that allows probing, for example, neural 
excitability, plasticity, and functional connectivity of the brain non-invasively in 
healthy and clinical populations. TMS equipment consists of a TMS stimulator and a 
TMS coil. The fundamental operating principle of a TMS stimulator is to create a 
changing current in the TMS coil, which produces a changing magnetic field that, in 
turn, can induce a current in adjacent conductive tissue (e.g. cortical tissue), as 
prescribed by Faraday’s law (Epstein, 2008). If the TMS coil is placed upon the 
scalp, then this induced current interacts with cortical and, to a lesser extent, sub-
cortical neurons. At the heart of this interaction, there is a transfer of charge across 
the nerve membranes. Positive ions are driven into the cell, its intracellular potential 
rises, and if the rise is sufficient, an action potential results (Davey, 2008). 
Traditionally, TMS has been used to measure or “read out” neural excitability, 
primarily by giving one single TMS pulse over the primary motor cortex (M1) whilst 
recording electromyographic activity (EMG) in the stimulated target muscle. In 
addition, TMS allows the non-invasive study of intra-cortical (i.e. paired-pulse TMS) 
as well as inter-hemispheric inhibitory and excitatory circuits (i.e. double-coil TMS). 
Further, using two TMS coils, one can study the functional connectivity of the brain 
by measuring the effect of a conditioning pulse, delivered to an area other than M1, 
on the MEP elicited by a single TMS pulse over M1. Repetitive TMS (e.g. 1Hz, 5Hz) 
induces changes in neural activity of the stimulated area and allows, as such, the 
non-invasive study of brain plasticity. Finally, in combination with behavioural 
experiments, TMS can be used to explore the functional relevance of a particular 
brain area to specific behaviour in cognitive lesion paradigms (Walsh & Cowey, 
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1998). We here limit ourselves to the discussion of on single and paired-pulse TMS 
protocols. 
Using TMS to measure neural excitability 
Single-pulse TMS over the primary motor cortex elicits a motor-evoked 
potential (MEP) in the target muscle. The amplitude and latency of the MEP are 
informative about cortico-spinal excitability (CSE) of the corticospinal representation 
of the target muscle (Roesler & Magistris, 2008). MEPs are caused by descending 
corticospinal volleys that bring spinal motor neurons from the resting state to the 
firing level. Spinal motor neurons may discharge more than once because of the 
nature of the descending corticospinal volley which contains a succession of a D-
wave (D – direct) and multiple I-waves (I – indirect) converging upon spinal motor 
neuron (Roesler & Magistris, 2008). D-waves are most likely due to direct activation 
of the axons of fast pyramidal tract neurons. I-waves are caused by indirect, 
transsynaptic activation of the corticospinal tract, most likely, by excitatory intra-
cortical neurons which synapse onto pyramidal neurons (Roesler & Magistris, 2008). 
Typically, there are one to four I-waves (I1 – I4-wave). Higher intensity stimulation 
causes more I-waves, with higher amplitude, with an inter-peak interval of 1.4ms 
(Roesler & Magistris, 2008). Multiple I-waves are most likely due to activation of the 
pyramidal tract neurons by a chain of cortical excitatory interneurons. Thus, the MEP, 
measured by surface EMG over the target muscle, is a summation of the D- and I-
waves and reflects, as such, excitability of excitatory interneurons, pyramidal tract 
neurons, and spinal motor neurons.  
To assess the contribution of changes in excitability of spinal motor neurons 
to the MEP, one can compare changes in MEP evoked by single pulse TMS to the 
EMG signature of Hoffmann’s reflex (H-reflex). The H-reflex is an analogue of the 
stretch reflex and is evoked by electrical stimulation of sensory fibres, more 
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specifically, Ia-afferents stemming from muscle spindles. The H-reflex recruits 
predominantly small spinal motor neurons. As such, any changes in the H-reflex are 
informative about changes in spinal excitability. If there are no changes in spinal 
excitability while MEP size has changed, then the origin of the latter is exclusively 
cortical. 
Using TMS to measure intra-cortical inhibition 
Paired-pulse TMS protocols allow non-invasive study of excitatory and 
inhibitory intra-cortical circuits in M1 (for a review, see Chen, 2004). There are a 
number of distinct paired-pulse protocols probing short and long intra-cortical 
inhibition (SICI, LICI), as well as (short) intra-cortical facilitation (SICF, ICF). We here 
concentrate on SICI and LICI, which are, by far the most heavily studied intra-cortical 
circuits in M1. SICI is measured by giving two pulses over the same area through 
one TMS coil with an inter-pulse-interval of 1-5ms (Kujirai et al., 1993). The first 
pulse is given at 70-80% and the second pulse above rMT. SICI leads to a 50-90% 
reduction of MEP amplitude primarily due to a reduction of later I-waves (I2 - I4). 
Most likely, SICI is generated by synaptic inhibitory mechanisms at the level of local 
interneurons in close proximity to the corticospinal neurons of the target muscle in 
M1. Pharmacological studies have revealed that SICI relies crucially on GABAA 
receptor driven neurotransmission (GABA: γ-aminobutric acid; Florian, Müller-
Dahlhaus, Liu, & Ziemann, 2008). GABAA receptors are ligand-gated ion channels 
with a comparatively fast response (Connors, Malenka, & Silva, 1988; McCormick, 
1989; McCormick & Williamson, 1989), consistent with the comparatively short 
duration of SICI (< 20ms). 
By contrast, long intra-cortical inhibition (LICI) acts over a much longer time 
scale (< 200ms; Connors et al., 1988; McCormick, 1989; McCormick & Williamson, 
1989). LICI is measured by giving two TMS pulses above rMT with an interpulse 
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interval ranging from 50 to 200ms. LICI leads to a significant reduction of MEP 
amplitude primarily due to a reduction of later I-waves (I2 - I4). LICI is mediated by 
GABAB receptor driven neurotransmission (McDonnell, Orekhov, & Ziemann, 2006). 
These receptors are G-protein coupled receptors with a comparatively slow response 
(Sakaba & Neher, 2003).  
The different time course and pharmacological profile of SICI and LICI 
suggest that these two types of intra-cortical inhibition are mediated by two distinct 
populations of inhibitory interneurons (Di Lazzaro et al., 2005, 2007; Di Lazzaro et 
al., 2006). Nevertheless, SICI and LICI interact: at rest LICI inhibits SICI, possibly 
pre-synaptically via GABAB receptor mediated transmission (Cash et al. 2010; Chu et 
al. 2008; Florian et al. 2008; Sanger et al. 2001). Such interactions can be studied by 
combining paired-pulse protocols to activate both intra-cortical circuits 
simultaneously. In this case, the SICI protocol is preceded by a TMS pulse above 
rMT with the inter-pulse interval characteristic for LICI (50-100ms). 
SICI, and LICI, as well as SICF, and ICF may all contribute to overt (motor) 
behaviour, for example, the preparation for action under conditions of event and 
temporal uncertainty. The functional relevance of distinct excitatory and inhibitory 
circuits, however, is not yet clear. MEP amplitude increases in the target muscle 
shortly before motor action (Mars, Bestmann, Rothwell, & Haggard, 2007) while SICI 
decreases (Reynolds & Ashby, 1999; Soto, Valls-Sole, & Kumru, 2010), consistent 
with the proposal that SICI sub-serves volitional inhibition of action (Sohn, Wiltz, & 
Hallett, 2002). The first finding reflects an increasing recruitment of motor neurons 
underlying forthcoming motor action, whereas the latter reveals that inhibitory 
processes may regulate the timing of forthcoming motor response by ‘keeping the 
breaks on’ until it is time to move (Floeter & Rothwell, 1999). Previous studies on the 
time-course of CSE prior to imperative signals during the preparatory period suggest 
that there are multiple excitatory and inhibitory processes that underlie preparation 
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for event and temporal preparation (Duque et al., 2005; Duque & Ivry, 2009; Duque, 
Lew, Mazzocchio, Olivier, & Ivry, 2010). 
Functional relevance of inhibitory & excitatory circuits for action preparation 
CSE changes throughout the preparatory period prior to imperative events. 
These changes in excitability suggest that two (Davranche et al., 2007; Duque et al., 
2010), possibly three (Hasbroucq, Kaneko, Akamatsu, & Possamaï, 1997, 1999; 
Hasbroucq, Osman, et al., 1999), processes may underlie preparation for imperative 
events and motor action. First, selection, preparation, and successful execution of 
motor action may be implemented by a relative increase in CSE in the corticospinal 
representation of the selected and thus prepared action (response competition; 
Bestmann et al., 2008; Cisek, 2006, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2005, 2010; Duque et 
al., 2010; Michelet, Duncan, & Cisek, 2010). This relative difference in CSE for the 
prepared versus unprepared action may be due to either an increase in CSE for the 
prepared action (van Elswijk, Kleine, Overeem, & Stegeman, 2007) or a decrease in 
CSE for the unprepared alternative (Duque & Ivry, 2009), or both. Second, during 
preparation for action, an adaptive mechanism may selectively suppress neural 
excitability for the prepared action to prevent premature responses before the 
imperative event (impulse control; Duque & Ivry, 2009; Duque et al., 2010; Floeter & 
Rothwell, 1999). Third, an adaptive mechanism may prepare the corticospinal 
representation of the selected action to receive and implement the voluntary motor 
command by decreasing its background noise (i.e. task-unrelated afferents; noise 
reduction) leading to an overall decrease in CSE for the prepared action (Burle, 
Bonnet, Vidal, Possamaï, & Hasbroucq, 2002; Hasbroucq et al., 1997; Hasbroucq, 
Kaneko, et al., 1999; Hasbroucq, Osman, et al., 1999).  
While these three accounts link changes in CSE to preparatory processes in 
anticipation of the imperative event (and the ensuing motor response), changes in 
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CSE prior to the imperative event may also be due to processes unrelated to the 
imperative event and ensuing motor action. The warning stimulus, for example, may 
trigger (sub-threshold) motor activity (Boulinguez, Jaffard, Granjon, & Benraiss, 
2008), which, in turn, may cause a transient increase in CSE for the instructed 
action. This highlights the potential functional relevance of a putative process that 
suppresses responses to non-imperative events. This process may act when the 
imperative event is less likely to happen. As such, this process could contribute 
critically to temporal preparation. Further, gradual changes in CSE throughout the 
preparatory period may reflect processes that underlie ‘keeping track of time’ 
(Janssen & Shadlen, 2005; Leon & Shadlen, 2003; Mita et al., 2009) which may not 
be directly related to temporal or event preparation. Fixed or constant foreperiod (FP) 
designs (Hasbroucq et al., 1997; Hasbroucq, Kaneko, et al., 1999; Hasbroucq, 
Osman, et al., 1999), or variable FP designs when the time of the TMS is locked to 
the warning stimulus (i.e. constant delay between warning stimulus and TMS), are 
particularly vulnerable to these two alternative explanations for changes in CSE 
throughout the preparatory period. In chapter 4, we explore whether changes in CSE 
can be described best by response competition, impulse control, or noise reduction 
by removing ETU and ITU (Experiment 1) or targeted manipulation of ETU 
(Experiment 2). We further aim to exclude non-motor explanations for changes in 
CSE during preparation for action.  
Chapter 5 present an experiment that aims to further elucidate the functional 
role of SICI and LICI in preparation for action. CSE is shaped by intra- and inter-
cortical excitatory and inhibitory circuits that increase or decrease CSE, respectively. 
Thus, distinct inhibitory or excitatory intra-cortical circuits may have functional 
significance in preparation for action, supporting either response competition, 
impulse control, or, noise reduction. Recent studies have reported decreasing CSE 
during the preparatory period, which highlights the importance of inhibitory processes 
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during preparation for action (Davranche et al., 2007; Duque & Ivry, 2009; Duque et 
al., 2010; Hasbroucq et al., 1997; Hasbroucq, Kaneko, et al., 1999; Hasbroucq, 
Osman, et al., 1999; Soto et al., 2010); although a decrease in CSE may also be 
caused by a removal of excitation (i.e. disinhibition). SICI and LICI, for example, may 
contribute to the time-course of CSE during preparation for action. However, the 
functional significance of SICI, and in particular LICI, during selection and 
preparation for action remains unclear. The different time courses of GABAA and 
GABAB receptor mediated intra-cortical inhibition suggest that LICI and SICI may 
play different functional roles (Chen, 2004). SICI could take on a functional role that 
requires high temporal precision, such as preventing the premature release of 
prepared action (impulse control; Floeter and Rothwell 1999; Hasbroucq et al. 1997, 
1999; Reynolds and Ashby 1999) due to the fast response of GABAAR. LICI on the 
other hand could contribute to the prevention of responses to non-imperative stimuli, 
as this form of inhibition needs to be maintained tonically to prevent unwanted 
actions to non-imperative stimuli. Alternatively, LICI could prevent the execution of 
non-selected action alternatives tonically suppressing their neural representations 
(contributing to response competition). The comparatively slow response of GABABR 
makes LICI a good candidate for taking on one of these two functional roles that 
require tonic suppression. 
ETU and ITU in reward-based decision making 
Uncertainty or advance information about future events should also affect 
decisions about which action alternative to commit to, in particular when expected 
reward decreases with increasing uncertainty. Consider jumping from one boat to 
another in a choppy sea. The key factors that should affect your choice are your 
probability of success and the costs and benefits you anticipate as consequences of 
success and failure (ruining your clothes, exciting laughter, etc.). Your probability of 
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success depends on both the external erratic movements of the boat and your own 
internal motor uncertainty (i.e. how good you are at jumping). In deciding whether to 
jump or not, both types of uncertainty need to be taken into account as they have 
equivalent effects on outcome: it makes little difference whether your woeful state, in 
case of failure, resulted from an unexpected lurch by the boat or a particularly 
maladroit jump. Combining uncertainty from external and internal sources to estimate 
the expected costs and benefits is a key challenge in deciding between alternative 
actions. In chapter 6, we examine the ability to estimate and combine ETU and ITU 
in a reward-based decision making task that puts a premium on the accurate timing 
of motor actions. 
For the most part, previous studies on decision making have focused on the 
effects of either external or internal uncertainty on reward-based decision-making. 
The scientific study on the effects of external risk and uncertainty on choice has a 
long-standing tradition in psychology and economics (Allais, 1953; Friedman & 
Savage, 1948; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000; 
Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992). Further, the neural mechanisms underlying choice under external risk and 
uncertainty have received much attention in recent years (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005; 
Dayan & Daw, 2008; De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Rushworth, 
Noonan, Boorman, Walton, & Behrens, 2011; Trepel, Fox, & Poldrack, 2005). 
Typically, participants exhibit patterned deviations from optimal performance in the 
face of external uncertainty. For example, participants overestimate the probability of 
infrequent events and display risk aversion (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
Perception and action, however, are intrinsically uncertain, too (Bays & 
Wolpert, 2007; Wolpert, 2007). Visuo-motor decision tasks (“motor lotteries”) and 
economic decision tasks can be translated into a common mathematical language 
(i.e. statistical decision theory), which allows comparison of performance under 
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external and internal uncertainty (Trommershäuser, Maloney, & Landy, 2003, 2008). 
In these tasks, participants typically, but not always (Trommershäuser, 2009), select 
actions that take into account their own visual and motor uncertainties and come 
close to maximizing expected reward (Gepshtein, Seydell, & Trommershäuser, 2007; 
Seydell, McCann, Trommershäuser, & Knill, 2008; Trommershäuser, Gepshtein, 
Maloney, Landy, & Banks, 2005; Trommershäuser, Landy, & Maloney, 2006). 
Patterned deviation in choice under conditions of external but not internal 
uncertainty suggests a fundamental difference between these two types of 
uncertainty. In Chapter 6, an experiment is presented which looks at choice under 
conditions of ETU and ITU to elucidate the possible differences. 
Reducing ITU through integration of multiple cues 
Performance often relies on the accurate perception of time. An accurate 
estimate of the “go-signal” improves a sprinters performance. ITU limits accuracy of 
time estimates. So far, we have treated ITU as a quantity that may or may not 
interfere with temporal expectation and preparation, or reduce expected outcome, 
unless it is reduced or removed by accurate external clocks. Participants may use 
other strategies, though, in the absence of accurate external clocks, to reduce ITU. 
Multiple cues may be informative about the appropriate time for action. Participants 
may combine this information provided by multiple cues to reduce ITU, a 
phenomenon typically known as “cue combination” or “cue integration”.  
There are many examples of successful cue integration in the literature. 
Integration of visual and haptic information improves depth perception (Ernst & 
Banks, 2002; Girshick & Banks, 2009; Hillis, Ernst, Banks, & Landy, 2002; Hillis, 
Watt, Landy, & Banks, 2004; Johnston, Cumming, & Landy, 1994; Knill, 2007; Knill & 
Saunders, 2003). Localization of one’s own limbs (Sober & Sabes, 2005; van Beers, 
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Wolpert, & Haggard, 2002), or entire body (Fetsch, DeAngelis, & Angelaki, 2010; 
Fetsch, Turner, DeAngelis, & Angelaki, 2009) improves through the integration of 
visual and proprioceptive information. Finally, motor performance improves through 
the integration of visual and proprioceptive information with the efference copy, a 
prediction about the sensorimotor consequences of motor actions (Bays & Wolpert, 
2007; van Beers, Baraduc, & Wolpert, 2002; Wolpert, 2007). In the final chapter, we 
explore whether participants can combine temporal information from multiple cues to 
reduce ITU and improve their timing performance. 
 
Taken together, this thesis presents a series of studies that explore the 
effects of ETU and ITU on temporal expectation and preparation, including 
neurophysiological correlates, and reward-based choice. Finally, we address a 
possibility to reduce ITU by integrating multiple cues all informative about action 
timing. As such, this thesis (re-)introduces two types of temporal uncertainty, ETU 
and ITU, largely overlooked since introduced by Klemmer (Klemmer, 1956, 1957). 
The studies presented here reveal distinct effects of ETU and ITU on temporal 
expectation and preparation, their neural underpinnings, and reward-based choice, 
highlighting the importance of the distinction between ETU and ITU for empirical 
research on explicit and implicit timing in the interval timing range. In short, the origin 
of uncertainty matters for a wide range of behaviour. 
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Chapter 2: The effects of external and internal temporal 
uncertainty on preparation for action 
Preparation for imperative events relies on accurate estimates about their time of 
occurrence. The accuracy of such estimates is limited by variability of events in time 
(ETU: External Temporal Uncertainty) and our limited capacity to measure time 
accurately (ITU: Internal Temporal Uncertainty). In a series of three experiments, we 
asked how these two types of temporal uncertainty interact, whether they can be 
dissociated from one another, and whether their effects arise from strategic 
adjustments in action preparation or automatic conditioning processes. Participants 
performed a modified implicit perceptual timing task with variable foreperiod (FPs) 
durations. ETU and ITU were manipulated in a factorial fashion (Experiment 1). In 
Experiment 2 reliable information about the passage of time removed ITU. In 
Experiment 3, information about the timing of the imperative event removed ETU in 
addition to ITU. Our results demonstrate that overall preparation (mean RT) and 
consistency in preparation (variability in RT) are affected by both ETU and ITU. While 
participants benefit from low ETU, high ITU can mask these beneficial effects. 
Sequential effects – the effect of the duration of the foreperiod of a preceding trial on 
current reaction time – are stronger for high levels of ETU. Removal of both ETU and 
ITU abolishes sequential effects. The strength of the FP effect increases with high 
ETU but decreases under conditions of high ITU. Again, removal of ETU and ITU 
abolishes the FP effect. Results thus support strategic accounts on temporal 
processing: explicit and reliable information about the timing of the imperative event 
removes effects of ETU and ITU. Further, ETU and ITU have distinct effects on 
temporal preparation. Two distinct processes may be concerned with the estimation of 
ETU and ITU and differentially affect preparation for action in an (temporally) 
uncertainty world. 
Keywords: action preparation, implicit timing, external temporal uncertainty, internal 
temporal uncertainty, temporal orienting, foreperiod paradigm, temporal expectation 
Time is a fundamental dimension of motor planning and performance 
(Woodrow, 1914). In many situations, temporal uncertainty limits the accuracy with 
which one can predict the timing of future imperative events, often with detrimental 
effects on behavioural performance. Accuracy is limited by both variability of events 
in time (ETU: External Temporal Uncertainty) and our limited capacity to measure 
time accurately (ITU: Internal Temporal Uncertainty). ETU and ITU are both likely to 
influence motor planning and performance (Klemmer, 1956, 1957), yet little is known 
about the specific effects of these two types of temporal uncertainty on preparation 
for action: whether they interact, and how possible interaction may affect the time 
course of action preparation. Crucially, the fundamentally different nature of these 
two sources of temporal uncertainty suggests differential effects on behaviour. 
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In a series of three experiments, we here asked how these two types of 
temporal uncertainty influence action preparation using a variable foreperiod (FP) 
simple reaction time task (Niemi & Naatanen, 1981). We specifically assessed how 
ETU and ITU affect the hallmark features of implicit timing: the foreperiod effect 
(Bueti et al., 2010; Jean Requin & Granjon, 1969) and sequential effects (S. Los et 
al., 2001). The foreperiod effect may reflect either strategic adjustments in 
preparation that mirror the increase in the probability of the imperative event with 
elapsed foreperiod duration (i.e. the hazard function; Nobre, Correa, & Coull, 2007; 
Requin & Granjon, 1969) or emerge as a side-effect of the sequential effects. 
Sequential effects are either due to strategic and dynamic adjustments in preparation 
due to an expectation of foreperiod repetition with ensuing re-preparation if the 
imperative event occurs later than expected (Drazin, 1961) or emerge from trace-
conditioning (Los et al., 2001). Trace conditioning explains sequential effects as a 
consequence of automatic adjustments in preparation. 
Previous studies have focused either on the effects of ITU in constant FP 
paradigms (P Bertelson, 1967), or on the effects of combined ETU and ITU in 
Figure 2.1: External (ETU) and internal (ITU) temporal uncertainty. A. ETU (left) is induced by 
variability in the timing of imperative events. With increasing variability, their timing is harder to 
predict, which leads to higher levels of ETU. B. ITU (right) is induced by noisy internal clocks. 
Internal temporal noise increases with longer to-be-estimated time intervals, which leads to higher 
standard deviation in time interval estimates centred on their true duration (right bottom graph). The 
level of ITU therefore increases with increasing time interval duration. 
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variable FP paradigms (P Bertelson & Tisseyre, 1968; Bueti et al., 2010; S. Los et 
al., 2001; S. Los & Schut, 2008). Crucially, no study to date has yet studied and 
directly compared how temporal preparation is shaped by ETU and ITU, respectively. 
We investigated how ETU and ITU shape temporal preparation using a factorial 
design in which we varied the degree of ETU and ITU independently. Moreover, in 
separate experiments, we explicitly removed ITU, or both ITU and ETU. The latter 
allowed us to test the predictions made by the strategic versus (trace) conditioning 
account of temporal preparation. The conditioning account predicts residual effects of 
ETU and ITU even if both are removed by explicit accurate information (S A Los & 
van den Heuvel, 2001; S. Los & Heslenfeld, 2005). The strategic accounts, by 
contrast, do not predict such residual effects under conditions of full advance 
information about the timing of the imperative event (Jean Requin & Granjon, 1969). 
Removal of ITU, by contrast, allows for studying the effects of ETU in isolation. 
We specifically focused on the impact of ETU and ITU on average response 
times, their variability, and how ETU and ITU modulate the FP and sequential effects. 
The latter two are of particular interest because they can reveal the specific 
processes through which these two types of temporal uncertainty modulate 
preparation and provide evidence in support of the aforementioned strategic versus 
conditioning accounts of temporal preparation. 
In all three experiments, we manipulated FP variability and mean duration. In 
Experiment 1, participants did not receive advance information about the timing of 
the imperative events. Consequently they experienced both ETU, due to FP 
variability, and ITU, due to having to keep track of the passage of time. We expected 
beneficial effects of low ETU and low ITU on action preparation – the less overall 
temporal uncertainty, the better our ability to anticipate and prepare for imperative 
events. Moreover, we also expected that high ITU might interfere with learning of 
temporal predictability of imperative events and might therefore reduce beneficial 
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effects of low ETU. For similar reasons, we predicted an attenuation of the FP effect 
for high ITU, whereas ETU should not significantly alter the FP effect. Both the 
strategic account and the conditioning account predict an attenuation of sequential 
effects under conditions of high ITU, because ITU limits the precision with which 
participants can prepare for the anticipated FP repetition. 
In Experiment 2, we asked whether the effects of ITU can be selectively 
removed by providing participants with reliable information about the passage of time 
(Borst & Cohen, 1987) whilst preserving inter-trial differences in mean FP duration. 
Successful removal of the effects of ITU on action preparation would suggest that the 
processes underlying these effects are (a) under cognitive control and (b) fully 
dissociable from processes underlying the effects of ETU. 
In Experiment 3, we asked whether the combined effects of ETU and ITU are 
under cognitive control. We removed both ETU and ITU by providing continuous 
information about the passage of time and the exact time of occurrence of the IS 
(Borst & Cohen, 1987; Carlsen & Mackinnon, 2010) whilst preserving differences in 
mean FP duration and variability. Siding with the strategic account and assuming 




47 participants (10 male, 2 left-handed; mean age 23.8 years, range: 18-45 
years) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision took part in this study (Experiment 1: 
N = 18, Experiment 2: N = 15, Experiment 3: N = 14).  Participants were recruited via 
the participants’ database of the Department of Psychology of University College 
London and reimbursed for time and travel (£7.50/h). Before participation, 
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participants gave written informed consent. This study was conducted with the 
approval of a local ethics committee and in line with the declaration of Helsinki. 
Apparatus 
The experiment was run on a desktop computer, using the cogent 2000 
toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php) running under Matlab 8.5 
(Mathworks, Natick, MA). Stimuli were presented on a 19’ LCD screen with a refresh 
rate of 60Hz. Participants sat in a reclining chair 40 cm in front of the screen and 
responded by pressing the V-key and M-key with their left and right index finger, 
respectively, on a standard QWERTY keyboard. Throughout the experiment, 
participants wore headphones. They received an auditory stimulus of 50 ms at 400 
Hz (60 dB) as error feedback (see below). All visual stimuli subtended approximately 
5 degrees of visual angle. 
Experimental procedure & design 
Participants completed a variable FP simple reaction time task. They were 
instructed to respond to the appearance of an imperative stimulus (IS) as fast as 
possible but not at the expense of accuracy (Figure 2.1). FPs were sampled from 
continuous truncated normal distributions. We manipulated mean FP duration (mean 
= 1500 / 3000ms) and FP variability (standard deviation = 100 / 600ms). By 
increasing mean FP duration, one can manipulate ITU (unless one uses special 
measures to remove ITU, see description of Experiment 2) because accuracy of time 
interval estimation decreases in direct proportion to time interval duration (J Gibbon, 
1977). Higher FP variability increases ETU by increasing the variability in the timing 
of IS occurrence (unless ETU is removed otherwise, see description of Experiment 
3). 
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Figure 2.2: Modified variable foreperiod reaction time task. A. Trials started with presentation of 
a fixation cross (200 ms). After a blank screen (300 ms), participants were presented with a simple 
clock superimposed on a red square. Appearance of the clock served as the warning stimulus (WS). 
The clock hand started turning upon presentation. Arrows above and below the clock instructed the 
response (left or right hand button press). After a variable foreperiod (FP), the red square changed 
colour to green, which provided the imperative stimulus (IS) that prompted participants to respond 
as quickly as possible with the instructed finger. The WS provided an endogenous temporal cue, 
whereas the FP duration of the previous trial served as an exogenous cue. The time since trial onset 
determines the conditional probability of IS occurrence (hazard function). In Experiment 1 the clock 
started at the 6 o’clock position and moved back and forth in a random walk. It therefore did not 
provide reliable information about the passage of time. In Experiment 2, the clock hand started at 
the 12 o’clock position and completed one full rotation. This provided reliable information about the 
passage of time thus removing ITU. In Experiment 3, the clock hand started in the 12 o’clock 
position and completed one full rotation. The return to the 12 o’clock position coincided with 
presentation of the IS. This provided explicit and reliable information about the time of IS 
occurrence, and therefore removed both ETU and ITU. B. Foreperiods (FPs) were sampled from 
continuous Gaussian distributions (top left, see probability density function), where the mean 
manipulated ITU (1500 / 3000ms) and the standard deviation manipulated ETU (100 / 600ms). The 
bottom left graph shows the cumulative Gaussian distributions, the top right the survival function and 
bottom right the hazard rate. The hazard rate is the ratio of the probability density function to the 
survival function. The hazard rate of the imperative stimulus (IS) increases progressively with the 
passage of time. Note the earlier rise in conditional probability for low ITU, and the steeper slope for 
low ETU. 
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For short mean FP durations (1500 ms), the normal distribution was truncated 
at 500ms, which has been suggested as the minimum time required for preparation 
(Hackley, 2009; Hackley et al., 2009). Truncation at 2500ms (max. FP duration) 
preserved the symmetry of the normal distribution (Figure 2.2). To ensure 
comparable standard deviations for short and long mean FP duration, the same was 
done for the long mean FP duration (3000ms) condition. In this case, we truncated 
the normal distribution at 2000ms and 4000ms, respectively. 
Each trial started with presentation of a fixation cross for 200ms (Figure 2.1). 
After a delay of 300ms, participants saw an analogue clock, comprised of a white 
circle with a black clock hand. This clock was presented at the centre of the screen, 
superimposed on a red square. The clock hand started moving upon presentation. 
Above and below the clock were two arrows, which pointed either towards the left 
(50% of all trials) or towards the right. These arrows instructed the response (left / 
right button press) that was required at IS appearance, which was signalled by a 
change in colour of the central square from red to green. Inter-trial intervals were 
sampled from a non-ageing (exponential) distribution (mean = 500ms). 500ms were 
added to every sampled inter-trial interval. 
Prior to each experiment, participants completed a training session of 40 trials 
to familiarise themselves with the experiment. During training, participants received 
feedback whenever they made an error. Errors were of four types: (a) a premature 
response, (b) a slow response, more than 500ms after IS occurrence, (c) a response 
omission, or (d) an incorrect button press (i.e. left when instructed to press right). In 
case of incorrect responses, written feedback was displayed on the screen informing 
participants about the type of error they had made. In case of premature responses, 
participants heard a short warning tone (50ms) in addition. FPs for the training were 
sampled from a non-ageing (exponential) distribution with a mean of 1000ms. 300ms 
were added to every sampled delay. Any delay lower than 500ms was re-sampled 
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from the exponential distribution. We used this distribution during training to prevent 
participants from familiarising themselves with the specific distributions and the 
associated changes in hazard rate over the course of a trial that they would later 
experience during the main experiment.  
In all experiments, participants completed four blocks of 120 trials, one block 
for each experimental condition in our 2 x 2 factorial design. Participants took breaks 
every 40 trials within a block, and after completion of each block. During the 
experiment, participants did not receive trial-by-trial error feedback with the exception 
of the tone in case of premature responses. Instead, they received summary 
feedback every 20 trials. Feedback about the number of late response (reaction time 
> 500ms) and response omissions (> 1000ms) was given to encourage preparation 
and faster responses. 
Experiment 1: action preparation under conditions of ITU and ETU 
In Experiment 1, the clock hand moved forwards and backwards in a random 
walk, starting at the 6 o’clock position. Therefore, no information about the passage 
of time or the time of occurrence of the IS was conveyed by the clock. The speed of 
the clock hand was adjusted to the mean FP duration in that block. We included the 
clock in Experiment 1 to ensure comparable stimulus characteristics across 
experiments (see below). A separate control experiment (data not reported here) 
verified that changes in clock speed, which here co-varied with ITU, cannot explain 
the effects of ITU reported below. 
Experiment 2: action preparation under conditions of ETU, when ITU is removed 
In experiment 2, the clock hand completed one full rotation on average, 
starting at the 12 o’clock position, with the speed of the clock hand adjusted to the 
mean FP duration of a block. This provided constant feedback about the passage of 
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time, and therefore removed participants’ ITU whilst preserving differences in mean 
FP duration between conditions. Therefore, the factor ITU reduces to mean FP 
duration (meanFP) because the passage of time was not explicitly communicated to 
the participants. In other words, an accurate clock removed all ITU. But the clock did 
not allow for predicting the time of IS occurrence and therefore did not remove or 
reduce ETU. 
Experiment 3: action preparation in the absence of ETU and ITU  
In Experiment 3, the clock hand completed one full rotation on every single 
trial, starting at the 12 o’clock position, with the speed of the clock hand now adjusted 
to the duration of the specific FP on each trial. This provided continuous and reliable 
information about both the passage of time and the time of occurrence of the IS 
(return to the 12 o’clock position). Therefore, the factor ETU reduces to FP variability 
(FPvar), because subjects could fully predict when the IS would occur. The factor 
ITU reduces to mean FP duration (meanFP) because subjects were fully aware 
about the passage of time. In short, we removed ITU and ETU, whilst preserving 
differences in FP variability and mean FP duration between conditions. 
Data analyses 
Reaction time (RT) was defined as the time between the onset of the IS and 
the behavioural response. Responses were considered correct if the response was 
made after the presentation of the IS with the instructed finger. All trials with incorrect 
responses were excluded from the RT analyses. In addition, we excluded outliers in 
RTs (Grubb’s test, α = 0.05). Finally, participants with an overall error rate exceeding 
20% of all trials were excluded from further analyses. In all analyses, RTs were 
averaged across left (50%) and right hand responses (50%). 
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RT data were analysed in three different ways. Each analysis was aimed at 
exploring specific effects of ETU and ITU on preparation. First, we analysed how 
ETU and ITU influence how quickly and consistently participants responded to the IS. 
Second, we studied sequential effects under ETU and ITU, that is, the effect of the 
foreperiod of the preceding trial on current RTs. Third, we explored the effects of 
ETU and ITU on the FP effect, that is, how reaction times change depending on 
current foreperiod duration. 
For all analyses, we report partial 
€ 
ηp
2  as a measure of effect size. Significant 
interaction effects were followed-up using paired t-tests. Statistical threshold was 
fixed at 
€ 
α  = 0.05 and, whenever appropriate, corrected for multiple comparisons 
using Bonferroni correction. Greenhaus-Geisser correction was applied to degrees of 
freedom whenever significant Mauchly’s test signalled violation of sphericity. 
Analysis of reaction times and their variability 
To analyse distribution, central tendency, and consistency of participants’ 
RTs, we first constructed the cumulative frequency distribution of RTs for each 
participant separately and then fitted a sigmoid function to this distribution. A good fit 
of the sigmoid to the data suggests unimodally distributed RT data. The mid-point 
and slope provide convenient measures of central tendency and consistency (i.e. 
variability) in RTs, respectively. 
To construct the cumulative frequency distribution, we determined the size of 
the smallest data-set in the sample (Nmin(data-set)). Data-set was defined as all data-
points in one experimental condition for one participant. Due to exclusion of errors, 
the size of data-sets differed across conditions and participants. To match data-sets 
in sample size, we randomly selected Nmin(data-set) data-points from all data-sets that 
contained more data-points than the smallest data-set (see also (Bertelson & 
Barzeele, 1965; Hohle, 1965). Subsequently, we assigned ranks to all RTs for each 
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data-set separately, and sorted RTs according to their rank to obtain the cumulative 
frequency reaction time distribution for each experimental condition and participant 
separately (Bertelson & Barzeele, 1965; Hohle, 1965). As a consequence of 
matching data-sets in sample size, the upper and lower bound of these cumulative 
frequency distributions were identical across data-sets (=Nmin(data-set)) and each rank 
had the same “meaning”. For example, if Nmin(data-set) = 96 then the 48th reaction time 
constituted the median reaction time for each participants and condition.  
We then fitted sigmoid functions to these cumulative frequency RT 
distributions separately for each participant and experimental condition. As the 
estimated mid-point or slope may be biased by random selection of extreme RT 
values (which may or may not have been included when randomly selecting trials to 
match data-sets in sample size), we repeated our procedure 10.000 times and 
computed mid-point and the slope averaged across these repetitions.  
We then ran two 2 x 2 within-subject repeated measures ANOVAs on the 
average mid-point and slope with ITU and ETU as factors. Goodness of fit (R2-
adjusted), averaged across repetitions, was inspected to confirm that the data were 
unimodally distributed and indeed appropriately modelled by sigmoid functions. 
Analysis of sequential effects 
We tested for the effect of ITU and ETU on sequential effects. First, we 
standardised FP duration for each combination of ITU and ETU by subtracting the 
mean FP duration from sampled FPs and then dividing this difference by the 
standard deviation in FPs. This accounts for (experimentally manipulated) 
differences in mean FP and FP variability. Second, we created three equally spaced 
bins [-2, 0, +2] of standardised FP duration, and assigned each trial to one of these 
bins depending on the current trial’s FP duration and the immediately preceding 
trial’s FP duration. We chose three bins to ensure a sufficiently high number of trials 
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in each experimental condition defined by the current and preceding trial’s FP 
duration (12.7 trials on average). We then classified the data according to the nine 
combinations of the FP of the current trial (FPn; short, intermediate, long) and the FP 
of the preceding trial (FPn-1; short, intermediate, long). Third, we computed the mean 
reaction time for each experimental condition defined by the current and previous 
trial’s FP separately for each combination of ETU and ITU. 
We assessed the influence of temporal uncertainty on sequential effects in a 
3 x 3 x 2 x 2 within-subject repeated-measures ANOVA on mean reaction times with 
the following repeated measures factors: current FP (FPn: short, intermediate, long), 
preceding FP (FPn-1:short, intermediate, long), ETU (low, high), and ITU (low, high). 
As this analysis was conducted with the specific aim to look at sequential effects: any 
effect of FPn-1, in particular any interaction between FPn-1 and either ETU, ITU, or 
both, will therefore be of particular interest. While we do report all significant effects 
of the ANOVA, we focus on the discussion of sequential effects (effects of FPn-1) and 
their interaction with other factors. 
Analysis of the foreperiod (FP) effect  
To address how ITU and ETU influence the FP effect, we assessed the 
relation between FP duration and mean RTs. First, we standardised FPs separately 
for each experimental condition by subtracting the mean FP from sampled FPs and 
dividing this difference by the standard deviation in FPs. This procedure accounted 
for the differences in mean FP duration and FP variability in the experimental 
conditions. Subsequently, we created nine equally spaced bins of normalised FP 
duration (ranging from -2 to 2) and computed the average RT for each bin for each 
experimental condition and participant separately. We chose nine bins to ensure a 
sufficiently high number of trials in each bin (12.7 trials on average). Our conclusions 
did not change when using a slightly larger or smaller number of bins.  
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We fitted linear regression models to mean RTs against normalised FP 
duration, separately for each experimental condition and participant. During the 
experiment, FPs were sampled from truncated normal distributions. Consequently, 
linear regression models should provide a good approximation to the RT data if 
participants indeed showed evidence for the FP effect, that is, if participants RTs 
reflect the hazard rate (see Figure 2.1B). We used 
€ 
Radjusted2  as a measure of the 
goodness of fit. In addition, we extracted the linear regression coefficients, which 
reflect the change in RT with increasing FP duration. Negative regression coefficients 
reflect a decrease in RTs with increasing FP duration, as the FP effect would predict. 
To test for a modulation of the FP effect by ITU and / or ETU, we computed a 2 x 2 
repeated-measures ANOVA on regression coefficients with ITU (high, low) and ETU 
(high, low) as factors. Finally, to test whether regression coefficients reflected a 
significant RT change with FP duration, we tested regression coefficients against 
zero using one-sample t-tests. 
Results  
Effects of ETU and ITU on central tendency and variability in reaction times 
Experiment 1: action preparation under conditions of ITU and ETU 
6.9% of all trials (4.2% due to premature responses) were excluded from 
further analysis. The smallest data-set in the sample comprised 95 data-points (= 
Nmin(data-set)) after exclusion. The data were unimodally distributed, as revealed by 
good sigmoid fits and correspondingly high 
€ 
Radj2  (see Table 2.1). 
Participants responded significantly faster under conditions of low compared 
high ITU as revealed by a significant effect of ITU on the mid-point of the fitted 
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sigmoid (F(1,17) = 5.89, p = 0.027, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.257), which here served as a measure of 
central tendency (Figure 2.3). ETU had no effect on this measure. 
The ANOVA on slope by contrast revealed a significant interaction effect 
between ITU and ETU (F(1,17) = 7.09, p = 0.017, 
€ 
ηp
2   = 0.294). This interaction effect 
was driven by higher variability in RTs, expressed by a flattened cumulative RT 
frequency distribution, for high compared to low ETU but under conditions of low ITU 
only (t(17) = -2.40, p = 0.028). The slope for high and low ETU did not differ 
significantly under conditions of high ITU (t(17) = 1.22, p = 0.238). 
Experiment 2: action preparation under conditions of ETU, when ITU is removed 
5.0% of all trials (2.0% due to premature responses) were excluded from 
further analysis. The smallest sample in the dataset comprised 88 data-points 
(=Nmin(data-set)) after exclusion. The data were unimodally distributed as revealed by 
high 
€ 
Radj2  (see Table 2.1). 
Participants responded significantly faster under conditions of low compared 
to high ETU (F(1,14) = 51.56, p < 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.786). MeanFP by contrast had no 
effect on reaction times (F(1,14) = 0.55, p = 0.472, 
€ 
ηp
2= 0.037). Also, there was no 




The ANOVA on slope revealed higher variability in RT, expressed by a flatter 
cumulative frequency distribution of RTs, under conditions of high compared to low 
ETU (F(1,14) = 10.07, p = 0.007 
€ 
ηp
2= 0.418; see Figure 2.3). There was no effect of 
meanFP (F(1,14) = 0.26, p = 0.616, 
€ 
ηp
2= 0.016) and no interaction between ETU and 




 = 0.005). 
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Figure 2.3 Action preparation under conditions of external (ETU) and internal temporal 
uncertainty (ITU; Experiment 1), ETU and meanFP (Experiment 2), and FPvar and meanFP 
(Experiment 3). ADG. Sigmoid functions were fitted to cumulative reaction time frequency 
distributions. These functions provided good fits to the data as revealed by high R2-adjusted. BEH. 
Average mid-points of sigmoid fits – a measure of central tendency – for each experimental 
condition and experiment. B. Experiment 1: higher levels of ITU lead to significantly higher mid-
points thus revealing on average slower responses for high ITU. E. Experiment 2: high levels of ETU 
lead to slower responses for both short and long meanFP, while the effect of meanFP (ITU) 
disappeared. H. Experiment 3: no significant effects of meanFP and FPvar. CFI. Average slope of 
sigmoid fits – a measure of dispersion – for each experimental condition and experiment. C. 
Experiment 1: we found an increase in slope for high levels of ETU only when ITU was low. F. 
Experiment 2: we found an increase in slope for high ETU for both short and long meanFP. I. 
Experiment 3: No significant effects of meanFP and FPvar. Errorbars reflect standard error. 
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Experiment 3: action preparation in the absence of ETU and ITU  
3 subjects were excluded from the analysis as their overall error rate 
exceeded 20%, primarily due to premature responses. In addition 9.1% of all trials, 
6.6% due to premature responses, were omitted from further analysis. The smallest 
data-set in the sample comprised 84 data-points (= Nmin(data-set)) after exclusion. 
Inspection of 
€ 
Radj2  revealed that the data were unimodally distributed (Table 1). 
ANOVAs on mid-point and slope of fitted sigmoid functions did not reveal any 
significant effects of meanFP and FPvar. 
 
Taken together, explicit information about the timing of the IS removes any 
effects of mean foreperiod duration as well as foreperiod variability (Experiment 3). 
When participants are provided with an accurate external clock that removes ITU 
(Experiment 2), then low levels of ETU benefits performance both by decreasing the 
average time taken to respond and by increasing consistency in RTs. Under 
conditions of ETU and ITU, effects of ETU on the average time taken to respond 
disappear, probably masked by even relatively low levels of ITU. Further, the effects 
of ETU on reaction time variability are apparent only when ITU is low. In short, ITU 
affects how participants cope with ETU. 
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Table 2.1: Goodness-of-fit for sigmoid functions (analysis of central tendency and variability in reaction times) and linear regression models (analysis of FP effect). 
Sigmoid functions provided good fits to the cumulative reaction time frequency distributions for all 4 experimental conditions. RT data were thus unimodally distributed. The 
linear regression explains a weak to moderate proportion of the reaction time data against FP duration. 
Experiment Analysis Parameter Condition        
      Low ITU   High ITU   
      Low ETU High ETU Low ETU High ETU 
1 Sigmoid fits R2 adjusted 0.99 (SE = 0.001) 0.99 (SE = 0.001) 0.99 (SE = 0.001) 0.99 (SE = 0.001) 
 FP effect R
2 0.23 (SE = 0.06) 0.57 (SE = 0.06) 0.18 (SE = 0.05) 0.40 (SE = 0.07) 
2 Sigmoid fits R2 adjusted 0.99 (SE = 0.001) 0.99 (SE = 0.001) 0.99 (SE = 0.001) 0.99 (SE = 0.001) 
 FP effect R
2 0.40 (SE = 0.07) 0.50 (SE = 0.06) 0.31 (SE = 0.07) 0.34 (SE = 0.05) 
3 Sigmoid fits R2 adjusted 0.99 (SE = 0.001) 0.99 (SE = 0.001) 0.99 (SE = 0.001) 0.99 (SE = 0.001) 
 FP effect R
2 0.14 (SE = 0.04) 0.25 (SE = 0.08) 0.21 (SE = 0.06) 0.29 (SE = 0.07) 
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Sequential effects 
Experiment 1: action preparation under conditions of ITU and ETU 
The ANOVA for repeated measures revealed significant main effects of ITU 
(F(1,17) = 9.30, p = 0.006, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.369) and ETU (F(1,17) = 10.01, p = 0.006, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.370; 
see Figure 2.4). In addition, there was a significant interaction effect between ETU 
and ITU (F(1,17) = 6.11, p = 0.024, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.264). Under conditions of low ITU, 
responses were faster for low compared to high ETU (t(17) = -3.91, p = 0.001). There 
was no difference under conditions of high ITU between low and high ETU (t(17) = -
0.83, p = 0.421). 
Current FP duration (FPn) had a significant effect on mean RTs (F(2,34) = 
45.22, p < 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.727). The effect of the previous FP duration (FPn-1) on RT of 
the current trial was marginally significant (F(1.40,23.81) = 3.80, p = 0.051, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.183). 
We found an interaction between FPn-1 and FPn (F(4,68) = 7.17, p < 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.297), 
as predicted by the previously reported asymmetry in sequential effects (Los et al., 




2  = 0.400) and intermediate FPn (F(2,34) = 12.27, P < 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.419). By 
contrast, there was no effect of FPn-1 on long FPn (F(1.08,18.43) = 0.25, p = 0.643, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 
0.014). 
For short FPn, responses were quickest when preceded by a short FPn-1 
(313.24 ms, SE = 12.35). RTs increased by 24.1ms on average when the short FPn 
was preceded by an intermediate FPn-1 (337.3 ms, SE = 15.25; t(17) = -3.30, p = 
0.004) and by 49.7ms when the short FPn was preceded by a long FPn-1 (362.9 ms, 
SE = 11.51; t(17) = -4.07, p = 0.001). For intermediate FPn, responses were fastest 
when the intermediate FPn was preceded by a short FPn-1 (284.2 ms, SE = 11.12). 
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RTs increased by 8.76ms on average when the intermediate FPn was preceded by 
an intermediate FPn-1 (293ms, SE = 11.79; t(17) = -2.64, p = 0.034) and by 20.6ms 
when it was preceded by a long FPn-1 (304.8 ms, SE = 11.51; t(17) = -4.50, p < 0.001). 
The asymmetry in sequential effects, that is, the interaction between FPn and 
FPn-1, was not modulated by ETU (F(4,68) = 0.37, p = 0.832, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.021), ITU (F(4,68) = 
1.86, p = 0.128, 
€ 
ηp
2   =0.099) or ETU and ITU combined (F(4,68) = 1.41, p = 0.241, 
€ 
ηp
2   
= 0.076). But the effects of FPn (F(1.16,19.70) = 12.63, p = 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.426) and FPn-1 
(F(2,34) = 5.12, p = 0.011, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.231) taken separately were both modulated by ETU. 
Under conditions of low ETU, there was a marginally significant effect of FPn 
on mean RT (F(1.47,24.99) = 2.82, p = 0.092, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.142) driven by a significant 8.62ms 
reduction in RTs (t(17) = 3.26, p = 0.01) for intermediate FPn (280.3ms, SE = 14.14) 
compared to short FPn (288.9ms, SE = 14.08). Under conditions of high ETU, FPn 
had a similar but now significant effect on mean RTs (F(2,34) = 66.60, p < 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 
0.797) driven by a significant 35.6ms decrease in mean RTs for intermediate 
(296.2ms, SE = 10.95) compared to short FPn (331.6ms, SE = 12.48; t(17) = 10.39, p 
< 0.001) while there was no difference between intermediate and long FPn (292.5ms, 
SE 11.84, t(17) = 0.913, p = 0.374). 
Under conditions of low ETU, FPn-1 had no effect on mean RTs (F(2,34) = 0.30, 
p = 0.744, 
€ 
ηp
2   = 0.017). By contrast, for high levels of ETU, FPn-1 had a significant 
effect on mean RTs (F(2,34) = 21.14, p < 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2   = 0.554) driven by a 11.2ms 
increase in RTs for intermediate (307.1ms, SE = 10.87) compared to short FPn-1 
(295.9ms, SE = 10.87; t(17) = -4.59, p < 0.001) and a 10.6ms increase in RTs for long 
(317.7ms, SE = 12.54) compared to intermediate FPn-1 (t(17) = -2.76, p = 0.026; see 
Figure 2.4). 
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Figure 2.4: Sequential effects. Relation between reaction times (RTs) on the current trial and the foreperiod 
duration of the preceding trial for all four experimental conditions.  Experiment 1: ETU and ITU. Preceding 
foreperiod duration has an effect on reaction times only for high levels of ETU. In addition, the difference in 
reaction time for intermediate compared to short current FP duration is attenuated for low levels of ETU. 
Experiment 2: ETU & meanFP. Effects of ETU on sequential effects (effect of preceding FP duration) 
disappear. Instead, meanFP interacts with the asymmetry in sequential effects (the relation between current 
and preceding foreperiod duration). The asymmetry in sequential effects disappears for long meanFP and, in 
addition, the effects of the preceding FP duration taken separately are attenuated. Experment 3: meanFP 
and FPvar. No significant effects. Errorbars show standard error. 
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Experiment 2: action preparation under conditions of ETU, when ITU is removed 
The ANOVA for repeated measures revealed faster responses for low 
compared to high ETU (F(1,14) = 59.69, p < 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.810). By contrast, we found 




 = 0.58) and no 




= 0.003; see Figure 2.4). 
The current FP (FPn: F(2,28) = 24.24, p < 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.634) and the preceding 
FP (FPn-1: F(1.97,27.61) = 10.10, p = 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.419) both affected mean RTs. The 
effect of FPn-1 was modulated by the effect of FPn (F(4,56) = 6.14, p < 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 
0.305), in line with the previously reported asymmetry in sequential effects (Los et 
al., 2001). 
ETU did not modulate the effect of FPn-1 on mean RTs (F(2,28) = 1.40, p 0.264, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.091) or the asymmetry in sequential effects, that is, the interaction effect 
between FPn and FPn-1 (F(1,72,24.06) = 1.18, p = 0.318, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.078). The effect of FPn by 
contrast was modulated by ETU (F(2,28) = 12.35, p < 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.469): FPn had a 




2  = 0.458) and high ETU (F(1.42,19.84) = 40.60, p < 0.001 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.744). Under 
conditions of low ETU, RTs progressively decreased for intermediate (244.4ms, SE = 
6.62) compared to short FPn (262.1ms, SE = 11.66; t(14) = 3.01, p = 0.018) and for 
long (232.27ms, SE = 9.12) compared to intermediated FPn (t(14) = 2.68, p = 0.036). 
At high ETU, RTs decreased for intermediate FPn (274.8ms, SE = 8.56) compared to 
short FPn (329.6ms, SE = 11.68; t(14) = 9.00, p < 0.001) but not for long FPn 
(277.4ms, SE = 7.07) compared to intermediate FPn (t(14) = -0.49, p = 0.635). 
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0.344) and with the asymmetry in the sequential effects, that is, the interaction 
between FPn and FPn-1 (F(1.86,26.07) = 4.96, p = 0.017, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.262).  
A separate repeated measures ANOVA for short meanFP only, revealed 
significant main effects of both FPn and FPn-1(F(1.05,14.69) = 12.14,p = 0.003, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 
0.464), FPn-1 (2,28) = 4.60, p = 0.019, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.247) and a significant interaction between 
FPn and FPn-1 (F(1.45,20.34) = 4.61, p = 0.032, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.248). Mean RTs were modulated 
by FPn-1 for short FPn (F(1.30,18.19) = 12.82, p = 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2  =  0.478) and intermediate 
FPn (F(2,28) = 4.12, p = 0.027, 
€ 
ηp




2  = 0.061). Responses were fastest when the short FPn was preceded by a 
short FPn-1 (278.4ms, SE = 13.41). When preceded by an intermediate FPn-1, RTs 
increased by 37.18ms (315.6ms, SE = 16.70; t(14) = -4.60, p < 0.001). When 
preceded by a long FPn-1, RTs increased by 57.51ms (335.9, SE = 21.23; t(14) = -
3.81, p = 0.004). For intermediate FPn, there was a trend towards faster responses if 
preceded by short FPn-1 (255.2ms, SE = 5.93) compared to long FPn-1 (269.1ms, SE = 
9.13; t(14) = -2.00, p = 0.066). There was no difference between effect of short and 
intermediate FPn-1 (253.8ms, SE = 8.41; t(14) = 0.24, p = 0.818) on intermediate FPn. 
A separate repeated-measures ANOVA for long meanFP only, revealed 
significant effects of FPn on RTs (F(2,28) = 16.95, p < 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.548). The effect of 
FPn-1 was marginally significant (F(1.43,20.07) = 3.83, p = 0.051, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.215) while the 




= 0.021). The significant effect of FPn was driven by a significant 21.9ms reduction for 
intermediate FPn (259.9ms, SE = 8.35) compared to short FPn (281.7ms, SE = 7.41; 
t(14) = 6.70, p < 0.001). There was no difference between intermediate and long FPn 
(259ms, SE = 9.03; t(14) = 0.210, p = 0.837). The marginally significant effect of FPn-1 
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was driven by a significant increase of 6.4ms for intermediate (268.1ms, SE = 8.78) 
compared to short FPn-1 (261.5ms, SE = 8.88; t(14) = -2.06; p = 0.016). There was no 
difference between intermediate and long FPn-1 (270.9ms, SE = 6.53; t(14) = -0.68, p = 
0.51). 
Experiment 3: action preparation in the absence of ETU and ITU  
A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed no significant effects of FPvar, 
meanFP, current FP (FPn), and preceding FP duration (FPn-1).  
 
Taken together, explicit information about the timing of the IS removes 
sequential effects and with it any effects of varying foreperiod and mean foreperiod 
duration on those sequential effects (Experiment 3). Removing ITU, however, by 
providing an explicit and accurate external clock, does not remove the effects of 
meanFP on sequential effects (Experiment 2). Under conditions of both ETU and ITU 
(Experiment 1), ETU modulates the effect of current and, importantly, preceding FP 
duration on reaction times. But when ITU is removed (Experiment 2), this effect of 
ETU disappears. Instead, meanFP modulates the effects of FPn-1 on RTs and the 
asymmetry in sequential effect (the interaction between FPn and FPn-1). 
Foreperiod affect 
Experiment 1: action preparation under conditions of ITU and ETU 
Linear regression analyses revealed a weak to moderate relation between FP 
duration and RTs (Table 2.1). Inspection of residuals showed that the linear 
regression model systematically underestimated short and long FPs while it 
overestimated intermediate values (see Figure 2.5). Quadratic regression models 
were fitted to the RT data against standardised FP duration to explore whether these 
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could provide a better fit. Unsigned residuals provide a measure of fit and a 
significant reduction in unsigned residuals for one versus another regression model 
(linear versus quadratic) would suggest a better fit. Paired t-tests on unsigned 
residuals, averaged across standardised FP duration, were used to test for a 
significant reduction, separately for each experimental condition. Only one of these 
four t-tests was significant after correction for multiple comparisons: the quadratic 
model provided a better fit of the RT data plotted against FP duration for low ETU at 
low ITU only (t(17) = 3.28, p = 0.018). Given these results, the simpler regression 
model with fewer parameters was preferred and analysed further.  
The ANOVA on the linear regression coefficients revealed that the change in 
RTs with increasing FP duration was pronounced for high versus low ETU (F(1,17) = 
44.46, p < 0.001, 
€ 
ηp




2  =0.278; see Figure 4). The interaction between ETU and ITU was 
marginally significant (F(1,17) = 3.18, p = 0.093, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.157). This interaction was 
driven by a significant decrease in regression coefficients (i.e. a flattened slope) for 
high compared to low ITU at high ETU (t(17) = 2.68, p = 0.032). At low ETU there was 
no difference between low and high ITU (t(17) = -1.17, p = 0.516). 
Finally, all regression coefficients were negative, revealing the predicted 
decrease in RTs with increasing FP duration. They were significantly different from 
zero in three out of the four experimental conditions, namely for low ETU / low ITU 
(t(17) = -4.04, p < 0.001), high ETU / low ITU (t(17) = -9.39, p < 0.001), and high ETU / 
high ITU (t(17) = -4.56, p = 0.001). 
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Figure 2.5: The foreperiod effect. Observed reaction time data (black diamonds) and the linear 
(solid line) and quadratic fits (dotted line) to the data for the four combinations of ETU and ITU 
(meanFP) in Experiment 1 and 2. Experiment 1: ETU and ITU and Experiment 2: ETU and meanFP. 
Reaction times decrease with increasing FP duration, but critically interact with the degree of ETU 
and ITU (meanFP) both in Experiment 1 and 2. For low levels of ETU, we found no difference in 
foreperiod effect between high and low levels of ITU. For high levels of ETU, we found an 
attenuated foreperiod effect under conditions of high ITU. Errorbars reflect the standard error. 
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Experiment 2: action preparation under conditions of ETU, when ITU is removed 
Linear regression analyses revealed a moderate relation between FP 
duration and RTs (Table 2.1). As before, the inspection of residuals showed that the 
linear regression models systematically underestimated short and long FPs and 
overestimated intermediate values (see Figure 2.5). Quadratic regression models 
were fitted to the RT data against standardised FP duration to explore whether these 
could provide a better fit. Paired t-tests on unsigned residuals, averaged across 
standardised FP duration, were used to test for a significant reduction in residuals, 
separately for each experimental condition. Only one of these t-tests turned out to 
border on significance after correction for multiple comparisons: for high ETU and 
long meanFP (t(14) = 2.86, p = 0.050). Given these results, the simpler linear model 
was preferred and linear regression coefficients were analysed further. 
A repeated-measures ANOVA on linear regression coefficients revealed a 
significant main effect of meanFP(F(1,14) = 11.25, p = 0.005, 
€ 
ηp
2= 0.446) and ETU 
(F(1,14) = 29.49, p < 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2 = 0.677). Also, the interaction between ETU and 
meanFP was significant (F(1,14) = 8.50, p = 0.011, 
€ 
ηp
2= 0.378).  This interaction was 
driven by a slower decrease in RTs with FP duration, a flattened slope, for long 
compared to short meanFP under conditions of high ETU (t(14) = -3.63, p = 0.006). At 
low ETU, there was no difference between short and long mean FP duration (t(14) = -
2.12, p = 0.16; see Figure 2.5). 
Finally, all regression coefficients were negative and differed from zero in all 
experimental conditions (low ETU/ short meanFP: t(14) = -3.67, p = 0.002; high ETU/ 
short meanFP: t(14) = -7.02, p < 0.001; low ETU/ long meanFP: t(14) = -3.73, p < 0.001; 
high ETU / long meanFP: t(14) = -8.21, p < 0.001). 
 	   71 
Experiment 3: action preparation in the absence of ETU and ITU  
The linear regression models explained a weak to moderate amount of 
variance in the RT data (Table 1). There was no clear systematic pattern in residuals, 
unlike in the previous analyses of the FP effect. Therefore, the regression 
coefficients of the linear models were analysed further. The ANOVA on regression 
coefficients revealed no significant effects. Also, none of the regression coefficients 
differed from zero. 
 
In summary, explicit information about IS timing removes any effect of mean 
FP and FP variability (Experiment 3) on the FP effect. By contrast, removal of ITU by 
means of an accurate external time-keeper (Experiment 2) did not remove the effects 
of meanFP. Instead, the effects of ETU and ITU (Experiment 1) or meanFP 
(Experiment 2) on the FP effect were similar regardless of the presence of absence 
of an accurate external time-keeper. The FP effect increases for high levels of ETU 
but only if ITU (meanFP) is sufficiently low (short). Effects of ETU and ITU on the FP 
effect may not be dissociable – they can only be removed together or not at all. 
Discussion 
In a series of three experiments, we examined the effects of internal (ITU) 
and external temporal uncertainty (ETU) on temporal preparation using a modified 
variable foreperiod (FP) simple reaction time task. Both types of temporal uncertainty 
are likely to influence action preparation, but their origin is fundamentally different. 
ETU originates in the environment and arises when the timing of imperative varies 
from one instance to the next. ITU arises from inaccurate internal clocks. To prepare 
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for impending actions in the face of ETU and ITU, both quantities need to be 
estimated, represented and temporal preparation needs to be adjusted accordingly. 
The main results reported here show that ETU and ITU interact in the way 
they affect behaviour, and have distinct influences on how fast participants respond 
to imperative events. While some effects of ITU cannot be fully dissociated from 
effects of ETU, participants can control for temporal uncertainty under conditions in 
which reliable information about the time of occurrence of imperative events is 
provided. As such, the current study strongly supports strategic accounts of temporal 
preparation (Drazin, 1961; Nobre et al., 2007; Requin & Granjon, 1969) as opposed 
to the automatic account (Los & van den Heuvel, 2001; Los & Heslenfeld, 2005; Los 
et al., 2001), and sheds novel light onto the processes underlying the preparation of 
action in a (temporally) uncertain world. 
Experiment 1: summary of results 
Experiment 1 was conducted to investigate the effects of ETU, ITU, and their 
possible interaction on temporal preparation. Overall, participants responded faster 
under conditions of low ITU. Moreover, ETU and ITU interacted in their effects on 
participants’ consistency in the time it took them to respond to the IS: participants 
were more variable when ETU was high but only under conditions of low ITU.  
Second, we asked whether and how ETU and ITU affect sequential effects. In 
line with previous work (S A Los & van den Heuvel, 2001; S. Los & Heslenfeld, 2005; 
S. Los et al., 2001) reaction times revealed both strong sequential effects and an 
asymmetry in those sequential effects. For short FPn, compared to intermediate or 
long FPn, long FPn-1, for example, had the strongest effect on RTs in that long FPn-1 
lead to a comparatively strong increase in RT on the current trial. This asymmetry in 
sequential effects was not modulated by ETU or ITU. The sequential effect itself, 
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however, was modulated by the degree of ETU, being present only under conditions 
of high levels of ETU.  
Third, we asked whether ETU and ITU modulate the FP effect (Drazin, 1961; 
Los et al., 2001; Nobre, Correa, & Coull, 2007; Requin & Granjon, 1969; Vallesi, 
Shallice, & Walsh, 2007). We found that high ETU increases the FP effect, whereas 
the FP effect is attenuated under conditions of high ITU. In addition, there is a further 
reduction in the FP effect for high levels of both ETU and ITU. The FP effect 
disappears entirely when ETU is low and ITU is high. 
Experiment 2: summary of results 
In Experiment 2, we removed ITU to study the influence of ETU on 
preparation for action in isolation. Introducing an accurate, external clock to remove 
ITU, differences in RTs were now driven entirely by ETU. On average, high ETU 
delayed participants’ responses. Similarly, high ETU increased participants’ 
variability in RTs. 
While ETU did not modulate sequential effects we found that the mean FP 
duration (i.e. ITU in Experiment 1) interacted with the asymmetry in sequential 
effects. While we found both sequential effects and an asymmetry in sequential 
effects for short mean FP duration, we found a mere trend towards sequential effects 
and no asymmetry for long mean FP duration. This pattern of findings is puzzling. 
We had two competing predictions for Experiment 2: the effects of ITU disappear, or 
are comparable to the effects observed when being exposed to both ETU and ITU. 
We return to this issue in the general discussion. 
We observed a stronger FP effect under conditions of high ETU regardless of 
mean FP duration. But if on average long FPs preceded the imperative event (long 
meanFP), then the FP effect is generally weaker. Removing ITU by means of an 
accurate external clock did thus not remove effects of mean FP duration on the FP 
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effect. The FP effect was now present, however, in all four experimental conditions, 
unlike in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 3: summary of results 
In Experiment 3 we asked whether the effects of ETU and ITU can be 
removed altogether by providing explicit and reliable information about both the 
passage of time and the time of occurrence of the IS. The removal of both types of 
temporal uncertainty abolished any behavioural differences driven by mean FP 
duration (ITU in Experiment 1) or its variability (ETU in Experiment 1 and 2). 
Moreover, providing explicit and reliable information abolished both the FP effect and 
sequential effects. 
  
The results reported here clearly show that ETU and ITU affect behaviour and 
have distinct influences on how quickly and consistently participants can respond to 
imperative events. While some effects of ITU may not be fully dissociable from 
effects of ETU, participants can control for temporal uncertainty under conditions in 
which reliable information about the time of occurrence of imperative events is 
provided. As such, the current study supports strategic accounts of temporal 
preparation as opposed to the automatic account. 
Effects of temporal uncertainty on reaction times and their variability 
When exposed to both ETU and ITU (Experiment 1), responses to imperative 
events are faster when levels of internal temporal noise are low (i.e. ITU). Responses 
are also less variable when imperative events are more predictable in time, but this 
effect is prominent only when internal uncertainty is also low. When participants 
experience high levels of internal uncertainty, then the (un)predictability of an event 
has relatively little additional impact on variability in preparation. When removing ITU 
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(Experiment 2), temporal preparation improves and becomes less variable if an 
imperative event is temporally predictable. This result appeals to intuition: the less 
variable events are in time, the better we can prepare for them. Importantly, the 
effects of ITU can be removed when explicit information about the passage of time is 
provided, which suggests that the effects of ETU and ITU are dissociable. 
Furthermore, comparison of Experiment 1 and 2 shows that ETU and ITU interact 
rather than being merely additive: in the face of high ITU one cannot benefit from 
stimulus occurrence being predictable in time, i.e. having low ETU (Experiment 1). 
However, when ITU is removed, and participants are aware of the passage of time, 
participants respond faster to predictable imperative events regardless of preceding 
mean FP duration (Experiment 2). Finally, when accurate information about the 
timing of imperative events is also provided (Experiment 3), then neither their 
variability in time (ETU in Experiment 1) nor the average duration of the FP 
preceding these imperative events (ITU in Experiment 1), affects reaction times or 
variability in reaction times. Thus, given appropriate temporal information, 
participants can overcome both the temporal uncertainty inherent in imperative 
events and their noisy internal clocks. 
Our results thus show that endogenous cues, such as warning cues that 
provide temporal anchor points, are used for temporal preparation. The quality with 
which such a reference can be used for temporal preparation decreases with 
increasing variability of imperative events (ETU) and with increasing internal 
temporal noise (ITU). Preparation is therefore less likely to be aligned with an 
imperative event when its temporal predictability is low, and when internal temporal 
noise is high. 
Finally, when ITU is removed (Experiment 2), then effects of the average time 
interval preceding the imperative event disappear. These results provide strong 
evidence in favour of strategic accounts of temporal preparation (Alegria & Delhaye-
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Rembaux, 1975; P Bertelson, 1967; Drazin, 1961; Klemmer, 1956, 1957; J Requin, 
1969; Vallesi, Mussoni, et al., 2007; Vallesi et al., 2009; Vallesi & Shallice, 2007; 
Vallesi, Shallice, et al., 2007) in which explicit information can be used to adjust 
preparation in the face of events variable in time. These conclusions are further 
bolstered by our final experiment, in which both ETU and ITU were both removed. 
This effectively abolished any behavioural effects caused by FP variability or mean 
FP duration. The effects of ETU and ITU can in fact be overcome through explicit 
guidance that removes the requirement to estimate temporal uncertainty for the 
preparation of action. 
Of note is that some previous studies have also aimed at reducing the effects 
of temporal uncertainty by providing participants with informative cues about the FP 
duration on a trial (S A Los & van den Heuvel, 2001; S. Los & Heslenfeld, 2005; S. 
Los & Schut, 2008; Steinborn et al., 2008). Such manipulations remove uncertainty 
about when the imperative stimulus will appear (ETU), but still require participants to 
track the passage of time, and therefore do not remove internal temporal uncertainty. 
Providing foreknowledge about either ITU or ETU is therefore distinct from actually 
removing it, and does not allow for isolating the processes assigned to estimate, 
represent, and implement appropriate changes in behaviour in the face of ETU, ITU, 
or both.  
The role of temporal uncertainty on sequential effects 
Our analyses of sequential effects confirm that the duration of the FP of a 
preceding trial impacts on action preparation on the next trial. In other words, 
participants use the most recent information about FP duration for future action 
preparation. As such, they use the available exogenous cues for temporal 
preparation, even though these may be misleading: in the present case there was no 
causal relationship between subsequent FPs. Importantly, when exposed to both 
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ETU and ITU (Experiment 1), sequential effects are significantly influenced by the 
level of ETU, being stronger for high ETU. This finding may be due to bigger 
differences in FP duration between two consecutive FPs when ETU is generally high. 
In other words, when ETU is low, the difference between two consecutive FPs is 
likely to be small whereas, when ETU is high, this difference is likely to be relatively 
large. These larger differences in FP duration may lead to bigger differences in 
reaction times and thus stronger sequential effects.  
This explanation implies, however, that sequential effects do not ‘scale’ with 
ETU. The effect of a preceding trial’s FP duration on preparation for future imperative 
events is fixed and determined by the absolute difference in FP duration between two 
consecutive trials. It does not scale (i.e. change proportionally to the overall ETU of a 
particular environment). That is, even if an environment is relatively unpredictable, 
the most recent information available is used to the same extent as when an 
environment is relatively stable. Interestingly, the effect of ETU on sequential effects 
disappears when ITU is removed. This suggests that when reliable information about 
the passage of time is available sequential effects do scale with the overall ETU 
depending on how well one can track the passage of time.  
An alternative explanation we propose here is that the effects of ETU on 
sequential effects may be driven, at least in part, by the level of ITU. In constant FP 
tasks participants might use the preceding FP duration for improving their time 
interval estimation by ‘recalibrating’ their internal clock based on the timing of the 
preceding imperative event. This may be required if the IS is perceived as occurring 
earlier or later than expected, which will be the case when an internal clock is 
inaccurate. When imperative events vary in time, participants may still attempt to use 
the timing of imperative events to recalibrate clock speed. In other words, if an 
imperative event occurs later than expected participants may adapt the speed of their 
internal clock such that it matches again with their temporal prediction of when the 
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event was most likely to occur. This would also lead to being unprepared when a 
subsequent imperative events occurs earlier than expected, which is the signature of 
sequential effects. Albeit speculative, this proposal can explain why the level of ETU 
does not affect sequential effects when information about the passage of time is 
provided: in such cases there is no requirement to recalibrate internal clocks. 
Finally, when explicit and reliable information about the timing of the 
imperative event was provided (Experiment 3), then sequential effects disappeared. 
This further supports the strategic account of temporal preparation and is evidence 
against the conditioning account. To our surprise, however, we found that when ITU 
was removed by an accurate external clock, mean FP duration (ITU in Experiment 1) 
remained affecting sequential effects. This finding suggests that effects of ITU cannot 
be removed selectively. Only full removal of temporal uncertainty, both ETU and ITU, 
abolishes effects of temporal uncertainty. In other words, participants cannot 
dissociate the effects of ETU and ITU on sequential effects. Only when they are not 
required to track time at all, when information about timing of the IS is given, do 
effects of temporal uncertainty disappear. 
The role of temporal uncertainty on the FP effect 
As in previous work (P Bertelson, 1967; P Bertelson & Tisseyre, 1968; Jean 
Requin & Granjon, 1969; Vallesi & Shallice, 2007), our results reveal a linear relation 
between FP duration and reaction times. Overall, reaction times tend to decrease 
with increasing FP duration, which is the hallmark feature of the FP effect. One key 
observation is that when exposed to both ETU and ITU (Experiment 1), the FP effect 
depends on the specific level of ETU and ITU, respectively. The FP effect is stronger 
when imperative events are unpredictable but reduced when internal temporal 
uncertainty is high. Furthermore, it disappears completely for combination of low 
levels of ETU and high levels of ITU. When ITU was removed (Experiment 2), we 
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found a comparable modulation of the FP effect by ETU and mean FP duration, but 
in contrast to Experiment 1 there was now a progressive decrease in reaction times 
with increasing FP duration for all experimental conditions. Finally, when accurate 
information about the timing of the imperative events was provided (Experiment 3), 
FP effects disappear altogether. 
Collectively our results can be taken as indication that the passage of time is 
in itself a cue for action preparation when participants experience either ETU alone 
(Experiment 2), or in conjunction with ITU (Experiment 1). However, to which extent 
the passage of time can be used depends on the specific levels of ETU and ITU. 
Critically, accurate estimates of time are necessary for computing the conditional 
probability of imperative events (i.e. the hazard rate), a process that is presumed to 
underlie the FP effect (Nobre et al., 2007). With increasing internal temporal noise 
(high ITU), estimates of the hazard rate may become too inaccurate and inefficient 
for temporal preparation. Importantly, this implies that the FP effect may disappear 
because of noisy internal clocks and not because of an inability to track changes in 
conditional probability per se. One may erroneously conclude, based on weak FP 
effects, that participants were not keeping track of conditional probabilities of 
imperative events when, in fact, high levels of intrinsic temporal noise could have 
influenced their temporal preparation.  
By contrast, the FP effect is stronger when ETU is high. There are two 
competing explanations for this finding. At high ETU levels, the rate of change in the 
conditional probability of imperative events is relatively small (see Figure 2.1B), 
which may facilitate the tracking of these changes. Alternatively, the subjective 
estimate about the conditional probability might be the same for both conditions of 
ETU, but participants may find it more difficult to translate this estimate into adequate 
levels of preparation when ETU is low as they would have to implement 
corresponding changes in preparation more quickly at a higher rate. 
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Removing ITU does not eliminate the effect of the average FP preceding the 
imperative event (ITU in Experiment 1) on the FP effect (i.e. the decrease in reaction 
times with increasing FP duration). Removing ITU may lower the intercept of the 
linear relation between FP duration and reaction times (i.e. responses are overall 
faster, which explains why mean FP duration does not affect mean reaction times in 
Experiment 2, see Figure 2.3). However, the regression coefficient, which indexes 
the strength of the FP effect, is not affected by removing ITU. Only removal of all 
temporal uncertainty, both ETU and ITU, abolishes FP effects (Experiment 3). This 
result speaks against the FP effects being caused by automatic processes. Rather, 
the effect of ITU on the FP effect may not be dissociable from the effects of ETU: 
effects can only be removed together when keeping track of time becomes obsolete 
thanks to an accurate external “stop-watch” (cf. conclusions regarding dissociability 
of effects of ETU and ITU on sequential effects). 
The importance of the distinction between ETU and ITU 
The effects of ETU and ITU on the various signatures of temporal preparation 
highlight the importance of distinguishing between, or controlling for, these two types 
of temporal uncertainty. The present results strongly suggest that temporal 
preparation in variable FP tasks engages multiple processes that serve to estimate, 
represent, and implement appropriate changes in behaviour in the face of ETU and 
ITU. These processes can interact in any number of ways. For example, the present 
study suggests that a proportion of sequential effects may be due to participants’ 
attempts to compensate for internal temporal uncertainty. 
The putative interaction with event preparation 
Distinguishing ETU and ITU is important for several reasons. For example, 
previous work has addressed how information about ‘what’ action to perform and 
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‘when’ to perform it might be combined for action preparation (P Bertelson & 
Barzeele, 1965; Sanders, 1990; Spijkers, 1990; Spijkers & Walter, 1985). Our results 
suggest that such investigations cannot reveal the specific process that binds 
together preparation for ‘what’ to do and ‘when’ to do it because of the inherent 
interaction between the different types of temporal uncertainty. Addressing this long-
standing question therefore requires investigation of how internal and external 
temporal uncertainty, respectively, influence action preparation when alternative 
actions are viable (‘what’ preparation).  
ETU and ITU in health and disease  
Our findings are further relevant for work on impairments in timing behaviour 
in neuropsychiatric disorders (for a review, see (Allman & Meck, 2011). For example, 
previous work has revealed abnormal performance on explicit timing tasks in patients 
with Parkinson’s Disease (PD; (Artieda et al., 1992; Jones et al., 2008; Koch et al., 
2008; Lange, Tucha, Steup, Gsell, & Naumann, 1995; Merchant, Luciana, Hooper, 
Majestic, & Tuite, 2007; Pastor et al., 1992). Similarly, performance on variable FP 
tasks differs from controls in patients with PD (JAHANSHAHI, BROWN, & 
MARSDEN, 1992; Jurkowski et al., 2005). Internal clocks therefore appear to be 
noisier following dopamine depletion (Jurkowski et al., 2005). This interpretation is 
congruent with the idea that intact dopamine in the basal ganglia is a crucial 
neurobiological pre-requisite for time perception (for reviews, see (Jennifer T Coull et 
al., 2011; Jones & Jahanshahi, 2009b).  
Work on clinical populations, however, has not distinguished between ETU 
and ITU, therefore precluding more specific interpretations about the origins of the 
observed deficits in the variable FP task in these patients. The observed deficits of 
PD patients in variable FP tasks (JAHANSHAHI et al., 1992; Jurkowski et al., 2005) 
may be caused by deficits in extracting temporal structure from the environment, by 
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an abnormally noisy internal clock, or both. In other words, either the estimation or 
representation of ETU and / or ITU, or the processes that implement behaviour in the 
face of ETU and ITU may be affected in PD patients. Further studies that distinguish 
between ETU and ITU may provide further insights into the origin of impaired explicit 
and implicit timing behaviour in this patient population. 
Similarly, performance on implicit and explicit timing tasks is more variable in 
patients suffering from schizophrenia (Allman & Meck, 2011; Carroll, Boggs, 
O’Donnell, Shekhar, & Hetrick, 2008; Carroll, O’Donnell, Shekhar, & Hetrick, 2009; 
Smyrnis et al., 2009), suggesting abnormally inaccurate internal clocks in these 
patients. Furthermore, in implicit timing tasks, such as the FP task, schizophrenic 
patients show a ‘cross-over effect’: patients are faster on variable FP tasks compared 
to constant FP tasks if constant FP duration exceeds 3000ms (Borst & Cohen, 1987, 
1989). Some have attributed this cross-over effect to higher levels of internal 
temporal noise in schizophrenic patients (Borst & Cohen, 1989). Providing explicit 
information about the passage of time reduced reaction times but did not abolish the 
cross-over effect (Borst & Cohen, 1989). Interestingly, the current study suggests 
that effects of ITU on the FP effect cannot entirely be dissociated from effects of ETU 
and removed selectively. Thus, a residual cross-over effect in schizophrenic patients, 
despite accurate information about the passage of time, is consistent with our data 
and suggests that internal temporal noise is indeed increased in these patients. In 
addition, however, schizophrenia patients may also suffer from impairments in 
extracting the temporal structure of events, which may be masked by high internal 
temporal noise (ITU). In other words, patients may not be able to discover 
regularities in the timing of imperative events because their internal clocks are too 
noisy to reliably detect such regularities. Future studies that distinguish between ETU 
and ITU, in the way introduced in this series of experiments, will be able to determine 
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the origins of abnormal performance on variable FP paradigms in PD, schizophrenia, 
and other disorders characterised by impairments in time estimation. 
Conclusions 
Being prepared for action is a paramount requirement in an uncertain world. 
In a series of three experiments, we studied the impact of ETU and ITU, two types of 
temporal uncertainty, on temporal preparation. We found differential effects of ETU 
and ITU on the overall level and consistency of temporal preparation, sequential 
effects, and the FP effect. As such, we demonstrated that both the level of temporal 
uncertainty and its origin determine how temporal uncertainty is dealt with in 
preparing for imperative events in an uncertain world. Finally, we provide evidence 
for the strategic account on temporal preparation: effects of temporal uncertainty can 
be fully removed by explicit information about the timing of imperative events. 
However, different types of temporal uncertainty may not be fully dissociable: it may 
not be possible to remove one without the other. We conclude that two distinct 
processes may be concerned with the estimation of ETU and ITU and differentially 
affect preparation for action in an (temporally) uncertainty world. 
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Chapter 3: How the origin of temporal uncertainty affects 
event preparation 
Abstract: Are there beneficial effects of knowing what action to prepare for when 
there is no information about when to act (temporal uncertainty)? Conversely, does 
information about action timing improve action preparation when there is no 
information about what action to prepare for (event uncertainty)? In two experiments, 
we explored the interplay between temporal and event uncertainty on action 
preparation. Temporal uncertainty was distinguished by origin. Temporal uncertainty 
is external when it is due to an unpredictable world (i.e. variability of imperative stimuli 
in time; ETU). Internal temporal uncertainty (ITU) arises as a consequence of noisy 
time perception. In Experiment 1, participants completed a variable foreperiod choice 
reaction time task. ETU was manipulated by foreperiod variability. ITU was removed 
by an accurate external time-keeper. Event uncertainty was manipulated by frequency 
imbalance of action alternatives. Results revealed that benefits of low external 
temporal uncertainty are apparent only when event uncertainty is low. In Experiment 
2, participant completed a constant choice reaction time task. Prior to this, participants 
completed a time interval reproduction task (Bridging Experiment). Their standard 
deviation in reproduced target intervals provided a measure of their ITU. Foreperiods 
were then chosen, based on data of the Bridging Experiment, to match the level of 
temporal uncertainty across Experiments 1 and 2. Experiment 2 revealed that high 
ITU has detrimental effects on preparation only when event uncertainty is high. Taken 
together, these results show, for the first time, that effects of knowing what and 
knowing when depend on the origin of temporal uncertainty. When temporal 
uncertainty is external, then one has to know what to benefit from knowing when. 
When temporal uncertainty is internal, then high temporal uncertainty can be 
compensated for but only if there is information about what action to prepare for. 
Key words: action preparation, choice reaction time task, temporal uncertainty, event 
uncertainty, implicit timing 
For efficient preparation and quick execution of motor action, both knowing 
what to do and knowing when to do it is crucial. For example, when playing tennis, a 
perfect forehand volley is useless when its timing is off. Conversely, even if perfectly 
timed, a forehand volley is unlikely to win a point when a backhand volley would have 
been more appropriate. In this chapter, we address how advance information about 
what to do and about when to do it affects preparation and execution of motor action. 
We asked whether one can successfully prepare for motor action under conditions of 
limited knowledge about either what to do or when to do it. 
Information about what action to prepare for may be a prerequisite for being 
able to use information about when to respond. Conversely, knowing when to act 
may be necessary to benefit from knowing what to do. Alternatively, information 
about what to do and when to do it may be used independently: one may benefit 
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from knowing what or when even when the other piece of information is missing. This 
chapter presents two experiments that explore the relation between advance 
information about the type of forthcoming motor action (what; event uncertainty) and 
about its timing (when; temporal uncertainty). We distinguished between the external 
(ETU) and internal (ITU) origin of temporal uncertainty (Klemmer, 1956, 1957). We 
asked whether the origin of temporal uncertainty determines how we use advance 
information about the type of forthcoming motor action or action timing. In other 
words, does it matter for preparation for action whether temporal uncertainty 
originates from an unpredictable world or noisy time perception? 
Action preparation typically benefits from low event uncertainty (Fitts, 1992; 
Fitts & Peterson, 1964; Hick, 1952; Hyman, 1953; Schneider & Anderson, 2011). 
Similarly, low temporal uncertainty improves preparation for action (Bertelson, 1967; 
Bertelson & Tisseyre, 1968; Carlsen & Mackinnon, 2010; Davis, 1962; Drazin, 1961; 
Hohle, 1965; Klemmer, 1956, 1957; Los & Schut, 2008; Zahn & Rosenthal, 1966; for 
reviews, see Hackley, 2009; Niemi & Naatanen, 1981). Event and temporal 
uncertainty are assumed to independently affect action preparation (Bertelson & 
Boons, 1960; Holender & Bertelson, 1975; Spijkers, 1990; Spijkers & Walter, 1985). 
It has been suggested that event preparation and temporal preparation are 
supported by two independent preparatory processes (Holender & Bertelson, 1975), 
which may take place at different discrete processing stages (Sanders, 1990; 
Spijkers, 1990; Spijkers & Walter, 1985). But problematically, all of these studies 
have looked at the effects of either ITU (Bertelson & Barzeele, 1965; Holender & 
Bertelson, 1975; Spijkers, 1990) or ETU and ITU combined (Bertelson & Boons, 
1960; Sakai et al., 2000). The effects of ETU on preparation for action have not yet 
been studied in isolation, and have not yet been compared to the effects of ITU. 
Importantly, ETU and ITU may differ in their effects on behaviour. The relation 
between temporal and event uncertainty may be influenced by, or entirely depend 
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on, the external (ETU) or internal (ITU) origin of temporal uncertainty. At the 
behavioural level, putative interaction effects between event and temporal 
uncertainty may cancel out when both ETU and ITU are experienced in conjunction 
(Bertelson & Boons, 1960; Sakai et al., 2000). For example, participants may benefit 
more from low ETU when event uncertainty is low, because they are then able to 
prepare the appropriate action at the appropriate time. By contrast, participants may 
be able to compensate for high ITU when they are not also simultaneously hampered 
by high event uncertainty. If this were the case and if ETU and ITU were then 
experienced together, putative interaction effects with event uncertainty would cancel 
out, at least partially. One would expect to observe a (comparatively smaller) 
difference in reaction times for high versus low temporal uncertainty under conditions 
of low event uncertainty, primarily driven by better preparation under conditions of 
low ETU. Similarly, one would expect to find a (comparatively smaller) reaction time 
difference for high versus low temporal uncertainty under conditions of high event 
uncertainty primarily driven by a lack of compensation for high ITU. This pattern in 
reaction times has been previously reported (Bertelson & Barzeele, 1965; Cotti et al., 
2011; Holender & Bertelson, 1975; Sakai et al., 2000; Spijkers, 1990; Spijkers & 
Walter, 1985). We ask whether it can be explained by independent processes for 
event and temporal preparation, as previously suggested, or whether the origin of 
temporal uncertainty determines the interaction between temporal and event 
uncertainty. 
As participants experience ITU whenever they are required to estimate time, 
either explicitly or implicitly, one needs to explicitly remove ITU in order to investigate 
the effects of ETU in isolation. This can be achieved experimentally by using 
accurate external time keepers (Borst & Cohen, 1989; Jean Requin & Granjon, 1969) 
such as, for example, stopwatches (Carlsen & Mackinnon, 2010). In two 
experiments, we here explored the relation between ETU, ITU, and event 
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uncertainty. In Experiment 1, we asked how event uncertainty and ETU interact when 
ITU is removed. In Experiment 2, we asked whether the relation between event and 
temporal uncertainty depends on the external or internal origin of temporal 
uncertainty. To explore the effect of origin on the relation between event and 
temporal uncertainty, the level of ITU and ETU that participants experienced had to 
be comparable. In other words, participants had to  experience the same level of 
temporal uncertainty, external or internal, in addition to event uncertainty to explore 
the effects of the origin of temporal uncertainty. We therefore estimated the level of 
ITU associated with time intervals of several durations to match Experiment 1 and 2 
with regard to the level of temporal uncertainty whilst exploring the effects of its 
external or internal origin (see Figure 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1: The interplay between knowing what? (event uncertainty) and knowing when? 
(temporal uncertainty) explored for an internal (ITU) and external (ETU) origin of temporal 
uncertainty. External temporal uncertainty (ETU) arises from an unpredictable world when the timing 
of imperative events varies from one instance to the next. Internal temporal uncertainty (ITU) arises as 
a consequence of noisy internal clocks. Experiment 1 investigated the relation between ETU and 
event uncertainty. Experiment 2 studied whether the relation between temporal and event uncertainty 
depends on the external or internal origin of temporal uncertainty. A bridging experiment was 
conducted to match Experiment 1 and 2 with regard to the level but not origin of temporal uncertainty 
that participants experienced. This allowed direct statistical comparison between Experiment 1 and 2 
and could reveal the importance of the origin of temporal uncertainty (external or internal) for the 
relation between temporal and event uncertainty. 
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Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we assessed the relation between ETU and event 
uncertainty, whilst removing ITU. We removed ITU by providing explicit information 
about the passage of time (Borst & Cohen, 1987; Jean Requin & Granjon, 1969). In 
addition, we asked how ETU and event uncertainty interact for two different hazard 
functions (Coull, Cheng, & Meck, 2011; Nobre, Correa, & Coull, 2007). A hazard 
function describes the probability of the imperative event occurring at any given time 
during the preparatory period (for example “now!”) given that it has not yet occurred 
(i.e. the posterior probability of the imperative event, or hazard rate). For a Gaussian 
distribution, for example, this hazard rate will increase monotonically over time. 
Participants may use their estimate about the hazard rate (i.e. the probability that the 
imperative event occurs “now!”) to prepare for action and, effectively, to reduce ETU 
(Coull et al., 2011; Nobre et al., 2007). In other words, this estimate that the 
imperative event has not yet occurred informs about the timing of the forthcoming 
imperative event. As such, it provides additional advance information about action 
timing, which accumulates throughout the foreperiod, and gradually reduces ETU. 
In the present experiment, we used two hazard functions. In one condition, 
the posterior probability of the imperative event increased throughout the foreperiod. 
By contrast, in the other condition this probability increased, peaked, and then 
declined. The first hazard function can be thought of as an analogue of situations 
where imperative events are bound to occur, after a set interval with some temporal 
variation, for example, when waiting for a traffic light to change colour. The latter 
represents situations where imperative events may or may not occur after a given 
time (again with some temporal variation), such as when waiting for a date to show 
up (or, sadly, in some cases not). This manipulation allowed us to address whether 
any interaction between ETU and event uncertainty depended on the specific type of 
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hazard function. We included this manipulation because only ETU, but not ITU, can 
be gradually reduced by the hazard function over time. Any interaction between 
event uncertainty or ETU and the type of hazard function would reveal a crucial 
difference between ETU, ITU, and their respective effects on behaviour. Further, 
including two hazard functions allowed us to dissociate the time course of 
preparation from the mere passage of time. If preparation follows the hazard rate 
(Nobre et al., 2007; Jean Requin & Granjon, 1969) then it develops gradually over 
time. Including two hazard functions allows dissociating preparation from the mere 
passage of time, as participants’ preparation should develop gradually over time 
depending on the hazard functions. If two hazard functions are different, then 
preparation over time should differ. 
Given previous findings, one may expect to find independent additive effects 
of ETU and event uncertainty on reaction times (Bertelson & Boons, 1960; Cotti et 
al., 2011; Sakai et al., 2000). In this case, action preparation should benefit from low 
levels of ETU irrespective of the level of event uncertainty, and vice versa. By 
contrast, ETU may interact with event uncertainty. For example, participants may 
benefit more from low ETU when they know which action to prepare for because, in 
this case, they will be able to prepare the appropriate action at the appropriate time. 
Finally, we held no specific predictions about how the type of hazard function might 
interact with the predicted relationship between event uncertainty and ETU. We 
speculated that the nature of preparation, in particular how ETU is processed, does 
not depend on how the probability of the imperative event develops throughout the 
foreperiod. In this case, the type of hazard function should not interact with event 
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Methods 
Participants 
12 participants (mean age = 20.4 years, age range = 19 – 24 years, 3 males, 
3 left-handed) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision took part in this study. They 
were reimbursed for time and travel (£20). Before the experiment, participants gave 
written informed consent. This study was conducted with the approval of a local 
ethics committee and in line with the declaration of Helsinki. 
Apparatus 
The experiment was run on a desktop computer, using the cogent 2000 
toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php) running under Matlab 7.5 
(Mathworks, Natick, MA). Stimuli were presented on a 19’ LCD screen with a refresh 
rate of 60Hz. Participants responded by pressing right < AltGr > and < Ctrl > keys 
with their right index and little finger, respectively, on a standard QWERTY keyboard.  
Experimental procedure 
Participants performed a modified variable foreperiod choice reaction time 
task, in which they were instructed to respond to the appearance of a visual 
imperative stimulus (IS) as fast as possible, but not at the expense of accuracy. On 
each trial, after brief presentation of a fixation cross (200ms), participants saw a 
simple clock, a white circle on a black background with a black clock hand (see 
Figure 3.2). At trial onset, the clock hand was in the 12 o’clock position. It completed 
one full rotation at constant speed lasting 4000ms, irrespective of the time of 
presentation of the IS. The IS, a green circle or square, was presented at the centre 
of the screen for 200ms after a variable foreperiod (FP) since trial onset. The two ISs 
were mapped onto index or little finger key press responses, respectively. The 
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mapping was counterbalanced across participants. The inter-trial interval (ITI) was 
sampled from a non-ageing exponential distribution (mean = 300ms) to prevent any 
built up of preparatory activity or temporal expectancy of trial onset or the 
subsequent IS during the ITI. The clock disappeared during the ITI and the screen 
went blank.  
The clock provided participants with constant feedback about the passage of 
time. By providing such information, we removed ITU. In other words, this accurate 
external time keeper removed temporal noise arising from participants’ inaccurate 
internal clock. In particular, we prevented the inevitable increase in ITU with longer 
time intervals (Gibbon, 1977). Thus, this manipulation allowed us to single out and 
study the effects of ETU in isolation.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Design for Experiment 1. Participants completed a variable foreperiod choice reaction time 
task. After brief presentation of a fixation cross (200ms), participants saw a simple clock, a white circle 
on a black background with a black clock hand. The clock hand was in the 12 o’clock position at trial 
onset. It completed one full rotation at constant speed lasting 4000ms. As such, it provided a constant 
measure of time, thus removing internal temporal uncertainty (ITU). The IS, a green circle or square, was 
presented at the centre of the screen (200ms) after a variable foreperiod (FP). The two ISs were mapped 
onto index or little finger key press responses, respectively. The mapping was counterbalanced across 
participants. The inter-trial interval (ITI) was sampled from a non-ageing exponential distribution (mean = 
300ms). The clock disappeared during the inter-trial interval. Foreperiods were sampled from continuous 
Gaussian distributions. External temporal uncertainty (ETU) was manipulated by varying the standard 
deviation of the distribution (200 / 700). The mean was fixed (2000 ms). For low event uncertainty, index 
finger responses were prompted on 80% of all trials. Little finger responses were prompted on the 
remaining 20%. For high event uncertainty, index and little finger responses were prompted on 55% and 
45% of all trials, respectively. Posterior temporal uncertainty (PETU) was manipulated by including 30% 
of catch trials in one of the two conditions (for more information, see text). The clock completed one full 
turn on each trial (4000ms) thus providing a constant measure of the passage of time. This accurate 
external clock compensated for the noisy internal clock and removed internal temporal uncertainty (ITU). 
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Experimental design 
Participants were exposed to eight different conditions resulting from 
factorially combining high and low event uncertainty (EU-, EU+), high and low ETU 
(ETU-, ETU+), and two hazard functions. The latter differed in how the probability of 
the IS developed throughout the foreperiod, which gradually reduced ETU. This 
factor, which in the following we will refer to as posterior external temporal 
uncertainty (PETU: PETU-, PETU+), was included in order to explore the possibility 
that the relation between event uncertainty and ETU depends on the specific type of 
hazard function. In addition, it allowed us to dissociate expectation and preparation 
from the mere passage of time. Participants thus experienced different combinations 
of uncertainty about the type of forthcoming action (what; event uncertainty), and the 
likely time of its execution (when; ETU) for two hazard functions (PETU). 
All three factors, event uncertainty, ETU, and PETU, were blocked. In two 
sessions, separated by at least 24 hours, participants completed four blocks with all 
four combinations of event uncertainty and ETU with either PETU- or PETU+, 
respectively. The order of blocks and sessions for each participant was sampled 
randomly without replacement from the 24 possible permutations of the 4 blocks. In 
PETU-, each block consisted of 120 trials. In PETU+, each block consisted of 180 
trials, of which an IS was presented in approximately 120 (70%) of these trials.  
A short training of one block of 50 trials preceded each session. During 
training, index and little finger response were equally likely. FPs were sampled from 
a non-ageing exponential distribution (mean:  1500ms), to prevent participants from 
learning any systematic changes in IS probability throughout the FP. All FPs shorter 
than 488ms and longer than 3512ms were re-sampled. During training for PETU+, no 
IS was presented on 30% of trials. Overall, the experiment comprised two sessions 
of 1 (PETU-) and 1.5 hours (PETU+) each. 
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Event uncertainty (EU) 
We manipulated event uncertainty (EU) by varying the probability of index 
versus little finger responses. In EU-, index finger responses were prompted on 80% 
of all trials (20% little finger responses), whereas in EU+, index finger responses 
were prompted on only 55% of all trials (45% little finger responses). Therefore, 
predictability of impending action varied between the two conditions, thus 
manipulating event uncertainty.  
External temporal uncertainty (ETU) 
All FPs were sampled from truncated Gaussian distributions with a mean of 
2000ms. We manipulated ETU by varying the standard deviation of these Gaussians. 
In ETU-, the standard deviation was set to 200ms. In ETU+, standard deviation was 
set to 700ms. High standard deviation (ETU+) increases the variability in the time of 
the IS, decreasing IS predictability and thus increasing ETU. To allow sufficient time 
for preparation (Hackley, 2009; Hackley et al., 2009), and to preserve the symmetry 
of the Gaussian, the Gaussians were truncated at 488ms and 3512ms, respectively. 
Posterior external temporal uncertainty (PETU) 
We manipulated the probability that the IS occurs, at a given point in time 
throughout the foreperiod, given that is has not yet occurred (i.e. the posterior 
probability of the IS or the posterior external temporal uncertainty: PETU). We 
manipulated PETU by including trials without presentation of the IS in PETU+ (cf. 
dating example) and by presenting an IS on every single trial in PTEU- (cf. traffic light 
example). Consequently, in PETU+, after an initial increase in the probability of the 
IS, which peaked at the mean of the Gaussian (2000ms), IS probability decreased 
and it became more likely that no IS was going to be presented. By contrast, in 
PETU-, the posterior probability increased progressively throughout the foreperiod. 
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To create these distributions, we first divided the time in between the shortest 
(488ms) and longest FP (3512ms) in bins of 48ms (i.e. approximately three frames 
given a refresh rate of 60Hz) resulting in 63 time bins. We then determined the 
probability of the IS occurring on each bin, based on the Gaussian distribution (i.e. 
the probability density function) from which FPs were sampled (with the standard 
deviation set by the level of ETU). For PETU-, we selected one of these 63 bins 
according to a bin’s probability of IS occurrence. Consequently, a bin closer to the 
mean of the Gaussian was more likely to be chosen compared to a bin towards 
either tail end of the distribution. The presentation of the IS was then centred on the 
time of the selected bin. As a consequence of this procedure, the probability of IS 
occurrence increased progressively throughout the foreperiod: if the IS had not yet 
occurred at any given point throughout the foreperiod, then it was increasingly more 
likely to occur. 
To create PETU+, we determined, for each of the 63 bins independently, 
whether or not the IS would occur on that bin, based on each bin’s IS probability. 
Consequently, the IS was more likely to occur close to the mean of the Gaussian 
than towards either tail end of the distribution. In addition, due to this sampling 
scheme, there was a proportion of trials with either no IS (~30% of trials) or multiple 
ISs. In the latter case, only one of the ISs was subsequently chosen with equal 
probability. This prevented multiple ISs within a single trial whilst preserving the 
shape of the underlying Gaussian. Participants were instructed to refrain from action 
whenever they did not receive the IS. Effectively, these trials constituted catch trials. 
Inclusion of catch trials caused a decrease in the probability of IS occurrence 
throughout the FP after a peak in probability at the mean of the Gaussian (2000ms). 
Put differently, the probability to receive an IS started to decrease when the 
foreperiod exceeded 2000ms while the probability of a catch trial increased 
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gradually. Thus, for PETU+ the posterior probability of IS occurrence increased until 
2000ms and declined subsequently. 
Data analyses 
Reaction times (RT) were calculated between the onset of the IS and the 
behavioural response. Responses were considered correct if the response was 
made after the IS (RT > 0ms) with the instructed finger. We excluded all trials with 
incorrect responses from the RT analyses. In addition, we excluded outliers in RT 
(Grubb’s test).  
To test for effects of event uncertainty, ETU, and posterior external temporal 
uncertainty on action preparation, we computed a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 within-subject 
repeated measures ANOVA on mean reaction times with the following factors: (a) 
event uncertainty (EU-, EU+), (b) external temporal uncertainty (ETU-, ETU+), (c) 
posterior external temporal uncertainty (PETU-, PETU+), and additionally (d) the type 
of motor response (index, little finger). If a significant Mauchly’s test indicated a 
violation of the sphericity assumption, then degrees of freedom were corrected using 
the Greenhouse-Geisser correction. We report partial 
€ 
ηp
2  as a measure of effect size. 
Significant interaction effects were followed-up using paired t-tests. Statistical 
thresholds for significance were fixed at 0.05 for all analyses and, whenever 
appropriate, corrected for multiple comparisons using Bonferroni correction. 
Results 
Overall, 14% of all trials were excluded from further analysis. 12 % were 
excluded due to incorrect key-presses, less than 1% due to premature responses, 
and 2% were classified as outliers. Response accuracy exceeded 75% in every 
participant. 
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An ANOVA on mean RTs revealed that participants responded significantly 
faster when the probability of the IS increased progressively (PETU-) compared to 
when it peaked and then declined (PETU+; F(1,11) = 25.38, p < 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.698; see 
Figure 3). Posterior external temporal uncertainty interacted with no other 
experimental factors (all p > 0.1). Further, we found significantly faster responses for 
low versus high event uncertainty (F(1,11) = 7.49, p = 0.019, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.405), index versus 
little finger responses (F(1,11) = 46.09, p < 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.807), and low versus high 
ETU (F(1,11) = 28.25, p < 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.720). Event uncertainty interacted with the 
type of motor response (F(1,11) = 26.79, p < 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.709). Critically, the analysis 
revealed an interaction between event uncertainty and ETU (F(1,11) = 8.42, p = 0.014, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.434). In addition, the 3-way interaction between event uncertainty, the type of 
motor response, and ETU was significant (F(1,11) = 5.43, p = 0.04, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.330, Figure 
3.3). 
 
Figure 3.3: Reaction time data of Experiment 1. A. Mean reaction times for the hazard function 
with a progressive increase in the probability of the imperative stimulus (PETU+) and B. for the 
hazard function with the central peak (PETU-). Participants respond faster for PETU+ than PETU- 
but PETU did not interact with any of the other experimental variables. Responses with the less 
frequently prompted little finger were slower than predominant index finger responses. Low event 
(EU) and external temporal uncertainty (ETU) lead to faster responses. In the predominant index 
finger, the beneficial effect of low ETU was apparent only when event uncertainty was low, too: 
knowing what is a prerequisite for being able to benefit from knowing when. By contrast, responses 
with the less frequently prompted little finger were faster for low ETU, regardless of event 
uncertainty: while knowing what to do had no effect on little finger responses, knowing when to do it 
proved beneficial. 
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To explore the 3-way interaction, we collapsed across the factor PETU, and 
performed separate follow-up 2 x 2 within-subject repeated measures ANOVAs for 
each motor response (index / little finger). The ANOVA on mean reaction times for 
index finger responses revealed faster responses for low versus high event 
uncertainty (F(1,11) = 40.70, p < 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.787) and low versus high ETU (F(1,11) = 
18.86, p = 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.632; see Figure 3.3). Critically, the interaction between 
event uncertainty and ETU was significant (F(1,11) = 12.72, p = 0.004, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.536). 
This interaction was driven by a significant reduction in RTs for low versus high ETU 
at low event uncertainty only (t(11) = 5.98, p < 0.001). At high event uncertainty, RTs 
for high versus low ETU did not differ (t(11) = -0.115, p = 0.911). 
The ANOVA on mean reaction times for little finger responses, averaged 
across the levels of posterior external temporal uncertainty, revealed faster 
responses for low versus high ETU (F(1,11) = 20.37, p = 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.649). No other 
effects were found to be significant (all p > 0.1)  
Thus, the follow-up analyses revealed that the 3-way interaction was caused 
by a significant reduction in reaction times for low versus high ETU, at low event 
uncertainty for the predominant motor response (i.e., index finger in the EU- 
condition; mean RT difference = -28.3ms, SE = 4.74). By contrast, for little finger 
responses, we found a reduction in reaction times for low versus high ETU for both 
low (mean RT difference = -21.2ms, SE = 5.75) and high event uncertainty (mean RT 
difference = -11.2ms, SE = 4.62). An exploratory paired post-hoc t-test, across 
experimental conditions, revealed that the RT benefit of low ETU for predominant 
index finger responses at low event uncertainty was significantly greater compared to 
when participants responded with the less frequently prompted little finger at high 
event uncertainty (t(11) = -2.26, p = 0.045).  
Discussion 
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In Experiment 1, we explored the relation between event uncertainty and ETU 
on action preparation for two different hazard functions whilst removing ITU. The 
data revealed an interaction between ETU and event uncertainty: participants 
responded faster when they could predict both the timing of the imperative event (low 
ETU) and the type of forthcoming motor response (low event uncertainty), at least for 
predominantly prompted and thus prepared index finger responses. The beneficial 
effect of low ETU on action preparation was not limited to the action that was 
prepared. Responses with the unprepared little finger still benefited from low ETU in 
that RTs were reduced in the same way as for prepared motor responses. Rather 
strikingly, however, while there was no benefit of low ETU for prepared actions when 
the type of forthcoming action was unpredictable (high event uncertainty), 
unprepared motor responses benefitted from knowing the timing of forthcoming 
action (low ETU) under conditions of low and high event uncertainty. Importantly, 
while absent for prepared responses, this benefit of being able to predict the timing of 
imperative events was reduced for unprepared responses in the face of high versus 
low event uncertainty. We can conclude that knowing what action to prepare for is a 
prerequisite for being able to maximally benefit from knowledge about when to 
execute future action. Finally, we find that while participants are generally faster 
when there is a monotonous increase in posterior external temporal uncertainty, 
there is no interaction between event uncertainty, ETU, and the development of 
posterior external temporal uncertainty. Thus, the relation between ETU and event 
uncertainty does not depend on the particular type of hazard function. While the 
posterior probability of the IS reduces ETU, it does not interact with temporal or event 
uncertainty. 
Taken together, the data clearly show that, when ITU is removed, the 
maximal benefit of knowing when to act depends on knowledge about what action to 
prepare. This finding raises the question whether knowledge about the type of 
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forthcoming action and action timing interact in the same way when the origin of 
temporal uncertainty is internal rather than external? We pursued this question in a 
follow-up experiment (Experiment 2). Importantly, in order to make Experiment 1 and 
2 comparable, we sought to match levels of internal (ITU) and external (ETU) 
temporal uncertainty. We therefore determined the level of ITU associated with time 
intervals of various durations separately for each participant (Bridging Experiment: 
Estimating ITU) to then choose the appropriate parameters for Experiment 2. 
Bridging Experiment: estimating ITU 
Internal clocks do not operate at high precision; keeping track of time is 
difficult. Imprecision in tracking time induces ITU, which affects how we prepare for 
imperative events (Klemmer, 1956, 1957). Some people are better at measuring time 
than others (Simon Grondin & Killeen, 2009), which may lead to different preparation 
for action despite similar timing of imperative events. This Bridging Experiment was 
conducted to estimate the level of ITU, and its progressive increase with time interval 
duration (Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon & Allan, 1984; Rakitin et al., 1998), on a participant-
by-participant basis ultimately to determine suitable foreperiod durations for 
Experiment 2 to manipulate ITU for each participant separately.  
In Experiment 2, participants took part in a constant foreperiod choice 
reaction time task. We manipulated ITU by varying the duration of foreperiods across 
blocks: one short FP for low ITU and one long FP for high ITU (for a similar 
approach, see e.g. Holender & Bertelson, 1975; Klemmer, 1956; Spijkers & Walter, 
1985) thus exploiting the scalar property of interval timing to manipulate ITU. We 
selected the short foreperiod so that its associated level of ITU was matched with the 
level of ETU that participants experienced in the low ETU condition in Experiment 1. 
We used the same strategy for the long foreperiod and high temporal uncertainty. 
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This allowed us to directly compare the effects of temporal uncertainty on action 
preparation for an internal or external origin of temporal uncertainty. To estimate ITU 
and its progressive increase with time interval duration on a participant-by-participant 
basis, we used a standard time interval production task (Lejeune & Wearden, 2006; 
Lewis & Miall, 2009a). We expected to find a linear increase in standard deviation 
with increasing time interval duration (Lejeune & Wearden, 2006). Using this linear 




28 participants (mean age = 26.5 years, age range = 19 – 47 years, 11 
males, 1 left-handed) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision took part in this 
study. Participants were reimbursed for time and travel (£7.50). They gave written 
informed consent before the experiment. This study was conducted with the approval 
of a local ethics committee and in line with the declaration of Helsinki. 
Apparatus 
The experiment was run on a desktop computer, using the cogent 2000 
toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php) running under Matlab 7.5 
(Mathworks, Natick, MA). Stimuli were presented on a 19’ LCD screen with a refresh 
rate of 60Hz. Participants responded by pressing < space > with their right index 
finger on a QWERTY keyboard. 
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Experimental procedure & design 
Participants completed a time interval reproduction task. They were instructed 
to reproduce one out of four target intervals (TI: 838ms, 1584ms, 2338ms, 3084ms) 
as accurately as possible. This interval reproduction task was conducted to estimate 
the level of ITU for each TI to compute one short and one long FP duration for each 
participant with an associated SD of 200 and 600, respectively. Note that this second 
value is lower than the standard deviation of the Gaussian used for high ETU in 
Experiment 1 (SD = 700). This is because inspection of FPs used in Experiment 1 
revealed that the standard deviation of the Gaussian was described better by 600 
than 700 due to the truncation of Gaussians. 
We designed the current experiment to resemble Experiment 1 and 2 as 
closely as possible to acquire accurate estimates of the level of ITU for each TI (see 
Figure 3.4). This was important because accuracy in time interval estimation is 
sensitive to various stimulus features (Burr et al., 2009). Each trial comprised a 
reference phase that indicated the TI (measurement phase, see Figure 3.4), followed 
by the estimation phase (see Figure 3.4; we reasoned that during Experiment 2, 
participants can use the preceding trial as a reference to estimate the timing of the IS 
on the subsequent trial; Los, Knol, & Boers, 2001). Trial onset was indicated by brief 
presentation of a fixation cross (200ms). Following fixation, participants saw a simple 
clock, a white circle with a black clock hand, superimposed on a red square. The red 
square indicated the reference phase. The clock hand was in the 12 o’clock position 
at trial start, and started moving immediately back and forth in a random walk, thus 
not providing any information about the passage of time. We included the clock, 
despite it not being informative, to match the stimulus characteristics of Experiment 1 
and 2. Participants were instructed to ignore the clock. 
The end of the TI was marked by a green shape (circle or square, 
counterbalanced across subjects) briefly flashing on the screen for 200 ms. The 
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clock disappeared after 1.5 times the TI, measured from trial onset. Then, the screen 
went blank for a variable time interval sampled from a non-aging exponential 
distribution (mean = 300ms) to prevent a progressively increasing expectancy about 
the onset of the measurement phase. If participants responded during the reference 




Subsequently, after brief presentation of the fixation cross (200ms), 
participants saw a simple clock superimposed on a green background, indicating the 
estimation phase. As before, the clock hand was in the 12 o’clock position at trial 
start, and started moving at the beginning of the estimation phase. Participants 
indicated their estimate of TI by pressing < space > with their right index finger. The 
Figure 3.4: Design for the Bridging Experiment. Participants completed a time interval 
reproduction task. During the measurement phase (top line / red square in background), they were 
presented with the target interval. The start of the target interval was determined by the onset of the 
clock face. The end of the target interval was set by a briefly flashing circle or square (200ms; 
counterbalanced across subjects). During this phase, the clock was presented on red background to 
indicate that participants were not yet required to respond. The clock handle moved back and forth 
in a random walk fashion and therefore did not provide information about the passage of time or the 
timing of the circle or square. The clock disappeared after 1.5 times the target time interval 
measured from trial onset. After a variable time interval, during which the screen was blank, the 
clock face reappeared (bottom line). The clock was now superimposed on green background to 
instruct participants to respond during the estimation phase. The onset of the clock indicated the 
start of the target interval. With their response, participants determined the end of the target interval. 
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clock on green background disappeared after 1.5 times the TI to allow participants 
sufficient time to respond, in particular when TIs were overestimated (i.e. when 
participants responded late). ITIs were sampled from a non-ageing exponential 
distribution (mean = 300ms) to prevent any build-up of expectancy about subsequent 
trial onset (S. Los & Schut, 2008). During the ITI the clock disappeared and the 
screen went blank. 
Participants had to reproduce different TIs, separately in different blocks. 
Each block was preceded by 10 training trials to familiarise participants with a block’s 
respective TI (Lewis & Miall, 2009a). On those training trials, participants received 
visual trial-by-trial feedback about their accuracy. The participant’s estimate was 
indicated by a yellow line in relation to a red bar whose height indicated the duration 
of the TI. The distance and direction between the yellow line and the red bar 
informed participants about the magnitude and direction of bias in their time interval 
estimate. Following these training trials, participants completed 60 trials for each TI 
with summary feedback about their accuracy at the end of each block. Taken 
together, participants completed 4 blocks of 70 trials each. 
This experiment was preceded by a short training session. Participants 
completed 10 trials with trial-by-trial feedback and 10 trials with summary feedback 
about their average time interval estimate. The only purpose of this training was to 
familiarise participants with the task but not to train them in reproducing a specific 
time interval duration. For that reason, the TI during training was the mean of the four 
TIs used during the experiment (1875ms). Overall, this Bridging Experiment lasted 
one hour. 
Data Analyses 
Participant’s time interval estimates were computed as the time in between 
the start of the TI and the participant’s response. Outliers in time interval estimates 
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were excluded using Grubb’s test (α = 0.05). Then, we computed the mean and 
standard deviation (SD) in time interval estimates for each TI. 
To test for an increase in SD with increasing TI duration, we computed a 4 x 1 
within-subject repeated measures ANOVA on SD with TI as a factor (838ms, 
1584ms, 2338ms, 3084ms). Then, we fitted linear regression models to SDs against 
respective TIs, separately for each participant. As a measure of fit, we inspected R2 
separately for each participant. We excluded participants from further analysis and 
participation in Experiment 2 if R2 dropped below 0.75, which suggests a deviation 
from the scalar property of interval timing. We chose such a stringent criterion 
because the data acquired here were used to determine FPs for Experiment 2. A 
deviation from the scalar property of interval timing might have compromised the 
accuracy of chosen FPs for Experiment 2. 
For remaining subjects, using the linear regression models, we predicted the 
two time intervals that would produce SDs of 200ms and 600ms. We excluded all 
participants from further analysis and participation in Experiment 2 if one of the two 
time intervals was shorter than 500ms or longer than 6000ms. We chose 500ms to 
allow sufficient time for preparation measured from trial onset, as in Experiment 1 
(Hackley, 2009; Hackley et al., 2009). We chose the upper boundary of 6000ms to 
limit the overall duration of Experiment 2 and to reduce the likelihood to tap into 
different timing mechanisms that operate at a different and larger temporal scale 
(Mauk & Buonomano, 2004). 
For the remaining participants, we tested for a bias in time interval estimation. 
Linear regression models were fitted to mean time interval estimates against TI 
duration. Regression coefficients were extracted and analysed. A regression 
coefficient equal to one would suggest no bias in time interval estimation. A one-
sample t-test was used to test whether regression coefficients differed from one. 
 	   105 
Results 
1% of all trials was classified as outliers on the basis of time interval 
estimates and excluded from further analysis. We note that exclusion of outliers will 
affect estimates of SD, but this effect is here limited due to the small percentage of 
excluded outliers. 
The 4 x 1 within subject repeated measures ANOVA on SD in time interval 
estimates revealed a significant effect of TI (F(3,81) = 41.41, p < 0.001, ηp = 0.611; see 
Figure 3.5AB). As expected, standard deviation increased progressively with 
increasing TI duration (TI750 – TI1500: t(27) = -4.51, p < 0.001; TI1500 – TI2250: t(27) = -4.79, 
p < 0.001; TI2250 – TI3000: t(27) = -4.55, p < 0.001). Inspection of R2, averaged across 
participants (mean = 0.77), revealed that linear regression models provided a good 
description of the data. We excluded seven participants because R2-adjusted was 
smaller than 0.75. This was driven by a non-monotonic increase in SD with 
increasing TI duration thus revealing a deviation from the scalar property of interval 
timing. 
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Averaged across remaining participants, the time intervals associated with a 
SD of 200ms and 600ms were 959ms (SE = 154) and 4482ms (SE = 454), 
respectively. Three participants were excluded from further analysis and participation 
in Experiment 2 because the time interval associated with a SD of 200ms was 
shorter than 500ms. An additional four participants were excluded because their time 
interval corresponding to a SD of 600ms was longer than 6000ms. Thus effectively, 
the first 3 participants were excluded because they were too noisy, and the latter four 
Figure 3.5: Data of Bridging Experiment. A. The standard deviation of participants’ target interval 
estimates plotted against target interval duration averaged across all subjects. Standard deviation 
increased linearly with increasing target interval duration. B. The standard deviation of participants’ 
target interval estimates plotted against target interval duration for 5 representative participants 
(solid lines) and their corresponding linear fits (dashed lines). C. Mean target interval estimates 
(solid blue line) plotted against the target interval duration (dashed black line). D. Difference 
between participants’ target interval estimates and the target intervals. Participants systematically 
overestimated the shortest target interval and systematically underestimated the longest target 
interval but the magnitude of this bias was small. 
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because they were too accurate in time interval estimation. After exclusion of these 
participants, the time intervals associated with an SD of 200ms and 600ms were 
1046ms (SE = 84.6) and 3695ms (SE = 324), respectively, averaged across 
participants. 
A one-sample t-test on regression coefficients (mean = 0.93, SE = 0.04), 
extracted from the linear model on mean time interval estimates against target 
interval duration, revealed a significant bias in time perception (t(14) = 25.46, p < 
0.001; see Figure 3.5CD). This bias, however, was qualitatively small: on average, 
participants’ time interval estimates deviated by 8.23%, 0.87%, 0.04%, and -1.57%, 
respectively, from the respective TIs.  
Discussion 
This Bridging Experiment was conducted to estimate participants’ ITU 
expressed by their variability in time interval reproduction. We predicted a linear 
increase in standard deviation of reproduced time intervals with increasing target 
interval duration. Indeed, the standard deviation increased progressively with 
increasing target interval duration. In 21 out of 28 participants, this relation was 
described well by a linear model. Using this linear relationship, we estimated two 
time intervals for each participant separately associated with a standard deviation of 
200 and 600. Six participants were too noisy or too accurate in time interval 
estimation and had to be excluded because their estimated foreperiods were too 
short or too long, respectively. Thus, 15 participants qualified to participate in 
Experiment 2. 
The data furthermore show a small but systematic bias in time perception. 
Participants systematically overestimated time intervals shorter and underestimated 
time intervals longer than the mean target interval (i.e. regression towards the mean; 
Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010). However, although significant, the bias turned out to be 
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small. The standard deviation therefore provided an adequate description of 
participants’ ITU. The estimated time intervals associated with a standard deviation 
of 200ms and 600ms thus reliably manipulated ITU in Experiment 2 and guaranteed 
that Experiment 1 and 2 were matched in level but not origin of temporal uncertainty. 
Experiment 2 
Does it matter, for the relation between event and temporal uncertainty, 
whether temporal uncertainty originates from an unpredictable world (ETU) or noisy 
time perception (ITU)? We addressed this question in Experiment 2. Experiment 1 
revealed that, when temporal uncertainty was induced by an unpredictable world, 
knowledge about what action to prepare for is a prerequisite to (maximally) benefit 
from being able to predict the timing of future action. Does this relation between 
event and temporal uncertainty change when temporal uncertainty comes instead 
from noisy time perception? Participants may be able to compensate for high ITU, 
due to life-long experience with their own noisy time perception, which in turn may 
alter the relation between event and temporal uncertainty. Perhaps, the ability to 
compensate depends on at least being able to predict the type of forthcoming motor 
action?  
To explore these questions, we used a constant foreperiod choice reaction 
time task in which one short (low ITU) and one long (high ITU) foreperiod were 
selected for each participant individually, based on the results of the Bridging 
Experiment. This ensured that levels of internal (ITU; Experiment 2) and external 
temporal uncertainty (ETU; Experiment 1) were comparable across experiments. 
Based on Experiment 1 and previous work (Holender & Bertelson, 1975; 
Spijkers, 1990; Spijkers & Walter, 1985), three alternative hypotheses were 
conceivable: (i) the origin of temporal uncertainty does not modulate the relation 
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between temporal and event uncertainty. In other words, the interaction between ITU 
and event uncertainty is comparable to the interaction between ETU and event 
uncertainty (i.e. maximal benefit of low ITU under conditions of low event 
uncertainty). Alternatively, the origin of temporal uncertainty may matter for the 
relation between temporal and event uncertainty. (ii) ITU and event uncertainty may 
have independent effects on action, as previously reported (Holender & Bertelson, 
1975; Spijkers, 1990; Spijkers & Walter, 1985); or (iii) the interaction between ITU 
and event uncertainty may be qualitatively different from the one reported in 
Experiment 1: for example, while participants may be able to compensate for high 
ITU when they know which action to prepare for, they may suffer from high ITU when 
the type of future action is unpredictable. This latter option could explain why, given 
our findings of Experiment 1, previous studies on the relation between event and 
temporal uncertainty have found additive effects of temporal and event uncertainty 
on action preparation. In these studies, when participants experienced both ETU and 
ITU in conjunction. In this case, if Hypothesis 3 turns out to be true, effects of ETU 
and ITU would cancel each other out. For that reason, given findings of Experiment 
1, we here adopt the third hypothesis. 
Methods 
Participants 
We re-invited all 15 participants who satisfied the criteria of the Bridging 
Experiment to participate in Experiment 2. One participant did not respond to our 
invitation. Thus, 14 participants (mean age = 26.9 years, age range = 20 – 47 years, 
6 males, 1 left-handed) took part in Experiment 2. Participants were reimbursed for 
time and travel (£10). They gave written informed consent before participation. This 
study was conducted with the approval of a local ethics committee and in line with 
the declaration of Helsinki. 
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Apparatus 
The experiment was run on a desktop computer, using the cogent 2000 
toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php) running under Matlab 7.5 
(Mathworks, Natick, MA). Stimuli were presented on a 19’ LCD screen with a refresh 
rate of 60Hz. Participants responded by pressing right < AltGr > and < Ctrl > keys 
with their right index and little finger, respectively, on a standard QWERTY keyboard. 
Experimental procedure 
Participants completed a constant FP choice reaction time task in which they 
were instructed to respond to the appearance of an imperative stimulus (IS) as fast 
as possible but not at the expense of accuracy (see Figure 3.6). Participants 
experienced two levels of event uncertainty (EU-, EU+) and two levels of internal 
temporal uncertainty (ITU-, ITU+). Posterior external temporal uncertainty (PETU) 
was not manipulated in Experiment 2. A constant FP choice reaction time task does 
not allow manipulation of posterior external temporal uncertainty. 
The constant FP choice reaction time task resembled the variable choice 
reaction time task in all aspects except for (a) FP duration (see below) and (b) the 
information provided by the clock (see Figure 3.6). In Experiment 1 the clock 
removed ITU, whereas in Experiment 2, the clock did not provide information about 
the passage of time. The clock hand was in the 12 o’clock position at trial start. It 
started moving back and forth in a random walk fashion. Participants received the 
imperative stimulus (IS), a circle or square prompting index or little finger responses, 
respectively after a constant FP. The clock hand continued to move back and forth 
until 1.5 times the FP measured since trial start. The clock disappeared and the 
screen went blank thereafter. After an ITI, sampled from a non-ageing (exponential) 
distribution (mean = 300ms) participants continued with the next trial. 
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Experimental design 
Participants were exposed to four different experimental conditions created 
by combining high and low event uncertainty (EU-, EU+) with high and low ITU (ITU-, 
ITU+) in a 2 x 2 factorial design. The factors event uncertainty and ITU were blocked. 
Participants completed 4 block each 120 trials. Before the experiment, participants 
took part in a short training session of one block of 50 trials. The FP used during 
training was the mean of the two FPs using during the experiment. 
Event uncertainty (EU) 
Event uncertainty was manipulated as in Experiment 1. In EU-, index finger 
responses were prompted on 80% of all trials (20% little finger responses). In EU+, 
index finger responses were prompted on 55% of all trials (45% little finger 
responses). 
Internal temporal uncertainty (ITU) 
The level of internal temporal uncertainty was manipulated by choosing a 
short (ITU-) and a long (ITU+) constant FP. The duration of the short and long FP 
Figure 3.6: Design of Experiment 2. Participants completed a constant foreperiod 2-choice 
reaction time task. The imperative stimulus (IS) occurred after a short foreperiod (low internal 
temporal uncertainty; ITU) or long foreperiod (high ITU). The duration of these two foreperiods was 
determined on a subject-by-subject basis based on the results of the bridging experiment. The short 
foreperiod was associated with a standard deviation of 200 and the long foreperiod with a standard 
deviation of 600. For low event uncertainty, index finger responses were prompted by the IS on 80% 
of all trials. Little finger responses were prompted on the remaining 20%. For high event uncertainty, 
index and little finger responses were prompted on 55% and 45% of all trials, respectively. The clock 
handle moved back and forth in a random walk thus not providing information about the passage of 
time or the timing of the IS. 
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was estimated for each participant separately (see Bridging Experiment) so that the 
short FP would be associated with a SD of 200ms, and the long FP with a SD of 
600ms. In this way, the ITU levels in Experiment 2 were matched to the two levels of 
ETU in Experiment 1. The short FP averaged across participants was 936ms (SE = 
83) and the long FP 3643ms (SE = 305). 
Data analysis 
Reaction times (RT) were calculated between the onset of the IS and the 
behavioural response. Responses were considered correct if the response was 
made after the IS (RT > 0ms) with the instructed finger. We excluded all trials with 
incorrect responses (e.g. index finger responses when the little finger was prompted) 
from further analyses. In addition, we excluded trials with outlying reaction times 
(Grubb’s test, α = 0.05). 
We directly compared the data acquired in the present experiment, where 
temporal uncertainty had an internal origin, to the data from Experiment 1 (only 
PETU- to match experiments in that an IS occurred on each trial), where the origin of 
temporal uncertainty was external. We computed a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed between-
within subjects ANOVA on mean reaction times with the origin of temporal 
uncertainty as a between-subject factor (external / internal) and event uncertainty 
(EU-, EU+), the level of temporal uncertainty (TU-/TU+), and the type of motor 
response (index, little) as within subject factors. If Mauchly’s test indicated a violation 
of the sphericity assumption, then degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser. We report partial 
€ 
ηp
2  as measures of effect size. Significant 
effects were further explored using paired t-tests. Statistical threshold was fixed at 
0.05 for all analyses and, whenever appropriate, corrected for multiple comparisons 
using Bonferroni corrections. 
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Results 
Data from two participants were excluded from further analysis as their total 
number of errors exceeded 25% of all trials. Of the remaining 12 participants, 11.4% 
of all trials were excluded from further analysis due to incorrect key-presses, less 
than 1% due to premature responses. 2% were classified as RT outliers. 
The 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed between-within subjects ANOVA on mean reaction 
times revealed that participants responded faster under conditions of external 
compared to internal temporal uncertainty (F(1,22) = 4.43, p = 0.047, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.168; see 








= 0.188), and for low versus high temporal uncertainty (F(1,22) = 4.83, p 0.039, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 
0.180). In addition, we found a significant 2-way interaction between event 
uncertainty and the type of motor response (F(1,22) = 20.19, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.479) and, crucially, 
a significant 3-way interaction between event uncertainty, the level of temporal 
uncertainty, and the origin of temporal uncertainty (F(1,22) = 14.12, p = 0.001, 
€ 
ηp
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The significant 2-way interaction between event uncertainty and the type of 
motor response was driven by a reduction in RT for low versus high event 
uncertainty for index finger responses only (t(11) = -5.13, p < 0.001) while there was 
no difference between high versus low event uncertainty for little finger responses 
(t(11) = 1.13, p = 0.282; see Figure 3.7). 
We further explored the significant 3-way interaction by computing two 2 x 2 
within subject repeated measures ANOVAs separately for ETU and ITU averaged 
across the type of motor response. For ITU, the follow-up ANOVA revealed a 
significant interaction between event uncertainty and temporal uncertainty (F(1,11) = 
6.80, p =0.024, 
€ 
ηp
2  = 0.382). This interaction was driven by an increase in reaction 
times for high versus low ITU at high event uncertainty approaching the boundary of 
significance (t(11) = -2.13,p = 0.056; see Figure 3.7). There was no difference in 
reaction times for high versus low ITU at low event uncertainty (t(11) = 0.29, p = 
0.774). 
Figure 3.7: Reaction time data of Experiment 2. A. The data of Experiment 1 for progressively 
increasing posterior temporal uncertainty (PETU+). These data were compared directly to the data 
of Experiment 2. B. The data revealed that the relation between event and temporal uncertainty 
depends on the origin of temporal uncertainty. When the origin of temporal uncertainty is external 
(ETU), then one has to know what to do to benefit from knowing when to do it. By contrast, when the 
origin of temporal uncertainty is internal (ITU), then not knowing when has a detrimental effect only 
when the information about what to do is limited, too (high event uncertainty). When participants 
know what action to prepare for, they may be able to compensate for high ITU. 
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For ETU, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of temporal 
uncertainty (F(1,11) = 26.34, p < 0.001) and a significant interaction between temporal 
and motor uncertainty (F(1,11) = 10.50, p = 0.008). This interaction was driven by a 
significant reduction in RTs for low versus high ETU at low event uncertainty only 
(t(11) = -5.48, p < 0.001; see Figure 3.7). At high event uncertainty, the reduction in 
RTs was marginally significant (t(11) = -1.84, p = 0.093). These results correspond 
with the findings of Experiment 1 where the same data were analysed separately for 
index and little finger responses but averaged across the levels of posterior external 
temporal uncertainty. 
Thus, the 3-way interaction revealed that the interaction between temporal 
and event uncertainty depends on the internal or external origin of temporal 
uncertainty. For ITU, we found a marginally significant beneficial effect of low 
temporal uncertainty only when participants could not predict the type of forthcoming 
motor response at high event uncertainty. By contrast, for ETU, we found a 
significant beneficial effect of low ETU on RTs only when the type of forthcoming 
motor action was predictable at low event uncertainty. 
Discussion 
We here asked whether the source of temporal uncertainty, that is an 
unpredictable world (ETU) or noisy time perception (ITU), determines whether event 
and temporal uncertainty interact. In line with our predictions, we indeed found that 
the origin of temporal uncertainty determines the interaction between temporal and 
event uncertainty. For ETU, there is a beneficial effect of low temporal uncertainty 
but only when the type of forthcoming motor action is predictable (i.e. low event 
uncertainty). For ITU, participants can compensate for the detrimental effect of high 
ITU on action preparation but only when forthcoming motor actions are predictable 
(i.e. low event uncertainty). When event uncertainty is high, action preparation is 
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detrimentally affected by high ITU and responses are slower. These findings reveal, 
for the first time, a fundamental difference in the influence of ETU and ITU on action 
preparation under conditions of event uncertainty.  
The effects of temporal uncertainty, both ETU and ITU, are not restricted to 
the action that was prepared (i.e. predominant index finger responses). Unprepared 
index finger responses were slower but the modulation of reaction times by event 
and temporal uncertainty followed the same pattern as for prepared motor 
responses. Two distinct preparatory processes thus support temporal and event 
preparation: event preparation is selective for prepared motor action while temporal 
preparation is non-selective but transient. Importantly, the data reveal that these two 
preparatory processes are influenced by the origin of temporal uncertainty. 
General discussion 
The experiments presented in this chapter address whether the origin of 
temporal uncertainty determines how temporal and event uncertainty interact. In 
other words, does it matter for preparation for action whether temporal uncertainty 
arises from an unpredictable world (ETU) or, alternatively, from noisy time perception 
(ITU). And if so, how does this impact on whether one can benefit from knowing what 
action to prepare for when action timing is unknown and vice versa?  
Summary of results 
The present data reveal that the relation between temporal und event 
uncertainty indeed depends on the origin of temporal uncertainty: when temporal 
uncertainty is caused by an unpredictable world (ETU) then action preparation 
benefits from low temporal uncertainty only when one knows what action to prepare 
for (i.e. low event uncertainty). By contrast, participants can compensate for high 
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ITU, but only when impending motor actions are highly predictable (i.e. low event 
uncertainty). When impending motor actions are less predictable (i.e. high event 
uncertainty), then action preparation is detrimentally affected by high ITU. 
The effects of ETU, ITU, and event uncertainty on action preparation are not 
limited to the predicted and thus prepared actions. Less frequently prompted (and 
thus unprepared) actions also benefit, to a comparable extent, from low ETU when 
the type of forthcoming action is predictable (i.e. low event uncertainty; with one 
exception which we discuss below). Similarly, preparation for action is impaired by 
high ITU under conditions of high event uncertainty for prepared and unprepared 
motor actions. These data thus support the proposal that preparation for what to do 
(i.e. event preparation) and when to do it (i.e. temporal preparation) engage two 
distinct preparatory processes (Bertelson & Boons, 1960; Holender & Bertelson, 
1975; Sanders, 1990; Spijkers, 1990; Spijkers & Walter, 1985). Event preparation is 
selective for the prepared action and explains faster responses for prepared motor 
actions. By contrast, temporal preparation is non-selective for the type of action: both 
frequently and less frequently prompted actions are affected to the same extent by 
ETU and ITU. Event preparation can be maintained over time, which is why it is not 
affected by information about when to act (i.e. ETU or ITU). Temporal preparation, on 
the contrary, is transient (i.e. difficult to maintain over time; see Alegria, 1974; 
Gottsdanker, 1975). Consequently, knowing when to act improves action 
preparation. 
Two strategic adjustments in preparation: the certainty & the strategy effect 
Importantly, our data reveal that the origin of temporal uncertainty affects the 
preparatory processes that underlie both event and temporal preparation, 
respectively. The relation between ETU, ITU, and event uncertainty can be 
accounted for by two (or three, see below) strategic adjustments in action 
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preparation under conditions of event uncertainty and either ETU or ITU (see Figure 
8). First, temporal preparation may be modulated by event uncertainty: when actions 
are less predictable (i.e. high event uncertainty) then the time interval decreases 
across which preparation can be maintained (certainty effect). Second, there may be 
a change in strategy when preparing for action under conditions of ETU compared to 
ITU (strategy effect). By definition, when participants experience ETU, the timing of 
the imperative stimulus varies from one instance to the next. Participants attempt to 
align preparation with the (their estimated) likely timing of the imperative event. In 
order to do so, participants give particular weight to the timing of the immediately 
preceding imperative stimulus as a temporal cue for subsequent preparation (Alegria 
& Delhaye-Rembaux, 1975; Bertelson, 1967; Bertelson & Tisseyre, 1968; Drazin, 
1961; Los et al., 2001; Steinborn, Rolke, Bratzke, & Ulrich, 2008; Vallesi & Shallice, 
2007; Van der Lubbe, Los, Jaśkowski, & Verleger, 2004). By contrast, ITU is induced 
by inaccurate time perception. The objective timing of imperative events does not 
vary. Previous studies have revealed that participants can compensate for subjective 
timing variability induced by inaccurate time perception (Balci et al., 2009; Hudson et 
al., 2008). This entails that participants know, to some extent, that they induce 
(subjective) timing variability. Consequently, instead of using their subjective 
estimate about the timing of the IS on the preceding trial, participants might align 
their preparation with their best current (but noisy) subjective estimate about the 
timing of the IS (Figure 3.8DE).  
This change in strategy (i.e. the strategy effect), together with the certainty 
effect, can account for the interaction between ETU, ITU, and event uncertainty (see 
Figure 3.8). In general, given a fixed time interval across which preparation can be 
maintained (i.e. the preparatory interval, see Figure 8A), responses to imperative 
events are less likely to benefit from preparation when temporal uncertainty is high, 
regardless of its origin (Figure 3.8C). Importantly, for comparable levels of temporal 
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uncertainty, due to the strategy effect, preparation is less likely to coincide with the IS 
under conditions of ETU, compared to ITU (Figure 3.8BC) because participants are 
trying to “chase up” the imperative event by taking the timing of the IS on the 
preceding trial as a temporal cue for preparation on the subsequent trial. 
Consequently, the timing of participants’ preparatory interval will vary from trial to trial 
more strongly for preparation under conditions of ETU than ITU. Participants are 
therefore more likely to be unprepared when the IS occurs under conditions of ETU, 
compared to ITU (see Figure 3.8BC), because they were prepared at the wrong 
moment in time.  
In addition, when event uncertainty is high, participants are less likely to be 
prepared when the IS occurs, under conditions of ETU and ITU, due to the certainty 
effect. Figure 8D illustrates that there is a preparatory interval that maximises the 
difference in the probability to be prepared when the IS occurs between low and high 
ETU (or low and high ITU). This difference decreases on either side of this 
“maximising” preparatory interval, with a steeper slope for increasingly shorter 
preparatory intervals, and for preparation under conditions of ITU to either side. The 
specific preparatory interval for low and high event uncertainty may then determine 
(the direction of) the difference in the probability to be prepared when the IS occurs 
for high and low ETU and ITU. For a variety of preparatory intervals, this difference 
between high and low ETU will be larger for low compared to high event uncertainty 
(see Figure 3.8D for an example), in agreement with observed differences in reaction 
times. And for the same variety of preparatory intervals, this difference between high 
and low ITU will be smaller for low compared to high event uncertainty (see 3.8D for 
an example), again in agreement with the reaction times observed in this study. As 
such, the relation between event, temporal, and the origin of temporal uncertainty 
can be explained by two adjustments in preparation: the certainty effect and the 
strategy effect. While the former reveals that temporal preparation is sensitive to 
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information about the forthcoming type of motor action, the latter reveals a 
fundamental difference in preparation for action under conditions of ETU versus ITU 
(i.e. a change in strategy). 
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Figure 3.8: The interaction between ETU, ITU, and event uncertainty. The interaction between event, 
temporal, and the origin of temporal uncertainty may arise from (i) a decrease in the duration of the time 
interval across which preparation can be maintained for high versus low event uncertainty (certainty effect), 
(ii) a change in strategy when preparing for actions under conditions of external (ETU) versus internal 
temporal uncertainty (ITU; strategy effect), and potentially (iii) an increase in the duration of the preparatory 
interval for internal (ITU) versus external temporal uncertainty (ETU) that compensates for internally 
generated temporal noise (compensation effect). The plots in B-E show simulated effects of these different 
preparatory adjustments on the level action preparation that can occur when exposed to combinations of high 
and low event uncertainty (EU), external temporal uncertainty (ETU), or internal temporal uncertainty (ITU). 
Simulated effects were obtained by sampling 10.000 foreperiods from two Gaussians (mean: 2000ms; 
standard deviation: 200 for low temporal uncertainty, 600 for high temporal uncertainty). We assumed that 
variability was either externally induced (ETU; orange) or originated from inaccurate internal clocks (ITU; 
green). The interaction between event, temporal, and the origin of temporal uncertainty can be explained by 
the certainty and strategy effect alone, see D. However, adding the compensation effect accounts for more 
specific differences in observed reaction times (see E).  
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A. The foreperiod (FP) is the time interval in between trial onset and the occurrence of the imperative 
stimulus (IS). The preparatory interval is the time interval across which preparation can be maintained. 
For simplicity, in the current simulation, the preparatory interval has a sudden on- and offset. We note 
that assuming a more a gradual on- and off-set (e.g. a bell-shaped preparatory interval) would not 
substantially change the influence of the certainty, strategy, and compensation effect on action 
preparation.  
B. Under conditions of ETU, participants use the timing of the IS on the previous trial as a temporal cue 
for action preparation on the subsequent trial. Under conditions of ITU, participants align preparation 
according to their subjective but noisy estimates about current foreperiod duration. This difference lies at 
the heart of the strategy effect: when matching the level of temporal uncertainty (here: high temporal 
uncertainty, SD = 600) and the duration of the preparatory interval (here: 300ms), preparation is more 
likely to be misaligned with the timing of the imperative event under conditions of ETU compared to ITU. 
In more formal terms, the difference in time between the mid-point of the preparatory interval and the IS 
(x-axis) is on average greater for ETU compared to ITU. Here, this is reflected by a higher standard 
deviation in the cumulative frequency (y-axis) distribution of the difference in time between the mid-point 
of the preparatory interval and the timing of the imperative event (x-axis). C. The probability, P (in %; y-
axis) that the IS falls into the preparatory interval, shown for conditions of ETU (orange) and ITU (green) 
for a range of preparatory intervals (in ms; x-axis). Participants are more likely to benefit from 
preparation when temporal uncertainty is low (bold lines), regardless of the origin of uncertainty, and 
when the preparatory interval is long.  
D. The difference in probability (in %, y-axis) between high and low internal (green) and external 
(orange) temporal uncertainty (cf. C: the difference between solid and dashed lines). The difference 
between high and low temporal uncertainty increases, peaks, and then slowly tapers off with increasing 
duration of the preparatory interval. The difference between high and low temporal uncertainty thus 
depends on the duration of the preparatory interval for both ETU and ITU. It is small when the 
preparatory interval is extremely short or long, while it is comparatively large for intermediate values. 
This has significant impact on how subjects deal with event, temporal, and the origin of temporal 
uncertainty. A relatively short preparatory interval for high event uncertainty (certainty effect), and 
conversely a long interval for low event uncertainty, can explain the increase in reaction times for high 
compared to low ETU under conditions of low event uncertainty (EU-) and the increase in reaction times 
for high compared to low ITU under conditions of high event uncertainty (EU+), respectively. Here, two 
preparatory intervals were chosen for which this observed relation between event, temporal, and the 
origin of temporal uncertainty holds. The bar graphs show the difference in probability that the imperative 
event is going to benefit from preparation for action (i.e. that the preparatory interval coincides with the 
timing of the IS) for low minus high temporal uncertainty. A bigger difference in probability will translate 
into a bigger difference in reaction times. This illustrates that the certainty effect and the strategy effect 
can explain the interaction between event, temporal, and the origin of temporal uncertainty. In agreement 
with observed reaction times, the difference in probability is larger for high versus low ETU under 
conditions of low event uncertainty (EU-) and high versus low ITU under conditions of high event 
uncertainty (EU+).  
E. Adding the compensation effect to the strategy, and certainty effect removes the restriction that 
preparatory intervals must be comparable for ETU and ITU. Preparatory intervals are longer for ITU 
because participants increase the time interval across which preparation is maintained, at the expense of 
the overall strength of preparation, to be at least somewhat prepared when the IS occurs. The difference 
in the duration of the preparatory interval between high and low event uncertainty, however, is 
comparable for ETU and ITU (i.e. the certainty effect does not interact with the compensation effect). 
Adding the compensation effect can account for no difference in reaction times for low versus high ETU 
under conditions of high event uncertainty (EU+) and no difference in reaction time for low versus high 
ITU under conditions of low event uncertainty (EU-). 
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A third strategic adjustment in preparation: the compensation effect 
Participants may further attempt to compensate for high ITU (cf. Balci et al., 
2009; Hudson et al., 2008) by directly adjusting the duration of the time interval 
across which preparation is maintained (compensation effect).  This may come at the 
expense of the overall strength of preparation (Figure 3.8E). In other words, 
participants may compensate for high ITU by maintaining preparation across a longer 
time interval to ensure at least some level of preparation when the IS actually occurs. 
In comparing Figure 3.8D to Figure 3.8E, one can see that the compensation effect 
removes the restriction that preparatory intervals for high and low event uncertainty 
must be comparable for ETU and ITU. Instead, preparatory intervals are longer for 
ITU while the difference in preparatory intervals for high compared to low event 
uncertainty remains comparable for both types of temporal uncertainty (i.e. the size 
of the certainty effect does not depend on the origin of temporal uncertainty). Adding 
this compensation effect can account for the observed increase in reaction times for 
high versus low ETU under conditions of low event uncertainty (EU-) while there was 
no detectable reaction time difference when event uncertainty was high (EU+). 
Similarly, while we found no difference between high and low ITU for low event 
uncertainty (EU-), reaction times increased for high versus low ITU when event 
uncertainty was high (EU+). Further, the compensation effect in combination with the 
strategy and certainty effect can also account for a smaller difference in reaction 
times under conditions of ITU (i.e. the difference between high versus low temporal 
uncertainty for high versus low event uncertainty) compared to ETU. Finally, the 
compensation effect also explains slower reaction times under conditions of ITU in 
general. We thus propose that three adjustments in action preparation (described 
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here by the certainty effect, strategy effect, and compensation effect) can account for 
the complex relationship between event and temporal uncertainty. 
The certainty, strategy, and compensation effect in context 
Our results suggest that preparation for when to act (temporal uncertainty) is 
influenced by advance information about what to do (event uncertainty) and that this 
interaction depends on whether temporal uncertainty arises from an unpredictable 
world (ETU) or noisy time perception (ITU). Notably, other studies have not observed 
such dependencies (Cotti et al., 2011; Holender & Bertelson, 1975; Sakai et al., 
2000; Spijkers, 1990; Spijkers & Walter, 1985). We note, however, that such studies 
did not distinguish between the two different sources of temporal uncertainty that we 
here identified. Our results show that when participants experience both ETU and 
ITU in conjunction, then reaction time differences “cancel each other out”. In other 
words, previous studies failed to find the interaction between event and temporal 
uncertainty, which is modulated by the temporal uncertainty’s origin, because they 
failed to pay attention to the difference between ETU and ITU. Future studies should 
distinguish between the external and internal origin of temporal uncertainty: even if 
levels of noise are comparable, it matters where this noise comes from.  
But our findings agree with previous studies in that there are two preparatory 
processes underlying preparation for action: one underlying what to do and one 
underlying when to do it (Holender & Bertelson, 1975). Our data reveal that 
preparation for when is affected by information about what to, that participants adjust 
temporal preparation according to the origin of temporal uncertainty that they 
experience, and compensate for their own internal temporal noisiness (ITU). 
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Conclusions 
The present study reveals that external and internal temporal uncertainty 
have fundamentally different effects on action preparation under conditions of event 
uncertainty. When temporal uncertainty arises from an unpredictable world (ETU), 
then participants can benefit from knowing when to act only when they also know 
what type of action to prepare for. When temporal uncertainty is due to noisy time 
perception (ITU), participants can compensate for high ITU as long as they know 
which action to prepare for. These findings can be explained by two, possibly three 
strategic adjustments in preparation: (i) participants can maintain preparation for 
longer when they know what action to prepare for (certainty effect); (ii) under 
conditions of ETU, participants use the timing of the IS on the preceding trial as a 
temporal cue for subsequent preparation whereas, under conditions of ITU, 
participants use their current subjective but noisy estimate about IS timing (strategy 
effect); (iii) finally, participants compensate for ITU by increasing the time interval 
across which preparation is maintained at the expense of the overall strength of 
preparation (compensation effect). Both the strategy and compensation effect reveal 
that the origin of temporal uncertainty matters for the effect of temporal uncertainty 
on preparation for action. These effects thus reveal an important and fundamental 
difference between ETU and ITU: even when levels of temporal noise are 
comparable, effects on behaviour differ when their source is different. 
 	   126 
Chapter 4: Event preparation is modulated by advance 
information about action timing 
Abstract: Studies using Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) have revealed that 
corticospinal excitability (CSE) is modulated during preparation for motor action. 
Changes in CSE may reflect selection and preparation of motor action (response 
competition), prevention of premature responses (impulse control), or suppression of 
task-unrelated afferents to improve the signal-to-noise ratio in the corticospinal 
representation of prepared action (noise reduction). Two experiments were conducted 
to distinguish between these proposals. Participants completed a variable foreperiod 
choice reaction time task. TMS was applied at one out of three time-points during the 
preparatory period. In Experiment 1, participants were provided with information about 
type and timing of forthcoming action. In Experiment 2, participants were provided 
with information about the type of impending action whilst we manipulated (low / high) 
external temporal uncertainty (ETU: temporal uncertainty induced by varying the 
timing of imperative events). In Experiment 1 and 2, CSE was elevated for prepared 
versus unprepared action throughout the entire preparatory period. We found relative 
CSE suppression for the prepared and unprepared action shortly before imperative 
events (Experiment 1) or shortly after warning cues (Experiment 2). Temporal 
information therefore delays preparatory processes until shortly before action. In 
Experiment 2, we found that stronger beneficial effects of temporal information on 
behavioural performance correlate (a) with a larger relative difference in CSE between 
prepared and unprepared actions and (b) lack of CSE suppression for prepared action 
before action. The first finding reveals that temporal information affects response 
competition. The latter finding suggests that impulse control (and not noise reduction) 
drives CSE suppression for prepared actions. 
Key words: Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS), action preparation, motor 
preparation, temporal uncertainty, even preparation, temporal preparation, inhibition 
Advance information about impending actions improves performance. 
Reaction times decrease with the amount of information provided about the type of 
forthcoming motor response (Fitts, 1954; Fitts & Peterson, 1964; Hick, 1952; Hyman, 
1953; Schneider & Anderson, 2011), its timing (Bertelson, 1967; Bertelson & 
Tisseyre, 1968; Klemmer, 1956, 1957; Los, Knol, & Boers, 2001; Niemi & Naatanen, 
1981), or both (Bertelson & Boons, 1960; Holender & Bertelson, 1975; Spijkers, 
1990; Spijkers & Walter, 1985). In two experiments, we studied how temporal and 
event uncertainty, that is, limited information about the timing of type of imperative 
events influence motor preparation, using Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS). 
Changes in corticospinal excitability (CSE) during the preparatory period (i.e. 
prior to imperative events) suggest that several processes underlie the preparation 
for imperative events and forthcoming motor responses. First, successful selection, 
preparation, and execution of actions may be instantiated by an anticipatory relative 
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increase in CSE in the corticospinal representation of the prepared action (response 
competition; Bestmann et al., 2008; Cisek, 2006; Cisek & Kalaska, 2005, 2010; 
Duque, Lew, Mazzocchio, Olivier, & Ivry, 2010; Michelet, Duncan, & Cisek, 2010; 
Reynolds & Ashby, 1999). Such response competition may occur by increasing the 
neural excitability for the prepared action (van Elswijk et al., 2007), decreasing 
excitability for unprepared alternatives (Julie Duque et al., 2010), or both. Second, 
during preparation for action, neural excitability for the prepared action may be 
selectively suppressed to prevent premature responses (impulse control; Davranche 
et al., 2007; Duque & Ivry, 2009; Duque et al., 2010; Sinclair & Hammond, 2008, 
2009). Third, an adaptive mechanism may prepare the corticospinal representation of 
the selected action for receiving and implementing the voluntary motor command by 
decreasing background noise (i.e. task-unrelated afferents; noise reduction; 
Hasbroucq, Kaneko, Akamatsu, & Possamaï, 1997, 1999; Hasbroucq, Osman, et al., 
1999). This would appear as an overall decrease in neural excitability for the 
prepared action representation.  
Impulse control and noise reduction are difficult to distinguish because they 
both predict a decrease in CSE during the preparatory period for the selected and 
prepared action. However, if CSE suppression for the selected and prepared action 
is attenuated, noise reduction predicts slower motor responses whereas impulse 
control predicts more premature and presumably faster motor responses. 
While these three accounts link changes in CSE to preparatory processes in 
anticipation of imperative events and motor responses, changes in CSE may also 
reflect processes unrelated to anticipation of imperative events. The warning 
stimulus, for example, may trigger an immediate but transient increase in CSE for the 
instructed response (cue activation; Boulinguez, Jaffard, Granjon, & Benraiss, 2008). 
In the face of such a transient increase, subsequent levels of CSE would seem 
suppressed. Gradual changes in CSE throughout the preparatory period may also 
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reflect processes that underlie keeping track o the passage of time (Janssen & 
Shadlen, 2005; Mita et al., 2009) rather than motor preparation (time tracking). These 
two alternatives are particularly viable in constant (Hasbroucq et al., 1997; 
Hasbroucq, Kaneko, et al., 1999; Hasbroucq, Osman, et al., 1999) or variable 
foreperiod tasks (van Elswijk et al., 2007) when the timing of the TMS is locked to the 
warning stimulus (i.e. a constant delay between warning stimulus and TMS). Finally, 
one study has suggested that CSE decreases in anticipation of the TMS pulse to 
reduce the evoked muscle twitch, in particular when the timing of the TMS is 
predictable (Takei, Hashimoto, Hagura, Matsumura, & Naito, 2005). 
In the current study, we assess the effects of advance information about the 
timing of imperative events on changes in CSE prior to such events. We conducted 
two experiments in which participants completed a variable foreperiod task. In 
Experiment 1, reliable advance information about the timing of imperative events was 
provided and thus removed any temporal uncertainty. TMS was applied at one out of 
three possible times-points during the preparatory period, time-locked to the 
imperative event, to measure changes in CSE. We reasoned that when the timing of 
the imperative event is known, changes in CSE should largely occur shortly before 
the imperative event (Carlsen & Mackinnon, 2010), if these changes indeed reflect 
motor preparation in anticipation of the imperative event. Such an effects would 
speak against both cue activation and time tracking as underlying mechanisms for 
delay-period CSE changes. The former instead predicts changes early during the 
preparatory period, whereas the latter instead predicts a gradual change across the 
entire preparatory period. This experiment thus allowed distinguishing between motor 
and non-motor related explanations of changes in CSE.  
In addition we reasoned that there should be a relative increase in CSE for 
prepared actions, and decrease for unprepared actions, as predicted by response 
competition (Bestmann et al., 2008; Cisek, 2006; Cisek & Kalaska, 2005, 2010; Julie 
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Duque et al., 2010; Michelet et al., 2010; Reynolds & Ashby, 1999). The increase in 
CSE for the prepared action, however, may be attenuated or (over-)compensated by 
impulse control or noise reduction (Duque & Ivry, 2009; Duque et al., 2010; 
Hasbroucq, Akamatsu, Burle, Bonnet, & Possamaï, 2000; Hasbroucq et al., 1997, 
1997; Hasbroucq, Kaneko, et al., 1999, 1999; Hasbroucq, Osman, et al., 1999). 
By contrast, in Experiment 2 we explored changes in CSE under conditions of 
temporal uncertainty. Participants now did not receive information about the timing of 
the imperative event and consequently experienced external temporal uncertainty 
(ETU), in addition to constant internal temporal uncertainty (ITU), as temporal 
uncertainty was induced by unpredictably varying the timing of the IS from one trial to 
the next. Most studies on the neurophysiology of action preparation employed fixed 
FP tasks (Boulinguez et al., 2008; Burle, Bonnet, Vidal, Possamaï, & Hasbroucq, 
2002; Duclos, Schmied, Burle, Burnet, & Rossi-Durand, 2008; Hasbroucq et al., 
1997; Hasbroucq, Kaneko, et al., 1999; Hasbroucq, Osman, et al., 1999) but see 
(van Elswijk et al., 2007). However, preparation under conditions of ETU may differ 
from preparation under conditions of ITU. Under conditions of ETU, the probability of 
the imperative stimulus changes throughout the FP, which is referred to as the 
hazard function (Coull, Cheng, & Meck, 2011; Nobre, Correa, & Coull, 2007). 
Typically, if the imperative event has not yet occurred, then it is increasingly likely to 
occur soon. For a Gaussian distribution, for example, the probability of the imperative 
event (i.e. posterior probability or hazard rate) increases monotonically throughout 
the entire FP. In Experiment 2, we therefore asked whether CSE reflects anticipation 
of increasing hazard rate either by a gradually developing relative difference in CSE 
for prepared versus unprepared action (response competition) or by an increasing 
suppression of CSE for prepared action only (impulse control / noise reduction). 
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Methods 
Experiment 1: changes in corticospinal excitability (CSE) during preparation 
for imperative events in the absence of temporal uncertainty 
Experiment 1 was conducted to investigate the neurophysiological correlate 
of action preparation when both temporal and event uncertainty were removed by 
advanced information. Participants completed a variable foreperiod (FP) choice 
reaction time task. Throughout the entire FP, an analogue clock provided participants 
with continuous, accurate, and reliable information about the timing of the imperative 
stimulus (IS). This removed both ETU and ITU. Participants also received reliable 
advance information about the type of required action at the start of each trial. 
Participants were thus fully informed about what to do, and when to do it. TMS was 
given at one out of three time-points during the FP, with the timing of TMS being 
locked to the timing of the imperative stimulus (Figure 4.1).  
We expected participants to respond shortly after the IS given that they fully 
knew what to do, and when to do it, thus removing the necessity for time tracking. 
Neither reaction times nor CSE should be affected by variability in foreperiod 
duration for the same reason. Instead, we expected that CSE relates to the 
anticipation of imperative events and motor responses, and that changes in CSE 
should therefore occur just before the imperative event, but not early on during the 
FP (contrary to the predictions of cue activation or time tracking). The direction of 
change in the selected and prepared versus unprepared action will allow us to 
distinguish between response competition, impulse control, and noise reduction.  
Experiment 2: changes in corticospinal excitability (CSE) during preparation 
for imperative events under conditions of temporal uncertainty 
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In Experiment 1, we removed temporal uncertainty to distinguish between 
motor (response competition, impulse control, noise reduction) and non-motor (cue 
activation, time tracking) explanations of changes in CSE prior to the IS. In 
Experiment 2, we reintroduced ETU to distinguish between different motor-related 
explanations of changes in CSE. Specifically, we tested whether changes in CSE 
reflect participants’ anticipation of a change in the hazard rate of the IS. The timing of 
the TMS was chosen carefully to explore these effects of hazard rate on CSE. The 
level of ETU determined the probability density function of the IS (by setting the 
standard deviation), and consequently the cumulative probability of the IS (Figure 
4.1C), and the conditional probability of the IS or hazard rate (Figure 4.1D) over time. 
For high ETU, the increase in cumulative probability of the IS is more gradual with an 
earlier onset (Figure 4.1C). The hazard rate thus increases gradually with a relatively 
shallow slope (Figure 4.1D) for high compared to low ETU. TMS timing was chosen 
to probe changes in CSE at different levels of cumulative IS probability / hazard rate.  
Based on previous studies and Experiment 1, we expected to find an 
increase in CSE for the selected and prepared action, which would support response 
competition. Further, we expected a decrease in CSE for the unprepared action 
alternative throughout the FP. This would increase the relative difference in CSE 
between selected versus unselected action alternatives and support response 
competition. And finally, we expected a decrease in CSE for the prepared versus 
unprepared actions throughout the FP that reflects either impulse control or noise 
reduction. In Experiment 1, the increase in CSE was not modulated over time, and 
we therefore we did not expect to find a modulation of this increase by the hazard 
function. However, we expected to find a modulation of the decrease in CSE by the 
hazard function in both the prepared and the unprepared muscle. In particular, for 
low compared to high ETU, we expected a strong decrease in CSE shortly before the 
IS, reflecting anticipation of the strong increase in hazard rate. 
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Participants 
16 participants took part in Experiment 1 (mean age = 22.9 years, min. = 19, 
max. = 28; all right-handed; 7 female), and 15 participants took part in Experiment 2 
(mean age = 23.5 years, range: 20-31 years; one left-handed, eight female). All 
participants had corrected or corrected-to-normal vision. They received £20 
remuneration. Before participation, written informed consent was obtained. This 
study was approved by a local ethics committee in line with the declaration of 
Helsinki. 
Procedure and design 
Experiment 1: changes in corticospinal excitability (CSE) during preparation for 
imperative events in the absence of temporal uncertainty 
Participants sat comfortably in front of a computer screen at approximately 70 
cm viewing distance, with their right index and little finger resting on the left and right 
buttons respectively of a custom-made button box. Their hands were placed so that 
they could comfortably press the buttons without any pre-contraction of the target 
muscle during the preparatory period. A comfortable chair as well as arm support 
further ensured that participants could maintain relaxation in the target muscles 
throughout the experiment. Stimuli were presented using Matlab and the Cogent2000 
toolbox (University College London, http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/ 
Cogent2000/index.html).  
Participants completed a variant of the variable FP choice reaction time task. 
Trial onset was signalled by a white fixation cross, appearing at the centre of the 
screen on black background. This was followed, after 200ms, by a simple analogue 
clock face (a white circle with a black clock hand; see Figure 4.1), superimposed on 
a red square, presented at central fixation. The red square instructed participants to 
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prepare their action: it served as the warning stimulus (WS). Two arrows pointing 
both either towards the left or right were placed above and below the clock. Left-hand 
arrows instructed an index finger response (90% of all trials), right-hand arrows 
instructed a response with the little finger. At trial onset, the clock hand was in the 12 
o’clock position. It completed one full rotation on each trial at constant speed. The 
clock speed varied across trials to accommodate different FP duration. When the 
clock hand returned to the 12 o’clock position, the colour of the square changed from 
red to green. Participants were instructed to respond as fast as possible to the 
change in colour, which thereby served as the IS. The clock allowed participants to 
predict the timing of the colour change with high accuracy. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Experimental design. A. Participants completed a variable foreperiod simple reaction 
time task. Trial onset was signalled by appearance of a fixation cross, followed by the onset of a clock 
superimposed on a red square. Arrows above and below the clock instructed participants to prepare a 
right index (left arrows: 90 % of all trials) or right little finger button press (right arrows: 10 % of all 
trials). B. In Experiment 1, the clock completed one full rotation on each trial. Once it returned to the 
12 o’clock position, the colour of the square changed to green which prompted participants to respond. 
In Experiment 2, the clock hand moved in a random walk until IS appearance. In Experiment 1, TMS 
was applied either 150ms, 450ms or 1400ms before the imperative stimulus (IS). In Experiment 2, 
TMS was applied 400ms, 1000ms, or 1400ms after the warning stimulus (WS). C. Foreperiods (FP) 
were sampled from a Gaussian distribution with a mean of 1500ms and a standard deviation of either 
100 (low FP duration variability / ETU) or 500 (high FP duration variability / ETU). For high compared 
to low FP duration variability / ETU, the cumulative probability of IS occurrence increased more 
gradually with an earlier onset. D. While there was a steep increase in hazard rate for low FP duration 
variability / ETU, starting at around 1400ms, the hazard rate developed more gradually for high ETU. 
In Experiment 2, the timing of TMS was chosen based on the cumulative probability of the occurrence 
of the IS and hazard rate (for more information, see text). 
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FP durations were sampled from truncated Gaussian distributions. The mean 
was set at 1500ms. The Gaussians were truncated at 500ms and 2500ms (Hackley, 
2009). FP variability was manipulated by varying the standard deviation (SD = 100 / 
500) across blocks. Participants completed six blocks of 60 trials each. FP variability 
was blocked, with three consecutive blocks of either high or low FP variability, 
respectively. The order of FP variability was counterbalanced across participants. 
Participants received feedback about their average reaction time every 15 trials to 
encourage preparation and quick responses to the IS.  
Experiment 2: changes in corticospinal excitability (CSE) during preparation for 
imperative events under conditions of temporal uncertainty 
Procedures and design were identical to Experiment 1 with one important 
exception: in the Experiment 2, the movement of the visual clock was uninformative 
about the time of occurrence of the IS. The clock hand started in the 6 o’clock 
position at trial onset and moved back and forth in a random fashion, at constant 
speed. Consequently, participants experienced ETU, due to variability in FP duration, 
as well as ITU, due to limited accuracy in time estimation. Despite being 
uninformative, the moving clock was included to match the stimulus features of 
Experiment 1. 
Electromyographic recordings (EMG) 
Surface EMG was recorded from the right first dorsal interosseous (rFDI; 
index finger flexion), and the right abductor digiti minimi (rADM; little finger flexion). 
EMG was recorded with Ag/AgCl disc electrodes in a tendon-belly montage, 
amplified (gain: 1000), band-pass filtered (10Hz – 1 kHz), digitised (5kHz), and 
stored on a laboratory computer for later off-line analysis. During the experiment, 
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EMG was monitored and the experimenter instructed participants to relax whenever 
necessary.  
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) 
TMS was delivered through a 70 mm figure-of-eight coil connected to a 
monophasic Magstim 200 magnetic stimulator (Magstim, Whitland, Dyfed, UK). The 
coil was placed flat on the scalp over the left motor cortex (lM1) with the handle 
pointing backward and laterally at 45° angle away from the midline. Thus, the current 
induced in the neural tissue was directed approximately perpendicular to the line of 
the central sulcus and therefore optimal for activating the corticospinal pathways 
trans-synaptically (Brasil-Neto et al., 1992).  
The stimulator coil was initially moved over the left hemisphere, with a fixed 
slightly supra-threshold intensity, to determine the optimal position for eliciting MEPs 
in the rFDI. The optimal position was then marked on the scalp to ensure optimal coil 
placement throughout the experiment. Subsequently, 1mV motor threshold (MT1mV) 
was determined to the nearest 1% stimulator output, and defined as the lowest 
stimulator output required to produce MEPs of 1mV peak-to-peak amplitude in the 
rFDI (mean = 48.1%, range = 32% – 62%). Furthermore, we ensured that with this 
procedure, MEPs were also reliably evoked in the rADM. Later normalisation 
accounted for activity differences at baseline. 
Experiment 1: changes in corticospinal excitability (CSE) during preparation for 
imperative events in the absence of temporal uncertainty 
A single TMS pulse was applied on 50% of trials, either 1050ms, 450ms, or 
150ms before the IS, with equal probability for each time-point. Consequently, the 
time interval between the WS and the TMS was variable due to variability in FPs. On 
the remaining 50% of all trials, no TMS was applied. This ensured that participants 
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could not use the TMS pulse instead of the WS as a temporal cue for action 
preparation. It also reduced predictability of the timing of the TMS. In addition, 15 
TMS pulses were delivered while the participant was at rest before and after each 
block. Participants were instructed to relax and fixate at the centre of the screen, with 
their right index and little finger resting on the response buttons, during the entire 
experiment and during baseline. 
Experiment 2: changes in corticospinal excitability (CSE) during preparation for 
imperative events under conditions of temporal uncertainty 
TMS location and intensities were determined as above (mean TMS: 49.7%, 
range = 34% – 66%). Contrary to the first experiment, the timing of the TMS was 
locked to the WS: participants now had to rely on the WS as an anchor point for 
temporal preparation. TMS was given on 50% of all trials 400ms, 1000ms, or 
1400ms after the WS, with equal probability for each time point. On the remaining 
50% of trials, no TMS was applied. These times for TMS were chosen with respect to 
the truncated Gaussians (see Figure 4.1CD) from which FPs were sampled. For the 
early stimulation time (400ms), both the cumulative probability of the IS and the 
hazard rate were zero for both high and low ETU as Gaussians were truncated at 
500ms. As such, it served as a reference because we assumed that preparation 
should be minimal at this time-point, irrespective of whether FP duration was overall 
more variable or not. For the intermediate TMS time point (1000ms), the cumulative 
probability of IS occurrence was close to zero for low ETU condition, but increased to 
15.9% for the late TMS time-point (1400ms). Hazard rate increased by 0.00029 from 
close to zero (< 0.0001) to 0.0029 and was bound to increase shortly after late TMS 
(Figure 4.1D). By contrast, for the high ETU, the IS was likely to occur before the 
intermediate TMS time-point on 15.9% of all trials and this probability increased to 
42.1% for the late TMS time-point. Thus, by the time participants received late TMS, 
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they had already experience the IS at an earlier time on 42.1% of all preceding trials. 
The hazard rate increased from by 0.0007 from 0.0005 to 0.0014 and was bound to 
increase comparatively slowly thereafter. Put simply, while keeping the absolute time 
of TMS fixed with respect to the WS, the cumulative probability of IS occurrence and 
the hazard rate significantly varied between the low and high FP variability condition, 
respectively.  
Data analyses 
We excluded all trials with premature responses (reaction times < 0ms), 
incorrect behavioural responses (e.g. a response with the little finger when instructed 
to respond with the index finger), and response omissions from further analysis. In 
addition, we excluded all trials on which participants were prompted to respond with 
the little finger (10% of all trials). These trials served to encourage participants to pay 
attention to the WS. Outliers in reaction times of the remaining trials were identified 
and excluded using Grubb’s test. To test for differences in reaction times, we 
computed a 2 x 4 within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA on mean reaction 
times with FP variability (low, high) and TMS (none, early: -1400ms, intermediate: -
450ms, late: -150ms) as factors. 
For trials with TMS, we extracted MEP peak-to-peak amplitudes as well as 
pre-TMS EMG activity from the EMG traces recorded from rFDI and rADM. All trials 
with a MEP amplitude below 0.1 mV were excluded from further analysis (Mars et al., 
2007). As pre-TMS EMG activity is known to affect MEP size, we excluded all trials 
with a root mean square of pre-TMS EMG activity exceeding 0.075 measured over a 
time window 100ms prior to the TMS pulse (Mars et al., 2007). Then, to ensure that 
pre-TMS EMG activity was similar across all conditions, we ran a Grubb’s test on the 
root mean square of pre-TMS EMG activity on all trials for each subject separately to 
determine and exclude any outliers in pre-TMS EMG activity. Similarly, Grubb’s test 
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was used to identify and exclude outliers in MEPs for each experimental condition 
and participant separately.  
Similarly, MEP peak-to-peak amplitudes were extracted from the baseline 
data recorded during rest before and after each block. Traces were excluded if MEP 
amplitude was smaller than 0.1mV and if pre-EMG activity exceeded 0.075, see 
above. Outliers in pre-EMG activity were identified and excluded using Grubb’s tests. 
MEP amplitudes recorded during one experimental block were divided by the mean 
baseline MEP amplitude recorded before and after the same block, separately for 
each muscle. This normalisation procedure accounts for differences in MEP 
amplitude, e.g. due to coil displacement or fatigue, and allows for meaningful 
comparison between MEPs recorded in the rFDI and the rADM. 
To test for condition specific differences in MEP amplitude, a 2 x 3 x 2 within-
subjects repeated measures ANOVA was computed on mean MEP amplitude, 
averaged across all remaining trials, with FP variability (low, high), TMS time (early: -
1400ms, intermediate: -450ms, late: -150ms), and muscle (prepared, unprepared) as 
factors. As participants were prompted to respond with their index finger on all trials 
included in this analysis, rFDI was the prepared and rADM the unprepared muscle. 
Finally, we tested for increase, or decrease, in normalised MEP amplitude compared 
to baseline using one-sample t-tests. For all tests, we adopted a significance 
threshold of α=0.05. 
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Results 
Experiment 1: changes in corticospinal excitability (CSE) during preparation 
for imperative events in the absence of temporal uncertainty 
Two participants were excluded because their error rates exceeded 25% of 
all trials. Of the remaining participants, we excluded 10.1% of all trials due to 
premature responses (8.8% of all trials), response omissions (0.8%) and incorrect 
button presses (0.5%). An additional 6.3% of all trials were excluded due to small 
MEP amplitude or pre-TMS EMG activity. 
The 2 x 4 ANOVA on mean reaction times revealed a significant effect of 
TMS only (F(3,42) = 23.91, p < 0.001, ηp
2  = 0.631). Participants responded significantly 
slower if no TMS was given (mean = 143.1ms, SE = 14.0) compared to early (mean 
= 116.6ms, SE = 10.7; t(14) = 3.95, p = 0.005), intermediate (mean = 89.1ms, SE = 
7.2; t(14) = 5.71, p < 0.001), and late TMS (mean = 103.0ms, SE = 10.5; t(14) = 6.45, p 
< 0.001, see Figure 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.2: Reaction times and changes in corticospinal excitability (CSE) under conditions of 
full removal of temporal uncertainty. Participants responded shortly after occurrence of the 
imperative stimulus (IS). The absence of a difference between low versus high foreperiod (FP) 
variability shows that participants used the explicit information about the timing of IS occurrence for 
preparation of actions. Participants responded faster on trials with versus no TMS. Corticospinal 
excitability (as reflected in mean MEP amplitudes) was higher in the selected and prepared (right first 
dorsal interosseous; rFDI) versus unprepared muscle (right abductor digiti minimi; rADM), and 
decreased towards the end of the foreperiod. This decrease was more pronounced in the prepared 
relative to the unprepared muscle. 
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The 2 x 3 x 2 ANOVA on mean MEP amplitude revealed an increase in MEP 
amplitude in the prepared compared to the unprepared muscle (F(1,14) = 13.87, p = 
0.002,   = 0.498). TMS time was also significant (F(2,28) = 22.43, p < 0.001,  = 
0.616), due to a decrease in MEP amplitude for late compared to intermediate TMS 
(t(14) = 4.82, p < 0.001) while there here was no difference in MEPs for early versus 
intermediate TMS (p > 0.01). Finally, the ANOVA revealed a marginally significant 
interaction between muscle and TMS time (F(2,28) = 3.09, p = 0.062,   = 0.181). 
Two 3 x 1 repeated measures ANOVAs on mean MEPs with the factor TMS time, 
collapsed across FP variability and computed separately for the prepared and 
unprepared muscle, revealed significant effects of TMS time on MEP amplitudes for 
both muscles (prepared: F(2,28) = 16.95, p < 0.001; unprepared F(2,28) = 12.76, p < 
0.001). Paired-sample follow-up t-tests show that, in the prepared muscle MEP 
amplitude decreased for late versus intermediate TMS (t(14) = 4.54, p < 0.001) but not 
for intermediate versus early TMS (p > 0.1). Similarly, MEPs decreased for late 
versus intermediate TMS (t(14) = 4.02, p = 0.002) but not for intermediate versus early 
TMS (p > 0.1) in the unprepared muscle. Thus, the marginally significant interaction 
between muscle and TMS time was driven by a stronger decrease in the prepared 
muscle for late compared to intermediate TMS (see Figure 4.2). 
Mean normalised MEP amplitude, collapsed across the non-significant factor 
FP variability, increased above baseline in the prepared muscle only for early (t(14) = 
4.11, p = 0.001) and intermediate TMS time (t(14) = 4.39, p < 0.001). No further 
comparisons were significant (p > 0.1). 
Experiment 2: changes in corticospinal excitability (CSE) during preparation 
for imperative events under conditions of temporal uncertainty 
One participant was excluded because the percentage of behavioural errors 
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excluded due to behavioural error, 4.9% of which due to premature responses. An 
additional 7.3% of all trials were excluded due to small MEP amplitude or pre-TMS 
EMG activity. 
The 2 x 4 ANOVA on mean reaction times revealed a significant effect of ETU 
(F(1,13) = 12.22, p = 0.003,  = 0.449). Participants responded faster for low (mean = 
264.67ms, SE = 7.83) compared to high ETU (mean = 276.01ms, SE = 6.92). In 
addition, TMS time was significant (F(3,39) = 26.70, p < 0.001,  = 0.640). 
Participants responded slower when no TMS was given (mean = 297.7ms, SE= 10.6) 
compared to early (mean = 265.9ms, SE = 7.0; t(13) = 4.41, p < 0.001), intermediate 
(mean = 258.2ms, SE = 6.8; t(13) = 5.82, p < 0.001), and late TMS (mean = 259.6ms, 
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The 2 x 3 x 2 ANOVA on normalised mean MEP amplitude revealed an 
increase in MEPs in the prepared versus the unprepared muscle (F(1,13) = 14.92, p = 
0.002,  = 0.534). In addition, the ANOVA revealed a significant effect of TMS time 
(F(2,26) = 6.07, p = 0.007,   = 0.318). MEP amplitude decreased for intermediate 





Figure 4.3: Reaction times and changes in corticospinal excitability (CSE) under conditions 
of external temporal uncertainty (ETU). Reaction times under condition of high external temporal 
uncertainty (ETU) were subtracted from reaction times under conditions of low ETU. A negative 
difference in reaction time thus reveals a benefit of advance information provided by the WS about 
the timing of the IS on action preparation. We then performed a median-split to sub-divide 
participants into two groups (small / large effect group) according to their difference in reaction time 
for high versus low ETU. Differences in reaction times were due to an improvement in performance 
when ETU was low compared to high. This difference was pronounced and absent in the large and 
small effect group, respectively. Averaged across groups, CSE increased for the selected and 
prepared (right first dorsal interosseous; rFDI) compared to the unprepared action (right abductor 
digiti minimi; rADM). Further, CSE decreased early on during the preparatory period (early / 400ms 
vs. intermediate / 1000ms) while it remained stable for the remainder (intermediate / 1000ms vs. late 
/ 1400ms). The effect of ETU on CSE for the selected compared to the unselected action differed for 
the two groups. When ETU was low, the difference in CSE between the prepared and unprepared 
action was pronounced in the large effect group. Similarly, the effect of time on the selected 
compared to the unselected action differed between groups. There was a stronger decrease over 
time in CSE for the prepared action in the group with the small behavioural effect. 	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relative to intermediate TMS (t(13) = 1.38, p = 0.190). No other effects were significant. 
In particular, there was no significant effect of ETU (all p > 0.1). 
Comparison of normalised MEP amplitude, collapsed across the non-
significant factor ETU, revealed an increase above baseline in the prepared muscle 
for early TMS only (t(13) = 3.90, p = 0.002). No other comparison against baseline was 
significant (p > 0.01). 
The lack of an effect of ETU on MEPs was surprising given the significant 
effect of ETU on reaction times. This may be due to the high inter-subject variability 
in behavioural performance, which may determine how ETU affects MEPs, and may 
cancel out on average. To test for this possibility, we sought to relate the size of the 
behavioural effect to changes in MEP amplitude. Put differently, we aimed to explore 
whether the benefit of having better advance information about the timing of the 
imperative event under conditions of low ETU is reflected in changes in MEPs. To 
this end, we first determined the size of the behavioural effect for each participant by 
subtracting reaction times for high ETU from reaction times for low ETU (here, 
collapsed across all trials with or without TMS). This subtraction revealed the degree 
to which participants were able to benefit from warning cues that were more 
informative about the timing of the imperative stimulus under conditions of low versus 
ETU. We then performed a median-split and divided participants in two groups based 
on whether their difference score was higher (i.e. small benefit of more informative 
warning cue) or lower (i.e. large benefit of more informative warning cue) than the 
median difference score. To determine the effect of ETU on MEPs, we then re-
analysed the MEP data with a 2 x 3 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with ETU, TMS time, and 
muscle as within-subjects factors, and group (small, large behavioural effect) as a 
between-subjects factor.  
As expected given the previous analysis, the 2 x 3 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA 
revealed higher MEPs in the prepared muscle (F(1,12) = 14.89, p = 0.002,  = ηp
2
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0.554), and a decrease in MEPs over time (F(2,24) = 5.96, p = 0.008,  = 0.332). 
Importantly, the analysis also revealed a significant interaction between muscle, 
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Figure 4.4: Correlation between behavioural performance and corticospinal excitability (CSE) 
in the prepared and unprepared muscle. Reaction times under conditions of high external 
temporal uncertainty (ETU) were subtracted from reaction times under conditions of low ETU. 
Negative difference scores thus reflect an improvement in reaction times for low ETU when the 
warning cue was more informative about the timing of the imperative stimulus. A. The left panel 
shows the relation between the difference in reaction time (low – high ETU: x-axis of scatter plot) 
and the modulation of CSE for the prepared versus unprepared action under conditions of low 
versus high ETU. The difference in reaction time correlated with a selective increase in CSE under 
conditions of low ETU for the prepared versus unprepared action, relative to the difference in CSE 
between prepared versus unprepared action at high ETU. Thus, the difference in CSE for the 
prepared versus unprepared action increased as participants benefitted more from the WS when it 
was more informative about the timing of the IS under conditions of low versus high ETU. B. The left 
panel shows the relation between the difference in reaction time (low – high ETU: x-axis of scatter 
plot) and the modulation of CSE during the preparatory period for the prepared and unprepared 
action. The decrease in CSE for the prepared action diminished with increasing size of the 
behavioural effect. Changes in CSE over time thus decreased as participants benefitted more from 
the information provided by the WS about the timing of the IS.  	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We further analysed this interaction by relating the difference underlying this 
significant 3-way interaction effect to the single-subject behavioural effect, rather 
than using a median-split approach as in the previous analysis. To this end, we first 
collapsed across the non-significant factor time and then computed the difference 
between the prepared and the unprepared muscle for both high and low ETU. Then, 
we subtracted these two difference scores from each other (i.e. a significant 3-way 
interaction in an ANOVA suggests a significant difference in difference scores) 
before correlating this resulting “difference in difference scores” to the single-subject 
behavioural effect. The correlation was negative and significant (r(14) = -0.553, p = 
0.0401; see Figure 4.4). As shown in Figure 4.4, the correlation was driven by a 
larger relative increase in CSE in the selected and prepared versus unprepared 
muscle in participants that were able to benefit from low levels of ETU (i.e. large 
effect group), but only under conditions of low ETU. 
We also found a 3-way interaction between muscle, time, and group (F(2,24) = 
3.45, p = 0.048,  = 0.223). Following the same logic as above, we collapsed 
across the non-significant factor ETU, and computed the difference between late and 
early TMS time points for the unprepared muscle. This difference score was then 
subtracted from the difference between late and early TMS in the prepared muscle. 
The correlation between the resulting “difference in difference scores” and the single-
subject behavioural effect was positive and significant (r(14) =  611, p = 0.020). It was 
driven primarily by a smaller reduction in MEP size in the prepared muscle for late 
versus early TMS when participants were able to benefit from low levels of ETU (i.e. 
large effect group). When participants did not use the information about the timing of 
the imperative stimulus provided by the warning cue, or used it to a lesser extent, the 
decrease in MEPs in the prepared muscle over time was comparatively large. 
Finally, to determine whether behavioural responses were driven by an 
improvement in performance for low ETU or a worsening for high ETU, we 
ηp
2
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reanalysed the reaction times per group, using a 2 x 4 x 2 mixed ANOVA. This 
analysis revealed a significant interaction between ETU and group (F(1,12) = 22.47, p < 
0.001,  = 0.652) in addition to a significant main effect of ETU (F(1,12) = 22.33, p < 
0.001,  = 0.650) and TMS time (F(3,36) = 24.22, p < 0.001,  = 0.669). The 
interaction between ETU and group was caused by a significant decrease in reaction 
times for low ETU (mean = 254.4ms, SE = 12.19) versus high ETU (mean = 
275.1ms, SE = 10.72) in the high effect group (t(6) = -6.95, p < 0.001) while there was 
no difference in the low effect group between low ETU (mean = 273.9ms, SE = 
12.19) and high ETU (mean = 273.9ms, SE = 10.72; t(6) = 0.01, p = 0.992). 
Participants thus benefited from warning cues that were more informative about the 
timing of the imperative stimulus under conditions of low versus high ETU in the high 
effect group. Reaction times under conditions of high ETU were comparable across 
groups. No further effects were significant (all p > 0.1). As the effect of TMS did not 
interact with group, it was not further explored. 
Discussion 
In Experiment 1, we sought to distinguish between motor (competition 
resolution, impulse control, noise reduction) and non-motor (cue activation, time 
tracking) explanations of CSE changes prior to imperative events. Additionally, we 
aimed to find evidence for one (or more) of the three motor-related explanations of 
CSE changes. To this end, we investigated the development of CSE during the 
preparatory period when participants were provided with full information about the 
timing of the forthcoming imperative event (removing the necessity of time tracking) 
and the type of required motor response. Experiment 2 aimed at distinguishing 
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particular by assessing whether modulation of CSE by the hazard function can be 
explained best by response competition, impulse control, or noise reduction. 
Experiment 1: changes in corticospinal excitability (CSE) during preparation 
for imperative events in the absence of temporal uncertainty  
Under conditions of complete information about the timing and type of 
imperative events, participants respond quickly to these events, and differences in 
foreperiod variability do not impact on reaction times. This shows that participants 
were able to accurately use both the information provided about the passage of time 
and the timing of the IS. As this information unambiguously removed all temporal 
uncertainty (ETU and ITU), any changes in CSE must be independent from 
processes required for dealing with either temporal or event uncertainty. 
The relative increase in CSE observed in the prepared muscle supports the 
idea that action selection and preparation is implemented by a relative increase in 
the corticospinal representation of the selected and prepared action, in line with the 
response competition account. Our findings are thus consistent with previous studies 
that have reported such CSE increase during action preparation (Mars et al., 2007; 
van Elswijk et al., 2007), and furthermore that such changes reflect the prior 
expectation about the forthcoming action (Bestmann et al., 2008). In the present 
experiment, the increase in CSE for the prepared action appeared to be sustained 
throughout the entire foreperiod. This may suggest that response competition, at 
least the boost in CSE for the selected action, is initiated as soon as information 
about which action to select and prepare for is provided (in the current experiment, at 
trial onset) and that the relative differences among competing action representations 
can be maintained until the response is required.  
At the same time, CSE decreased shortly before the IS for both the prepared 
and unprepared action, suggesting that the preparation-specific increase in CSE 
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occurred in the face of a broader non-specific CSE suppression. The decrease in the 
prepared muscle may reflect either impulse control or noise reduction (Davranche et 
al., 2007; Duque & Ivry, 2009; Duque et al., 2010; Hasbroucq et al., 1997; 
Hasbroucq, Osman, et al., 1999; Sinclair & Hammond, 2008, 2009; for further 
discussion, see below) while the decrease in the unprepared muscle may reflect on-
going response competition (Julie Duque et al., 2010). In other words, under 
conditions of complete removal of temporal uncertainty, increases in CSE that 
ensure successful selection and execution of the selected action can be initiated as 
soon as information is provided and sustained throughout the foreperiod. By contrast, 
in such conditions suppression of the corticospinal representation of the non-selected 
alternative may be strongest shortly before the anticipated execution of an action. 
These results complement and extent recent work about the influence of temporal 
uncertainty on motor preparation (Carlsen & Mackinnon, 2010). These authors 
showed that accurate and reliable information about the timing of IS occurrence 
delays motor preparation until approximately 500 ms prior to the response (Carlsen & 
Mackinnon, 2010). The time course of the present CSE decreases is compatible with 
this observation, occurring approximately 450-150ms prior to the presentation of the 
IS. We suggest, in agreement with Carlsen and Mackinnon, that this late decrease in 
CSE, when temporal uncertainty was fully removed, may be energetically efficient: 
preparatory processes underlying the CSE decrease are initiated only shortly before 
the imperative event. 
While the decrease in CSE in the unselected and unprepared action can be 
explained by response competition, the concomitant CSE suppression for the 
selected and prepared action may result from either impulse control (Davranche et 
al., 2007; Julie Duque & Ivry, 2009; Julie Duque et al., 2010; Sinclair & Hammond, 
2008, 2009) or noise reduction (Hasbroucq, Kaneko, et al., 1999, 1999; Hasbroucq, 
Osman, et al., 1999). The current data do not allow for distinguishing between these 
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two alternatives. However, our data do clearly show that there must be two inhibitory 
processes co-occurring during preparation for action: response competition, which 
explains suppression of the unselected action alternative, and either impulse control 
or noise reduction, which explain the suppression in CSE for the selected alternative. 
Our data therefore corroborate recent evidence that response competition and 
impulse control may occur concurrently during preparation (Julie Duque et al., 2010). 
As in the current study, MEPs were suppressed both in the prepared and unprepared 
muscle, whereas H-reflex amplitudes were attenuated only in the prepared muscles. 
The authors concluded that impulse control targets prepared muscles only and is 
manifest at the spinal level (see also Prut & Fetz, 1999), whereas suppression of 
CSE in the unprepared muscle reflects a different inhibitory process, presumably 
related to response competition, being expressed mainly at the cortical level (Julie 
Duque et al., 2010). 
Finally, the decrease in CSE starting just before the anticipated imperative 
event when temporal uncertainty was fully removed provides evidence against the 
cue activation account (Boulinguez et al., 2008) which would predict a de- or 
increase in CSE early on during the preparatory period. For the same reason, it 
appears unlikely that in the current experiment these changes in CSE reflect time 
tracking (Janssen & Shadlen, 2005; Mita et al., 2009) which would predict a gradual 
de- or increase in CSE over the course of the entire foreperiod. Finally, because 
TMS was given only on 50% of trials, and time intervals between the WS and TMS 
were variable, the current results are unlikely to reflect reduction in CSE due to 
anticipation of TMS pulses (Takei et al., 2005). We conclude that motor accounts of 
CSE changes best explain our findings. 
With regard to the reaction time data, several studies have reported a 
decrease in reaction times when single TMS pulses are delivered prior to an 
imperative stimulus (Hasbroucq, Kaneko, et al., 1999). This facilitatory effect of TMS 
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is likely due to cross-modal facilitation (Arieh & Marks, 2008; Baier, Kleinschmidt, & 
Müller, 2006). TMS causes ‘click’ sounds that can act as additional sensory cues. 
Alternatively, single-pulse TMS may affect neural processing in M1 directly, 
consequently speeding up motor responses. For example, previous work has shown 
that TMS to M1 can increase reaction times, albeit at subthreshold intensities 
(Hashimoto, Inaba, Matsumura, & Naito, 2004). Whatever the underlying causes for 
this observation, in our experiments it had no impact on how participants prepared 
for action. 
Taken together, we show some of the physiological underpinnings of the 
multiple processes supporting action preparation. Response competition ensures the 
activation of corticospinal representations of prepared actions relative to unprepared 
alternatives. By contrast, inhibition that specifically acts on the corticospinal 
representation of the prepared action serves either to prevent premature responses 
(impulse control) or to prepare the cortex for the voluntary motor command (noise 
reduction). CSE suppression for the prepared action shortly before the imperative 
event reflects on-going response competition, now implemented by selectively 
suppressing the non-selected alternative. The contribution of Experiment 1 is to have 
isolated these processes, and allowed us to exclude alternative accounts that explain 
changes in CSE during the preparatory period as being unrelated to anticipation of 
the imperative event and ensuing motor responses (cue activation and time tracking). 
Experiment 2: changes in corticospinal excitability (CSE) during preparation 
for imperative events under conditions of temporal uncertainty 
In Experiment 1, we removed temporal uncertainty to distinguish between 
motor (response competition, impulse control, noise reduction) and non-motor (cue 
activation, time tracking) related explanations of CSE changes prior to the IS. In 
Experiment 2, we introduced ETU to distinguish between different motor-related 
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explanations of changes in CSE. Specifically, we tested whether in- or decreases in 
CSE relate to the hazard function. As expected, participants overall responded faster 
under conditions of low versus high ETU. This shows that they benefitted from the 
WS when it was more informative about the timing of the imperative event under 
conditions of low versus high ETU. However, we observed considerable inter-
individual variability in participants’ ability to extract temporal information from the 
WS as a cue for preparation. 
Similar to Experiment 1, the relative increase in CSE in the prepared versus 
unprepared muscle supports the idea that changes in CSE prior to imperative events 
reflect response competition (Bestmann et al., 2008; Cisek, 2006, 2007; Cisek & 
Kalaska, 2005; Duque et al., 2010; Michelet et al., 2010; Reynolds & Ashby, 1999). 
Interestingly, the difference in reaction times between low versus high ETU 
correlates with the relative increase in CSE in the prepared muscle, and the relative 
decrease in CSE in the unprepared muscle when the time for action can be 
anticipated under conditions of low ETU. This relationship further supports the idea 
that successful selection and execution of actions relies on the activation of the 
corticospinal representation of the selected action alternative and suppression of the 
non-selected action, akin to a competitive process through which the appropriate 
response is ultimately selected (Bestmann et al., 2008; Cisek, 2006, 2007; Cisek & 
Kalaska, 2010; Julie Duque et al., 2010; Michelet et al., 2010; Reynolds & Ashby, 
1999).  
This differential activation and suppression of the corticospinal representation 
of the prepared and unprepared action, respectively, was not influenced by the 
conditional IS probability (i.e. the hazard rate). This suggests that the differential (de-
)activation of action representations reflects event preparation rather than temporal 
preparation. Importantly, however, event preparation is nevertheless sensitive to the 
degree of temporal information. Our data show that when participants fail to use the 
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more informative warning cues under conditions of low ETU, then the relative 
difference in CSE for prepared versus unprepared actions decreases, compared to 
participants who benefit from low ETU. This suggests that information about time, 
temporal expectation, or the lack thereof (i.e. temporal uncertainty), interacts with 
event preparation (see also Chapter 3). 
We additionally found that the size of the behavioural benefit under conditions 
of low ETU is related to the time-course of changes in CSE in the prepared versus 
unprepared muscle. Here, the relative decrease in CSE in the prepared muscle for 
early versus late time-points in the preparatory interval was more pronounced in 
participants with relatively small behavioural effects. In other words, the difference in 
reaction times for high versus low ETU correlates with the change in CSE over time: 
a decrease in CSE over time is correlated with reduced benefit of low ETU. This 
finding speaks against the interpretation that a decrease in CSE reflects an adaptive 
mechanism that increases the signal-to-noise ratio in the corticospinal representation 
of the prepared action in anticipation of the voluntary motor command (i.e. noise 
reduction; Hasbroucq et al., 1997; Hasbroucq, Kaneko, et al., 1999; Hasbroucq, 
Osman, et al., 1999). Contrary to the current data, this account predicts a decrease 
in CSE in the prepared muscle that should relate to an improvement in performance 
(i.e. larger benefit of low ETU). Instead, the relation that we here observed between 
the behavioural performance and the neurophysiological correlate supports the idea 
that inhibitory processes during the FP reflect impulse control processes that prevent 
premature responses (Davranche et al., 2007; Duque & Ivry, 2009; Duque et al., 
2010; Sinclair & Hammond, 2008, 2009). If indeed the case, our data suggest that 
impulse control may come at a prize. We entertain the idea that strong impulse 
control may cause slower responses to imperative events, an effect that would 
become evident in cases when advance information about the timing of imperative 
events (e.g. low ETU) should allow for accurate temporal preparation. A stronger 
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reduction in CSE in the prepared muscle throughout the foreperiod therefore might 
lead to a smaller difference in reaction times for low versus high ETU. 
 What neurophysiological mechanisms may account for the changes in CSE 
that reflect response competition and impulse control? Facilitatory and inhibitory 
intra- and inter-cortical circuits shape CSE. Both short (SICI) and long (LICI) intra-
cortical inhibition rely on GABA-ergic neurotransmission (Fitzgerald, Maller, Hoy, 
Farzan, & Daskalakis, 2009), as does the silent period (Davranche et al., 2007). 
Removal of GABA-ergic inhibition could explain the increase in CSE for selected and 
prepared actions. Previous work has indeed shown a reduction in SICI and LICI 
during preparation for action (Sinclair & Hammond, 2008). However, removal of 
inhibition cannot explain the concomitant suppression in CSE that co-occurs at the 
same time. Using appropriate paired-pulse TMS techniques that allow for measuring 
intra- and inter-cortical inhibition and facilitation, future studies may address the 
neural mechanisms of CSE suppression during action preparation, and how they 
relate to impulse control and response competition. 
Against our predictions, changes in CSE in Experiment 2 did not reflect the 
hazard rate. We expected to find a modulation of CSE driven by changes in 
conditional probability of the IS over time. However, we found no such modulation 
(for different results, see van Elswijk et al., 2007). Excitatory and inhibitory processes 
that implement response competition and impulse control therefore do not appear to 
be sensitive to changes in IS probability. It is possible, however, that small changes 
in CSE, driven by changes in IS probability, were masked by processes underlying 
response competition and impulse control, in particular as they also influence the 
time-course of CSE. Future studies may address this issue exploring hazard 
functions that differ more strongly than in the current experiments, for example, by 
using uniform versus Gaussian distributions. In this case, the probability density 
function, cumulative probability, and survival function, which underlie the hazard 
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function, would differ not only in their variability but also in their overall shape. And 
larger differences may allow finding subtle effects of hazard rate on CSE. 
With regard to behavioural data, we also observed a reduction in reaction 
times on trials when TMS was delivered, as in Experiment 1, which is likely to reflect 
inter-sensory facilitation (Hashimoto et al., 2004). Importantly, TMS did not modulate 
the effect of ETU on reaction times. Participants used the same strategy to prepare 
for imperative events under conditions of ETU irrespective of absence or presence of 
TMS. 
Taken together, selection and preparation of motor actions is supported by a 
selective increase in CSE in the corticospinal representation of the selected action, 
and a concomitant decrease for the selected action and non-selected alternative. 
While the former is not modulated during the preparatory period, CSE suppression 
increases throughout the foreperiod. Muscle-specific enhancements of CSE are 
congruent with recent proposals in which actions are selected through a competitive 
process in which the representation of the most likely action is strengthened (i.e. 
response competition; Bestmann et al., 2008; Cisek, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2005, 
2010; Duque et al., 2010; Michelet et al., 2010; Reynolds & Ashby, 1999). 
Suppression of the non-selected alternative further supports such response 
competition accounts. By contrast, suppression of the selected and prepared action 
representations is congruent with impulse inhibition and noise reduction accounts. 
The contribution of Experiment 2 is to show that information about the timing of 
impending action interacts with processes underlying response competition. When 
temporal information improves performance, then the relative difference in excitability 
between prepared and unprepared actions is enhanced throughout the entire 
preparatory period, predominantly by stronger suppression for the non-selected 
action. Further, the data suggest that the decrease in CSE throughout the foreperiod 
may not reflect an adaptive mechanism that increases the signal-to-noise ratio in the 
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motor cortex in preparation for the voluntary motor command (noise reduction). More 
likely, the decrease underlies prevention of premature responses (impulse control). A 
smaller behavioural benefit of advance information about the timing of the imperative 
event is related to a stronger suppression (i.e. more impulse control). A stronger 
emphasis on avoiding premature responses may disproportionally affect the 
condition in which advance information allowed faster responses. 
Summary and conclusions 
Advance information about impending action improves behavioural 
performance. In two experiments, we elucidated the electrophysiology of event and 
temporal preparation for action. Results from Experiment 1 and 2 support the 
hypothesis that a competitive process supports selection and preparation of the 
appropriate action alternative (Bestmann et al., 2008; Cisek, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 
2005, 2010; Julie Duque et al., 2010; Michelet et al., 2010; Reynolds & Ashby, 1999), 
by selectively increasing CSE for the prepared, and decreasing CSE for the 
unprepared action representation. The decrease in CSE for the unprepared action 
occurred either shortly before the IS (Experiment 1), or shortly after the WS when 
participants experienced ETU (Experiment 2). That is, when participants experience 
ETU, they initiate inhibitory preparatory processes early on during the FP whereas 
these processes are delayed until shortly before the IS when its timing is known. 
While the competitive action selection process is not directly modulated by the 
probability of occurrence of the imperative event, and how it changes over time (i.e. 
the hazard function), we show that utilising advance temporal information leads to a 
stronger suppression for the non-selected action. Information about the timing of 
forthcoming events thus modulates event preparation.  
Second, our findings support the hypothesis that premature responses are 
prevented by an inhibitory mechanism that selectively suppresses the corticospinal 
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representation of prepared actions (Julie Duque & Ivry, 2009; Julie Duque et al., 
2010). Such impulse control explains the decrease in CSE for the prepared action 
shortly before the IS when temporal uncertainty was removed (Experiment 1), or 
shortly after the WS when participants were exposed to temporal uncertainty 
(Experiment 2). 
The correlation between CSE suppression over time with the degree of 
temporal preparation under conditions of temporal uncertainty (Experiment 2) allows 
us to distinguish between impulse control and noise reduction. Only impulse control 
predicts less suppression for faster responses. This finding further suggests that 
impulse control is influenced by the degree of temporal uncertainty, and that strong 
impulse control (as reflected in time-dependent decreases in CSE) may even 
counteract the beneficial effect of reliable temporal information leading to slower 
responses.  
In summary, the present study provides novel insight into the physiological 
foundations of action preparation. Preparation for action is supported by excitatory 
and inhibitory processes underlying response competition and inhibitory processes 
underlying impulse control. Crucially, we show that information about the timing of 
imperative events interacts with response competition. Temporal preparation and 
event preparation are thus not entirely independent processes. 
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Chapter 5: The functional contribution of short and long 
intracortical inhibition to action preparation 
Abstract: Preparation for action enables quick responses to imperative events. 
Inhibitory intracortical circuits in the primary motor cortex (M1) may contribute to 
action preparation by selectively suppressing the neuronal representation of 
competing actions (response competition), controlling the time of action release by 
preventing premature responses (impulse control), or preventing responses to 
distracting stimuli (prevent non-imperative, cf. cue activation Chapter 4). We assessed 
the functional significance of short (SICI) and long (LICI) intracortical inhibition, as well 
as their interaction (SICI*LICI), during preparation for action. Transcranial Magnetic 
Stimulation (TMS) was applied to left M1 during the delay period of an instructed-
delay reaction time task 150ms before the imperative stimulus. A warning stimulus 
instructed preparation for left or right index finger flexion. Motor Evoked Potentials 
(MEPs) were recorded from the right hand. We found an effector-specific increase in 
corticospinal excitability (CSE) during preparation for action (i.e. right WS). Further, 
we found an increase in MEP amplitude for SICI*LICI compared to SICI: LICI inhibits 
SICI leading to overall disinhibition (net excitation). But neither SICI, LICI, nor the 
SICI*LICI interaction showed effector-specific modulation during preparation. The 
increase in CSE during preparation suggests that neural representations of prepared 
actions are selectively enhanced to ensure quick and efficient execution, consistent 
with the response competition. We speculate that sub-optimal timing of the 
assessment of intracortical inhibition (i.e. the timing of the TMS) did not allow us to 
find effector-specific effects for SICI, LICI, and their interaction. We interpret our 
findings in relation to a neural model of the intracortical circuitry of M1. 
Keywords: Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS), short intracortical inhibition, 
long intracortical inhibition, action preparation, motor preparation. 
Action preparation relies on both excitatory and inhibitory motor circuits 
(Coxon, Stinear, & Byblow, 2006; Davranche et al., 2007; Duque et al., 2005; Duque 
& Ivry, 2009; Duque, Lew, Mazzocchio, Olivier, & Ivry, 2010; Floeter & Rothwell, 
1999; Hasbroucq, Kaneko, Akamatsu, & Possamaï, 1997, 1999; Reynolds & Ashby, 
1999; Sinclair & Hammond, 2008, 2009; van Elswijk, Schot, Stegeman, & Overeem, 
2008). Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) allows the non-invasive study of 
these circuits. Combining two or more TMS pulses in conditioning-test designs allows 
for probing distinct excitatory and inhibitory circuits (Kujirai et al., 1993; Ziemann et 
al., 1998). Using this approach, previous work has established the importance of 
inhibitory circuits in action preparation (Duque et al., 2005; Duque & Ivry, 2009; 
Duque et al., 2010; Sohn, Wiltz, & Hallett, 2002), though the specific functional role 
of inhibition is still debated. Inhibition may contribute to the selection and preparation 
of an action by suppressing action alternatives in a competitive selection process 
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(response competition; see also Chapter 4; Cisek, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2005; 
Michelet, Duncan, & Cisek, 2010; van Elswijk, Kleine, Overeem, & Stegeman, 2007). 
Alternatively, during action preparation, inhibition may prevent the premature release 
of prepared action (impulse control; see also Chapter 4; Floeter & Rothwell, 1999; 
Hasbroucq et al., 1997, 1999; Reynolds & Ashby, 1999). Finally, inhibition may 
prevent responses to incidental, non-imperative, and distracting stimuli (prevent non-
imperative, related to cue activation see Chapter 4; Boulinguez, Jaffard, Granjon, & 
Benraiss, 2008)2. 
At least two different intracortical inhibitory circuits can be assessed with 
TMS: short (SICI) and long intracortical inhibition (LICI), respectively (Cash, 
Ziemann, Murray, & Thickbroom, 2010; Kujirai et al., 1993; Sanger, Garg, & Chen, 
2001; Ziemann, Rothwell, & Ridding, 1996). Previous work has established that both 
SICI and LICI are mediated by the inhibitory neurotransmitter γ-aminobutric acid 
(GABA). The GABA receptor involved in the regulation of neuronal excitability differs 
for SICI and LICI. SICI is mediated by fast acting GABAA receptors (GABAAR), 
whereas LICI predominantly relies on comparatively slow GABAB receptor mediated 
neurotransmission (GABABR; Di Lazzaro et al., 2005, 2007; Di Lazzaro et al., 2006; 
Florian, Müller-Dahlhaus, Liu, & Ziemann, 2008). 
The functional significance of SICI and LICI during action selection and 
preparation remains unclear. The different time courses of GABAAR and GABABR 
mediated intracortical inhibition (Avoli et al., 1997; Connors et al., 1988; Deisz, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In Chapter 4, we introduced cue activation, a non-motor related explanation of changes in CSE prior to 
imperative events. According to cue activation, CSE increases following the warning cue due to partial, 
sub-threshold activation of motor pathways elicited by this cue (Boulinguez, Jaffard, Granjon, & 
Benraiss, 2008). Prevent non-imperative is related to cue activation but extents to partial activation as a 
consequence of any non-imperative stimulus, not only the warning cue. 
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1999a, 1999b; McCormick, 1989; McCormick & Williamson, 1989) suggest that LICI 
and SICI may play different functional roles. SICI could take on a functional role, 
which requires high temporal precision, such as preventing the premature release of 
prepared action (impulse control; Floeter & Rothwell, 1999; Hasbroucq et al., 1997, 
1999; Reynolds & Ashby, 1999) due to the fast response of GABAAR. LICI on the 
other hand could contribute to the prevention of responses to non-imperative stimuli 
(prevent non-imperative), as this form of inhibition needs to be maintained tonically. 
And the comparatively slow response of GABABR makes LICI a good candidate for 
functional roles that require tonic suppression.  Alternatively, LICI could prevent the 
execution of non-selected action alternatives by tonically suppressing their neural 
representations thus contributing to response competition.  
Recent work has shown that at rest LICI inhibits SICI, possibly pre-
synaptically via GABABR mediated transmission (Cash et al., 2010; Chu, Gunraj, & 
Chen, 2008; Florian et al., 2008; Sanger et al., 2001). Thus, when assessing SICI, 
studying the interaction between LICI and SICI is important, because changes in 
SICI at rest or during a task can be due to either a genuine change in SICI or 
changes in LICI, which caused changes in SICI. We therefore assessed the 
functional role of SICI and LICI as well as their interaction during action preparation. 
First, we address whether corticospinal excitability (CSE: a measure of the 
excitability or ‘readiness’ of M1), SICI, LICI, and their interaction show modulation 
specific to the effector for which action is prepared. Second, we ask which of the 
three theories of inhibitory contribution to preparation best explains the observed 
pattern of modulation, response competition, impulse control, or prevent non-
imperative separately for each intracortical inhibitory circuit. 
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Methods 
Subjects 
We studied 21 right-handed participants (9 male, mean age 23.4 years, age 
range 19 – 30 years). All participants were free from known neuropsychological and 
neuromuscular disorders and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants 
gave their written informed consent before participation. The study was approved by 
a local ethics committee of the UCL Institute of Neurology and in agreement with the 
declaration of Helsinki.  
Electromyographic (EMG) recordings 
Surface EMG was recorded from the right first dorsal interosseous (rFDI), 
stored on a laboratory computer, and subsequently analysed. Additionally, we 
recorded EMG in the left first dorsal interosseous and the extensor carpi radialis 
muscle to monitor background EMG activity during the experiment that may 
contaminate behavioural and physiological data due to differential background 
muscle activity.  EMG was recorded with Ag/AgCl disc electrodes in a tendon-belly 
montage. EMG was amplified (gain: 1000), band-pass filtered (10Hz – 1 kHz), and 
digitised (5kHz). During the experiment, EMG was monitored and the experimenter 
instructed participants to relax when necessary.  
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation 
TMS was delivered through a 70mm figure-of-eight coil connected to four 
monophasic Magstim 200 magnetic stimulators (Magstim, Whitland, Dyfed, UK) via a 
custom made connector module. This setup allowed us to combine the input of four 
stimulators and to deliver four pulses at different intensities and / or with different 
inter-pulse intervals (IPIs) through one stimulator coil. The coil was placed flat on the 
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scalp over the left motor cortex (lM1) with the handle pointing backward and laterally 
at 45° angle away from the midline. Thus, the current induced in the neural tissue 
was directed approximately perpendicular to the line of the central sulcus and 
therefore optimal for activating the corticospinal pathways transsynaptically (Brasil-
Neto et al., 1992).  
The stimulator coil was moved over the left hemisphere, with fixed slight 
supra-threshold intensity, to determine the position for eliciting MEPs of optimal 
amplitude in the rFDI. The optimal position was then marked on the scalp to ensure 
optimal coil placement throughout the experiment. Subsequently, resting motor 
threshold (rMT) was determined to the nearest 1% stimulator output. RMT was 
defined as the lowest intensity required to produce MEPs with an amplitude > 50µV 
in at least 5 out of 10 consecutive trials (mean = 41.6%, range = 30 – 55%). We 
similarly determined MT1mV defined as the lowest stimulator output required to 
produce MEPs of 1mV peak-to-peak amplitude (mean = 44.6%, range = 36 - 62%). 
Finally, we determined MT1mV/LICI defined as the lowest intensity required to produce 
MEPs of 1mV peak-to-peak amplitude when preceded by a single TMS conditioning 
pulse given 100ms earlier at MT1mV, see below (mean = 48.2%, range = 38 - 67%). 
Our experimental design included four experimental TMS stimulation 
conditions: single-pulse TMS (TPonly), SICI, LICI, and the combination of SICI and 
LICI (SICI*LICI; FIG 1). MT1mV intensity was used as the standard test pulse (TP) 
intensity for SICI (TPSICI), LICI (TPLICI) and for single-pulse TMS (TPonly). MT1mV/LICI 
was used as test pulse intensity in the triple-pulse condition testing SICI*LICI 
following a protocol used by Sanger and colleagues (Sanger et al., 2001) and Cash 
et al. (Cash et al., 2010). The underlying rationale of using MT1mV/LICI instead of 
MT1mV is that the SICI conditioning pulse (CS2) then acts on the same MEP 
amplitude in SICI and SICI*LICI – 1mV peak-to-peak. Alternatively, we could have 
fixed TMS intensity as opposed to MEP amplitude. We decided not to do so, 
 	   163 
because the LICI conditioning pulse (CS1) decreases MEP amplitudes (Sinclair & 
Hammond, 2008).  This would have made it difficult to detect a further decrease in 
MEP amplitude in SICI*LICI during action preparation, a possibility we did not want to 
exclude beforehand. In any case, intensity adjustments were small (mean % 
increase = 3.6% stimulator output) and unlikely to be a confound (Garry & Thomson, 
2009). For SICI, CS2 was set at 80 % rMT and the inter-pulse interval (IPI) was set at 
2ms (Chu et al., 2008; Kujirai et al., 1993). For LICI and SICI*LICI, CS1 was set at 
MT1mV, using an IPI of 100ms. This protocol is known to yield strong inhibition when 
applied on its own, and to cause disinhibition when the test pulse is preceded by CS1 
and CS2 during rest (Sanger et al., 2001). 
Additionally, we included two TMS control conditions (Figure 5.1). First, 
LICIcontrol to assess whether our efforts to match MEP amplitudes in SICI and 
SICI*LICI were successful throughout the experiment. In LICIcontrol, we used MT1mV/LICI 
as a test pulse, and MT1mV as CP1 with an IPI of 100ms. Second, we included a 
stimulation condition in which CP1 was applied without subsequent test pulse (i.e. 
250ms before IS: CS1 only). We included this condition, because otherwise CP1 could 
have been informative about the timing of the IS and thus have biased participants’ 
preparation for future action. Essentially, we wanted to prevent participants from 
waiting with their action preparation until after TMS was delivered. For the same 
reason, we also included trials without TMS stimulation. 





Figure 5.1: Schematic illustration of the Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) conditions. (A) 
For the TPonly condition, a single supra-threshold TMS pulse (TP) was given 150ms before the imperative 
stimulus (IS) at the TMS intensity required to elicit Motor Evoked Potentials (MEP) of 1mV peak-to-peak 
amplitude (MT1mV). To assess GABAAR mediated short intracortical inhibition (SICI), a TP at MT1mV was 
preceded by a single sub-threshold TMS conditioning pulse (CS2) at 80% MT1mV by 2ms. To assess 
GABABR mediated long intracortical inhibition (LICI), a TP at MT1mV was preceded by a single supra-
threshold TMS conditioning pulse (CS1) at MT1mV by 100ms. A combination of the SICI and LICI protocol 
was employed to assess the interaction between SICI and LICI (SICI*LICI). A single sub-threshold TMS 
conditioning pulse (CS2) at 80% MT1mV was inserted 2ms before TP into the LICI protocol. For SICI*LICI, 
TP was given at MT1mV/LICI which was set to evoke 1mV peak-to-peak MEP amplitudes if preceded by 
CS1.This ensured that CS2 acted on the same peak-to-peak MEP amplitudes in SICI and SICI*LICI. (B) 
Control conditions: LICIcontrol was a modification of the LICI protocol. CS1 preceded TP by 100ms, as in 
the LICI protocol, but TP was given at MT1mV/LICI. This condition was included to assess whether MEP 
amplitudes in SICI and SICI*LICI were sufficiently matched throughout the experiment. Additionally, we 
included trials with CS1 only (CS1 only) and trials without TMS stimulation (TMSno) to reduce the 
predictability of the IS based on the delivery of TMS. 	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Experimental design 
Participants sat comfortably in front of a computer screen at approximately 70 
cm viewing distance. Participant’s left and right index fingers were resting on the left 
and right buttons of a custom-made button box. Their hands were placed so that they 
could comfortably press the buttons without pre-contraction of the target muscle. A 
comfortable chair as well as arm support furthermore ensured that participants could 
relax throughout the experiment. Stimuli were presented using Matlab and the 
Cogent2000 toolbox (University College London, http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/ 
Cogent2000/index.html).  
We used a basic instructed-delay reaction time task (see Figure 5.2). After a 
brief presentation of a fixation cross (200ms) to indicate the start of a trial, 
participants received the warning stimulus (WS), an arrow pointing either to the left 
(42% of all trials) or to the right (42% of all trials). The WS informed participants 
about future action and was included to prompt preparation for action. The WS was 
presented for 500ms and then replaced by the fixation cross. After a fixed delay of 
1500ms the imperative stimulus (IS) appeared. The IS was a circle either to the left 
or to the right of the fixation cross, instructing a left-hand or right-hand button press, 
respectively. Participants were instructed to respond as fast as possible, but not at 
the expense of accuracy. The WS was always valid, thereby reliably indicating future 
action and thus allowing preparation for action. 
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Additionally, we included two types of control trials. First, on 16 % of all trials, 
the WS consisted of an arrow pointing both to the left and to the right and was thus 
non-informative about the future action. Nevertheless, participants had to respond as 
quickly as possible to the IS. Comparing reaction times between informative and 
uninformative cues allowed us to confirm whether participants used informative cues 
to prepare the appropriate action in advance.  Second, to prevent premature 
responses, we included 16% of catch-trials in which participants received either an 
informative (80%) or a non-informative (20%) WS, but no IS. Participants were 
instructed to withhold a response if no IS was presented. On all trials, except catch 
trials, participants were encouraged to respond as quickly and as accurately as 
possible. Every 15 trials, they received feedback about their average reaction time 
over the last 15 trials to motivate quick and consistent responses throughout the 
experiment.  
The specific stimulation condition for catch and non-informative control trials 
was randomly sampled from all available stimulation conditions, including non-TMS 
Figure 5.2: Experimental design and setup. (A) Timeline. Participants were instructed to prepare 
either left or right index finger flexion based on the warning stimulus (WS) and to respond as quickly 
as possible to a subsequent imperative stimulus (IS). Feedback about average mean reaction times 
(RT) was given every 25 trials during the inter-trial interval (ITI). The test pulse (TP) was always 
applied 150ms before IS. (B) Motor-evoked potentials were recorded from the right first dorsal 
interosseous (rFDI) muscle. Additionally, EMG was recorded from the left FDI and right extensor carpi 
radialis to monitor background EMG activity in both hands. (C) The different combinations of WS and 
IS included informative and non-informative trials. WS, if informative, was always reliable. The non-
informative WS was included to test for an increase in RT compared to informative WS to infer action 
preparation. 
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trials. The proportion of TMS trials thus varied slightly across blocks and participants. 
On 22% of trials, participants did not receive TMS, and on a further 22% of trials 
participants received CS1 only (CS1 only). On the remaining trials, participants received 
either TPonly, SICI, LICI, SICI*LICI, or LICIcontrol , respectively (see Figure 5.1). Thus, 
participants received CS1 (250ms before IS: CS1 only, LICI, LICI*SICI, LICIcontrol) on 
56%, and no CS1 on 44% of trials (TPonly, SICI, TMSno). If participants did not receive 
CS1 (TPonly, SICI, TMSno), then there was a 50% chance to receive late TMS 
stimulation (CS1 and / or TP 152/50ms before IS: SICI, TPonly). If participants had 
received CS1 (LICI, SICI*LICI, CS1 only) then there was a 40% chance of receiving no 
further TMS (CS1 only). The inclusion of these trials at the given percentages avoided 
predictability of the IS based on TMS delivery.  When delivered, the TMS test pulse 
occurred at 150ms and CS1 occurred 250ms prior to the imperative stimulus. 
The experiment consisted of 6 blocks of 74 trials each. Each experimental 
block was preceded by verification of correct coil placement, the correct intensity of 
MT1mV/LICI and, if necessary, TMS intensity adjustment (for MT1mV/LICI only) to 
guarantee matched amplitudes throughout the experiment. Before and after each 
experimental block, we recorded two MEP traces for each TMS stimulation condition 
(= 10 trials) to confirm accurate coil placement and that CS1 and CS2 (SICI, LICI) 
intensities remained appropriate. Participants were given a short training session of 
20 trials before the experiment to familiarise themselves with the task, including the 
measurements before and after each experimental block, and to get used to the TMS 
stimulation. 
Data processing and statistical analysis 
We excluded all trials with premature responses (reaction times < 100ms). 
Additionally, we excluded trials with incorrect behavioural responses (e.g. a left hand 
response for a right hand IS), and response omissions. Subsequently, Grubb’s test 
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(α = 0.05) was used on remaining trials to determine and exclude outliers in reaction 
times. If after exclusion overall error exceeded 20% of all trials, we excluded the full 
dataset of the participant from further analysis. To test whether participants prepared 
following informative WSs we ran a 3 x 1 within subject repeated measures ANOVA 
on mean reaction times with the factor cue (informative right, informative left, non-
informative). Paired two-tailed t-tests were used to further explore effects. 
For trials with TMS stimulation, we extracted MEP peak-to-peak amplitudes 
as well as pre-TMS EMG activity from the EMG traces recorded in rFDI. We 
excluded all trials with a MEP amplitude below 0.1mV (Mars et al., 2007). As pre-
TMS EMG activity is known to affect MEPs (Duque et al., 2005; Duque et al., 2010), 
we excluded all trials with a root mean square of pre-TMS EMG activity exceeding 
0.05mV measured over a time window 100ms prior to the first TMS pulse. 
Subsequently, to ensure that pre-TMS EMG activity was similar across all conditions, 
we ran Grubb’s test (α = 0.05) on the root mean square of pre-TMS EMG on all trials 
for each subject separately to determine and exclude any outliers in pre-TMS EMG 
activity. The limited number of trials in each experimental condition did not allow us 
to exclude outliers in peak-to-peak MEP amplitudes in each condition separately. 
Excluding outliers across conditions may have biased results. Hence, all further 
analyses were run on median MEP amplitudes in order to reduce the effect of 
possible outliers in the data (Livingston & Ingersoll, 2008).  
Since we stimulated the left hemisphere, trials where a right cue was 
presented as the WS should reveal neural effects of action preparation, relative to 
trials where a left cue was presented as the WS. This approach controls for possible 
non-specific effects of action preparation, such as arousal and attention.  
First, we assessed whether action preparation modulates CSE and whether 
MEP amplitude evoked in TPonly and LICIcontrol were matched. We computed 2 x 2 
within subject repeated measures ANOVA on median MEP amplitude evoked in 
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TPonly and LICIcontrol with WS (left, right) and TMS (TPonly, LICIcontrol) as factors (for 
illustrative single trial MEP traces, see Figure 5.3).  
Second, we explored whether action preparation modulates SICI, LICI, or the 
interaction between SICI and LICI. We divided MEP amplitude evoked in SICI, LICI, 
or SICI*LICI by the median MEP amplitude in TPonly for each WS (left, right) and 
participant separately, because the strength of SICI, LICI, or SICI*LICI, is expressed 
as the percentage reduction in median MEP amplitude compared to TPonly: Then, to 
explore the modulation of SICI, LICI, and SICI*LICI by preparation for action, we 
computed a 2 x 3 within subject repeated measures ANOVA on normalised MEP 
amplitudes with the factors WS (left, right), and TMS (SICI, LICI, SICI*LICI).  
Finally, we verified that MEP amplitude was indeed reduced in SICI, LICI, and 
SICI*LICI. Normalised MEP amplitude was tested against one using 6 one-sample t-
tests. Statistical threshold was set at 0.05 and corrected for multiple comparisons, 
whenever appropriate, using Bonferroni-correction. If a significant Mauchly’s tests 
revealed a violation of the sphericity assumption, then degrees of freedom were 
adjusted using Greenhouse-Geisser.  




Exclusion of trials or datasets 
Based on behavioural performance, we excluded one participant with an error 
rate exceeding 20% of trials. Additionally, we excluded one further participant 
because after exclusion of MEP traces following the criteria given above no trials 
were left in one of our experimental conditions. Overall, we excluded 13.0 % of all 
Figure 5.3: Single EMG traces for each TMS condition for warning stimuli (WS) indicating right 
index finger flexion. Single EMG traces illustrate single trial peak-to-peak MEP amplitudes evoked in 
TPonly, SICI, LICI, SICI*LICI, and LICIcontrol. In SICI and LICI, peak-to-peak MEP amplitudes were 
reduced compared to TPonly. In TPonly and LICIcontrol, the peak-to-peak MEP amplitudes evoked by the 
TP were approximately equal. 
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trials due to either behavioural error (omissions: 1.3 %, incorrect key presses: 0.5 %, 
RT < 100ms: 4.1 %), small MEP amplitude (4.8 %), or pre-TMS EMG activity (2.4 %).  
Reaction time task 
The 3 x 1 repeated measures ANOVA on mean reaction times was significant 
(F(1.15,20.77) = 43.68, p < 0.001, ηp
2  = 0.708). If the WS was non-informative, 
participants responded slower to imperative events (mean = 271.4ms, SE = 9.3) 
compared to informative WSs indicating either left (mean = 238.1ms, SE = 6.3; t(18) = 
-7.34, p < 0.001) or right (mean = 239.0ms, SE = 6.1; t(18) = -6.34, p < 0.001) index 
finger flexion. Reaction times between left and right index finger responses did not 
differ (t(18) = -0.56, p = 0.585; see Figure 5.3). 
	  
 
CSE and manipulation check: TPonly & LICIcontrol 
Figure 5.4: Reaction times. Responses to imperative events were faster if events were preceded by 
informative versus uninformative warning stimuli (WS). There was no difference between responses 
with the left or right index finger if preceded by informative WS. 
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If the WS indicated a right compared to a left hand response, then the median 
MEP amplitude increased (F(1,19) = 12.70,  p = 0.002, ηp
2  = 0.401). There was no 
difference between TPonly and LICIcontrol (F(1,19) = 0.49, p = 0.491, ηp
2  = 0.025) and no 
interaction between the type of TMS (TPonly  / LICIcontrol) and the WS (F(1,19) = 0.04, p = 
0.849, ηp
2  = 0.002; see Figure 5.4).  
 
 
SICI, LICI, and their interaction (SICI*LICI) 
The type of stimulation, SICI, LICI, or SICI*LICI, had a significant effect on 
normalised median MEP amplitude (F(2,38) = 6.66, p = 0.003, ηp
2  = 0.259). 
Normalised median MEP amplitude was increased for SICI*LICI (mean = 0.81mV, 
SE = 0.09) compared to SICI (mean = 0.57mV, SE = 0.07; t(18) = 0.238, p = 0.006) or 
LICI (mean = 0.53mV, SE = 0.06; t(18) = 0.281, p = 0.010). But the WS had no effect 
on normalised median MEP amplitude (F(1,19) = 0.17, p = 0.683, ηp
2  = 0.009). Also, 
Figure 5.5: Results for TPonly and LICIcontrol. The graph shows the median amplitude of Motor 
Evoked Potentials (MEPs) averaged across participants for TPonly (left) and LICIcontrol (right) for warning 
stimuli (WS) indicating left (red) or right (green) index finger flexion. Corticospinal excitability (CSE), 
reflected by MEP amplitude, increased in the corticospinal representation of the right first dorsal 
interosseous (rFDI) following right versus left WS. There was no difference between TPonly and 
LICIcontrol. 
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the interaction between WS and TMS was not significant (F(2,38) = 0.45, p = 0.641, ηp
2  
= 0.023; see Figure 5.5). 
 
The CS1 (LICI), CS2 (SICI), and the combined CS1 and CS2 (SICI*LICI) lead 
to a significant reduction in MEP amplitude for both left and right WS (SICI*WSleft: t(18) 
= 6.33, p < 0.0001; SICI*WSright: t(18) = 8.69, p < 0.0001; LICI*WSleft: t(18) = 8.18, p < 
0.0001; LICI*WSright: t(18) = 6.81, p < 0.0001; SICI*LICI*WSleft: t(18) = 8.26, p < 0.0001; 
SICI*LICI*WSright: t(18) = 8.40, p < 0.0001; see Figure 5.5 and 5.6). 
Discussion 
The present study assessed SICI, LICI as well as their interaction (SICI*LICI) 
during preparation for action with the overall aim to elucidate the functional 
contribution of GABAAR (SICI) and GABABR (LICI) mediated intracortical inhibition to 
preparation for action. Intracortical inhibition may contribute to action preparation by 
selectively suppressing the neuronal representation of competing actions (response 
Figure 5.6: Modulation of SICI, LICI, and their interaction (SICI*LICI) during action 
preparation. The graph shows the median amplitude of Motor Evoked Potentials (MEPs) evoked in 
SICI, LICI, or SICI*LICI as a percentage of the median MEP amplitude evoked in TPonly. CS2 for 
SICI, CS1 for LICI, and CS1 and CS2 combined for SICI*LICI reduced MEP amplitude. For SICI*LICI 
versus SICI or LICI this reduction was for smaller suggesting disinhibition. There was no effector-
specific modulation of SICI, LICI, or SICI*LICI by left (red) or right (green) warning stimuli. 
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competition), controlling the time of action release (impulse control), or preventing 
responses to distracting, non-imperative stimuli (prevent non-imperative, cf. cue 
activation in Chapter 4).  
We found an effector-specific increase in corticospinal excitability (CSE) in 
the corticospinal representation of rFDI when a preceding WS indicated right 
compared to left index finger flexion. In addition, we found disinhibition of SICI by 
LICI reflected by an increase in MEP amplitude when LICI conditioning pulse 
preceded SICI (CS1: SICI*LICI). However, there was no evidence for an effector-
specific modulation of SICI, LICI, or their interaction by a preceding left or right WS. 
The effector-specific increase in CSE during action preparation supports the 
hypothesis that during preparation the excitability of action representations required 
for the selected and prepared action alternative increases selectively (response 
competition; Cisek, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2005; Michelet et al., 2010; van Elswijk et 
al., 2008). The data suggest that this increase in CSE is not due to an effector-
specific removal of inhibition. In the current sample, LICI decreased only slightly 
during preparation for action in the prepared effector. Such a slight reduction in 
inhibition, which in this dataset was not statistically significant, cannot convincingly 
explain the clear and significant modulation of CSE duration action preparation. 
Similarly, the lack of an effector-specific effect for SICI cannot explain the modulation 
of CSE during action preparation. On the contrary, in the current sample, SICI was 
slightly elevated during preparation for action (albeit not significantly). Increased SICI 
could only explain a decrease in CSE during preparation for action. Instead of 
inhibitory circuits, facilitatory circuits may be responsible for increasing the neuronal 
excitability during preparation for action, for example, intracortical facilitation (ICF) or 
short intracortical facilitation (SICF). Future research may address the potential 
functional significance of intracortical facilitation during preparation for action. 
Importantly, facilitatory circuits, as assessed with TMS, interact with both facilitatory 
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and inhibitory circuits. For example, SICI is known to facilitate SICF while ICF inhibits 
SICF (Wagle-Shukla, Ni, Gunraj, Bahl, & Chen, 2009). 
Our data show that SICI is inhibited by LICI. This constitutes a removal of net 
inhibition (i.e. disinhibition) in SICI*LICI reflected by an overall increase in CSE. This 
increase in CSE cannot be attributed to higher MEP amplitude in SICI*LICI 
compared to SICI as we ensured that CS2 acted on comparable MEP amplitude in 
SICI and SICI*LICI. Therefore, this finding reveals, for the first time, that SICI and 
LICI interact when participants are engaged in a cognitive task. Previous studies 
have found such interaction at rest only (Cash et al., 2010; Sanger et al., 2001). 
However, there was no effector-specific modulation of this disinhibition: the strength 
of disinhibition in the corticospinal representation of rFDI did not differ during 
preparation for left versus right index finger flexion. Similarly, we found no evidence 
for an effector-specific modulation of SICI and LICI during preparation for action. As 
expected, we did find a substantial reduction in MEP amplitude by the CS2 for SICI 
and the CS1 for LICI. There was SICI and LICI while participants were performing the 
task. However, differences in SICI and LICI during preparation for right versus left 
index finger flexion were too small to reach significance. 
However, the numerical pattern of our data does match the initial hypotheses, 
despite not reaching statistical significance. Based on the time course of GABAAR 
and GABABR mediated intracortical inhibition, we speculated that SICI controls the 
well-timed release of prepared actions by preventing premature responses (impulse 
control). Consequently, we expected an increase in SICI, expressed by a stronger 
reduction in MEP amplitude, during preparation for action close to the imperative 
event. Albeit not significant, in the current sample, SICI increased during preparation 
for action. Previous studies have reported effector-specific removal of SICI during the 
RT period after presentation of the IS, shortly before action execution (Floeter & 
Rothwell, 1999; Reynolds & Ashby, 1999; Y. H. Sohn et al., 2002). In addition, 
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studies using stop-signal tasks have demonstrated the importance of SICI in 
volitional inhibition of a prepared response (Y. H. Sohn et al., 2002) when the release 
of the prepared action has to be prevented after the imperative stimulus has been 
shown. Our data show that SICI may have functional relevance during preparation 
for action, too, in particular preventing the premature release of prepared actions. 
The fast response of GABAAR mediated intracortical inhibition makes it a good 
candidate indeed for controlling the release and timing parameters of actions (Avoli 
et al., 1997; Connors et al., 1988; Deisz, 1999a, 1999b; McCormick, 1989; 
McCormick & Williamson, 1989). 
Based on the comparatively slow response of GABABR, we speculated that 
LICI might prevent responses to non-imperative signals (such as the WS: prevent 
non-imperative), or alternatively, suppresses representations of unselected action 
alternatives (response competition) because both alternatives require tonic inhibition. 
Prevent non-imperative predicts a gradual removal of LICI, expressed by a smaller 
reduction in MEP amplitudes, during preparation for action as the probability of the 
imperative event increases, in particular for the prepared response. Similarly, for the 
prepared response, response competition predicts a gradual removal of LICI and for 
the unprepared response a gradual increase in LICI as the probability of the 
imperative event increases. Indeed, though not significant, LICI was reduced during 
preparation for action (for similar results, see Sinclair & Hammond, 2008). This 
finding is compatible with both prevent non-imperative and response competition. 
LICI may either prevent responses to non-imperative stimuli or contribute to action 
selection by suppression cortical representations of non-selected action alternatives. 
However, the clear effector-specific modulation of CSE during action preparation 
suggests that another mechanism, perhaps in addition to LICI (e.g. ICF), also 
contributes to response competition. 
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Studies on SICI, LICI, and their interaction during rest have inspired models 
of intracortical connectivity in M1 (Sanger et al., 2001). Our data support these 
models: SICI and LICI decrease the output of I-wave generating neurons thereby 





Models of intracortical connectivity in M1 offer a useful framework for 
interpreting our results. ICF may be involved in selectively enhancing, or 
suppressing, the neural representations of selected or unselected action alternatives 
Figure 5.7: Schematic model of the intracortical circuitry of the primary motor cortex (M1) 
and their functional contribution to action preparation. The initial model of the intracortical 
circuitry in M1 was developed based on data acquired at rest (see Sanger et al., 2001). Our data 
support this model: SICI and LICI decrease the output of I-wave generating neurons reducing 
corticospinal excitability (CSE). LICI interacts with SICI, possibly via pre-synaptic GABABR mediated 
neuronal transmission. LICI decreases SICI and thus leads to an increase in CSE by removal of 
SICI (i.e. disinhibition). During action preparation, an effector-specific increase in CSE suggests that 
the neural representation of the prepared action is selectively activated (response competition). We 
speculate that intracortical facilitation (ICF) may support effector-specific increases in CSE. We 
found no effector-specific modulation of SICI or LICI. We speculate that SICI controls the release of 
action initiation and execution to ensure the correct timing of actions (impulse control). We speculate 
that LICI prevents responses to non-imperative events. Future experiments will have to confirm 
these hypotheses. If SICI controls the timing of the release and execution of actions, then SICI 
should increase during action preparation in an effector-specific way (impulse control). If LICI 
prevents actions either when an action needs to be withheld or to the occurrence of non-imperative 
but distracting stimuli (prevent non-imperative), then LICI should increase when the IS is not likely to 
occur, i.e. early during the delay, and decrease as the likelihood of occurrence of IS increases. 
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underlying the reported modulation in CSE. SICI may underlie the controlled and 
well-timed release of prepared actions (impulse control). LICI may prevent responses 
to distracting, non-imperative events (prevent non-imperative). However, in the 
current study, the effector-specific modulations of SICI, LICI, and their interaction 
were small and failed to reach statistical significance. We probed CSE, SICI, LICI, 
and their interaction shortly before the arrival of the IS. Ideally, one would study the 
development of CSE and intracortical inhibition during the entire preparatory period 
and not only at one isolated time-point. In the current study, the particular moment in 
time when CSE and intracortical inhibition were probed may have been sub-optimal. 
Possibly, at other time-points, one could have found clear effector-specific 
modulations of SICI, LICI, and their interaction. In particular, if LICI was involved in 
preventing responses to distracting events, it should show strongest effector-specific 
modulation early on during the preparatory period. SICI should be strongest just 
before the IS, if preventing the premature release of prepared actions (impulse 
control). The time when we probed intracortical inhibition in the current study may 
have been too late for LICI and too early for SICI to find effector-specific modulation. 
Future studies that probe CSE and intracortical inhibition at several time-points 
during the preparatory period will have to explore this possibility. Such studies are 
relevant for our understanding of the functional significance of inhibitory and 
excitatory circuitry in M1. They allow the integration of models of the intracortical 
circuitry in M1 with classic behavioural paradigms used for studying manual actions, 
which may allow establishing the relation between abnormalities in intracortical 
circuitry and behavioural symptoms in disease in the future. 
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Chapter 6: Distortion of external but not internal temporal 
uncertainty in reward-based decision making 
Abstract: Part of the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of an action is external, 
due to stochastic variability in the environment, and part is internal, due to 
sensorimotor “noise”. In this study, we asked whether observers could select actions 
that correctly compensate for combinations of external (ETU) and internal timing 
uncertainty (ITU) to maximise expected reward. We first trained participants on a time 
interval estimation task. They received reward when their estimate fell inside a brief 
reward-window. ETU was manipulated by stochastically varying the timing of the 
reward-window around the target interval (TI). ITU was manipulated by increasing the 
duration of the TI. Following this training, participants chose between pairs of stimuli 
varying in ITU and ETU including novel combinations not encountered during training. 
We compared human performance to that of an ideal observer who selects ITU / ETU 
combinations with lower temporal uncertainty and consequently, a higher probability 
of reward. Observed behaviour differed from optimal performance due to biased 
estimates of ETU while estimates of ITU were highly accurate. 
Keywords: Statistical decision theory, Bayesian decision theory, timing, temporal 
uncertainty, optimal statistical models, interval reproduction 
Combining uncertainty from external and internal sources to estimate the 
expected costs and benefits is a key challenge in deciding between alternative 
actions. In this chapter, we examine the ability to estimate and combine internal and 
external temporal uncertainty in a reward-based decision making task that puts a 
premium on the accurate timing of motor actions. Under conditions of external risk 
and uncertainty (Allais, 1953; Friedman & Savage, 1948; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000; Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, & 
Combs, 1978; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), participants typically exhibit patterned 
deviations from optimal performance. In particular, participants overestimate the 
probability of infrequent events and display risk aversion (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992). By contrast, under conditions of internal uncertainty (Trommershäuser et al., 
2003, 2008) participants typically, but not always (Trommershäuser, 2009), select 
actions that take into account their own visual and motor uncertainties and come 
close to maximizing expected reward (Gepshtein et al., 2007; Seydell et al., 2008; 
Trommershäuser et al., 2005, 2006). 
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Crucially, learning about one’s own internal uncertainty differs from learning 
about environmentally induced external uncertainty. Participants know about their 
own internal uncertainty from experience. By contrast, in typical economic choice 
tasks, all possible outcomes and their respective probabilities are explicitly 
communicated to the decision-maker: participants might be offered a choice between 
10% chance of winning $5000 (90% winning nothing) and a 95% change of winning 
$300 (5% change winning nothing; Trommershäuser et al., 2008).  
When participants make decisions under conditions of external uncertainty 
based on experience (i.e. repeated sampling of the available options), they typically 
underestimate the probability of rare events (Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, & Hertwig, 2008; 
Hertwig & Erev, 2009). Increasing the sample size reduces this discrepancy between 
decisions based on experience versus decisions based on explicit descriptions 
(Rakow, Demes, & Newell, 2008). A recent study has found that, when given the 
opportunity to draw large representative samples in little time, participants neither 
over- nor underweight small probabilities (Hilbig & Glöckner, 2011). 
Can we thus explain optimal performance on motor-lotteries and sub-optimal 
performance on economic decision tasks by this difference in how we learn the level 
of internal or external uncertainty that we are exposed to? The answer is: probably 
not! While participants require extensive training to achieve optimal performance on 
economic decision tasks based on experience (Hilbig & Glöckner, 2011), participants 
perform close to optimal right from the start on unfamiliar and highly artificial visuo-
motor decision tasks (Trommershäuser et al., 2006). However, to directly compare 
choice under external and internal uncertainty, one has to match the learning 
process for external and internal uncertainty and then compare their effects on 
behaviour in a single experiment. 
We developed a novel paradigm to explore choice under conditions of both 
internal (ITU) and external (ETU) temporal uncertainty. Participants learned about 
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both ETU and ITU by repeated sampling during training with feedback. Following 
training, they repeatedly chose between two options that differed in ETU, ITU, or 
both, now without feedback. We asked, first whether participants could combine 
estimates of ETU and ITU for choice, and second, whether participants’ estimates of 
ETU and ITU were biased. 
We compared observed versus predicted optimal performance to address the 
latter question. Formally, ITU is a Gaussian random variable whose standard 
deviation grows linearly with time interval duration. It depends entirely on 
participants’ accuracy in time interval estimation. By contrast, ETU is under 
experimental control. In the present study, ETU was manipulated to also resemble a 
Gaussian random variable. Participants had to choose between executing of one out 
of two possible actions. Each action was the reproduction of a target interval (TI) of a 
particular duration and could potentially lead to a reward. Two factors affected the 
probability of reward. The first was the duration of the TI: as ITU increases with 
increasing time interval duration, participants were less likely to accurately reproduce 
longer TIs. Second, the appropriate time for action was varied unpredictably from 
one trial to the next. While participants were instructed to reproduce the TI, the 
appropriate time to respond to receive reward was sometimes earlier and sometimes 
later than the indicated TI, which constituted our manipulation of ETU. Evidently, 
participants were more likely to be rewarded for short TIs, due to greater precision in 
time estimation, and under conditions of low levels of ETU, due to less variability in 
the external world. 
In choice, we asked participants to consider two hypothetical time interval 
reproduction trials, which varied in ETU, ITU, or both. Participants did not attempt to 
execute either trial; they simply chose which of the two they would prefer to execute. 
They were told that they would be allowed to execute the chosen configuration on a 
small number of randomly chosen trials and receive monetary rewards if they 
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responded at the right time ($0.25). The probability of reward was determined by the 
sum of ITU and ETU, the total timing uncertainty, 
€ 
σTU = σ ITU
2 +σETU
2 . It was to the 
participant’s advantage on each trial to select the configuration (combination of ITU 
and ETU) that was lower in overall temporal uncertainty. Figure 6.1 shows 
indifference contours and optimal choice for a variety of different decision scenarios. 
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Figure 6.1: Indifference contours, optimal rank order, and optimal choice for 3 different 
scenarios. A. shows indifference contours for 16 combinations of ETU and ITU in three different 
scenarios (left, middle, right). On the left, the world is stable and ETU is low. Consequently, the 
contribution of ITU towards overall temporal uncertainty is large compared to the contribution of 
ETU. As such, ITU is dominant. Participants should always choose the combinations low in ITU. 
ETU is secondary. On the right, the word is unstable and ETU is high. The contribution of ETU 
towards temporal uncertainty is large compared to the contribution of ITU. ETU is dominant, 
participants should always prefer the combination low in ETU. ITU is secondary. In the middle, 
participants need to assess both ETU and ITU and trade-off ETU and ITU in choice. B. shows the 
optimal rank order based on the overall temporal uncertainty associated with each combination of 
ETU and ITU for each scenario (i.e. dominance) and C. depicts optimal choice. 
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Prior to the choice task, participants completed a large number of time 
interval reproduction trials, without preceding choice, and were given trial-by-trial 
feedback. This provided them with the opportunity to observe the effects of ETU and 
ITU on reward. Further, it allowed us to verify that ITU is indeed a random Gaussian 
variable and to compute predicted optimal choice behaviour. 
We predicted that participants could form stable estimates of ETU and ITU 
and combine these estimates in choice. In line with previously reported optimal 
choice on motor-decision tasks, we expected accurate estimates of ITU. Three 
hypotheses were conceivable with regard to ETU: (i) in line with previous findings on 
decisions from description, participants may overweight small (and correspondingly 
underweight high) ETU; (ii) in line with previous findings on decisions from 
experience, participants may underweight small (and correspondingly overweight 
high) ETU; (iii) participants may form accurate estimates of ETU. If the latter 
hypothesis turned out to be true, then internal and external uncertainty would affect 




Fifteen right-handed participants (3 male, mean age: 23 years, age range: 19 
– 33 years) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision took part in this study, which 
was conducted with local ethics approval in line with the declaration of Helsinki. All 
participants gave written informed consent before participation. 
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Experimental procedure and design 
An extensive training, which provided participants with the opportunity to 
learn ETU and ITU, was followed by a reward-based decision making task. In 
addition, before taking part in the experiment, participants completed a short pre-
screen probing for existing biases in time interval reproduction. 
Pre-screen for systematic biases in time interval estimation 
Participants completed a time interval reproduction task with a ready-set-go 
procedure (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010). They were instructed to reproduce one out of 
four target intervals (TI: 750, 1150, 1550, 1950ms) on separate blocks. Participants 
received feedback about their mean reproduced TI, following completion of 10 trials, 
averaged across those 10 trials. Participants were excluded from further participation 
if their mean reproduced TI deviated more than 150ms from the corresponding TI 
(i.e. duration of the rewarded interval divided by two, see below) after 50 training 
trials (i.e. 5 sets of 10 trials each) for each of the four TIs. This pre-screen was aimed 
at reducing existing biases in time interval reproduction, and excluding participants if 
bias persisted, whilst providing limited information about trial-by-trial variability. 
ETU and ITU Training 
During the ETU and ITU training, participants completed the same time 
interval reproduction task as during pre-screen (see Figure 2A): they were instructed 
to accurately reproduce one out of four TIs (750, 1150, 1550, 1950ms). The timing of 
their response determined whether participants received positive feedback (see 
Figure 6.2B). Positive feedback depended on whether participants’ response fell 
inside a rewarded interval (RI) of 300ms. The mid-point of the RI was sampled from a 
Gaussian distribution, see Figure 6.2B. The TI set the mean of the Gaussian. The 
standard deviation of the Gaussian was set at one out of four values (0, 133, 267, 
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400ms). A higher standard deviation increases the variability of the RI and decreases 
the probability of reward. As such, the mean of the Gaussian manipulated ITU, due 
to the increase in ITU for longer TIs, while the standard deviation manipulated ETU. 
There were 16 (= 4 x 4) possible combinations of the four levels of ITU and 
ETU. During training, participants were exposed to only seven of them, see Figure 
6.2C. They experienced all four levels of ITU at lowest ETU, and all four levels of 
ETU at lowest ITU, to learn how ITU and ETU affect the probability of reward without 
concomitant changes in ETU and ITU, respectively. 
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During training, participants were seated in front of a touch screen (32’’) and 
wore headphones. On each trial, participants saw a centrally presented coloured 
Figure 6.2: Experimental design. A. illustrates the ETU and ITU training. Participants performed an 
interval reproduction task with a ready-set-go procedure. They were instructed to reproduce the four 
target intervals as accurately as possible. Participants received trial-by-trial feedback about 
performance. B. feedback was dependent on whether the participant’s response fell inside a 
rewarded interval. The mid-point of the rewarded interval was sampled from a Gaussian. The 
Gaussian was centred on the target interval. ITU increased with increasing time interval duration. 
The standard deviation was set at one out of four values. Higher standard deviation increases the 
variability of reward timing, thus manipulating ETU, and decreasing expected reward. C. four levels 
of ETU (indicated by colour) and four levels of ITU (indicated by the timer bars) were included. 
Participants trained with seven of the 16 possible combinations of the four levels of ETU and ITU. 
During the experiment, participants encountered all 16 combinations. D. participants completed a 
reward-based decision making task. They chose between pairs of stimuli (previously trials). On 10% 
of all trials, randomly selected, participants performed the interval reproduction task as during ETU 
and ITU training with the chosen combination of ETU and ITU. If their response fell inside the 
rewarded interval, then participants earned $0.25. 
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target square (5cm2: orange, green, blue, yellow) and “timer-bars” to the left and right 
of the target square (see Figure 6.2A). The colour communicated the level of ETU. 
The timer-bars informed participants about TI duration. Trials were initiated by key 
press on a standard QWERTY keyboard. 500ms after trial initiation, two auditory 
stimuli (300Hz, 50ms) occurred (READY and SET) separated by one out of the four 
TIs (750, 1150, 1550, 1950ms). Participants had to reproduce the TI by touching the 
target square at the centre of the screen at the appropriate time after SET. ETU and 
ITU training comprised eight blocks of ten repetitions each for each combination of 
ETU and ITU, in random order (70 x 8 trials = 560 trials). It took about an hour to 
complete. 
Reward-based decision-making task 
 During the reward-based decision task, participants had to choose between 
two possible time interval reproduction trials (see Figure 6.2D). More specifically, on 
each decision trial, participants were presented with two possible time interval 
reproduction trials varying in ETU, ITU, or both. We instructed participants to select 
the time interval reproduction trial with the combination of ETU and ITU that they 
preferred. Participants were told that they could win a monetary reward ($0.25) on 
10% of randomly selected trials. On these trials, following choice, participants 
performed the chosen time interval reproduction trial with its associated levels of 
ETU and ITU. Participants earned a reward if their time interval estimate fell inside 
the RI. As during training, the mid-point of this RI was sampled from a Gaussian 
distribution. The TI set the mean of the Gaussian and the standard deviation of the 
Gaussian was set at one out of four values (0, 133, 267, 400ms). To maximise 
expected reward, participants should choose the option with overall lower temporal 
uncertainty. 
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Choice trials were initiated by key-press. 500ms after trial onset, participants 
were presented with the stimuli, two coloured target squares (5cm2) equidistant from 
the centre of the screen towards the left and right respectively. Colour indicated the 
level of ETU (orange, green, blue, yellow) and “timer-bars” to the left and right of 
each target square the level of ITU. During the choice task, participants encountered 
all 16 combinations of ETU and ITU. By touching the respective target square, 
participants chose between all possible 120 pairs of these 16 combinations of ETU 
and ITU, one pair at a time (excluding choice between time interval reproduction 
trials with identical ETU and ITU). Participants completed 4 blocks of 240 trials, thus 
repeating each possible pair of time interval reproduction trials eight times.  
Following an actual time interval reproduction task trial (on those 10% of 
randomly selected trials on which participants could earn a reward) subsequent 
decision trials started no earlier than 2925ms after trial onset to prevent temporal 
discounting (i.e. choosing options with short TIs to shorten the experiment). In other 
words, there was no other benefit to choosing trials with short TIs than low ITU. 
Summary feedback was provided every 25 actually executed time interval 
reproduction trials. Overall, this choice task took 1.5 hours.  
As participants were exposed to only seven out of the 16 possible 
combinations of ETU and ITU during ETU and ITU training, they could not choose 
based on the previously experienced frequency of reward associated with each 
combination of ETU and ITU during the main part of the experiment. Instead, 
participants had to use their individual estimates of ITU and ETU for choice 
particularly when choosing between novel environments. 
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Data analysis 
ETU and ITU training 
Reproduced TIs were computed as the time interval in between the second 
auditory stimulus (SET) and the participants’ response. They were analysed with 
regard to mean accuracy (i.e. bias) and trial-by-trial accuracy, that is, variability 
across trials. To detect biases in time interval reproduction, the actual TI duration 
was subtracted from the mean reproduced TI duration. Difference scores were tested 
against zero using eight one-sample t-tests, one for each level of ETU (target 
interval: 750 ms) and one for each level of ITU (target interval: 750, 1150 1550 1950 
ms). There should be no significant bias in time interval reproduction (in particular 
after having passed the pre-screen). Statistical threshold was thus set at alpha = 
0.05 but not corrected for multiple comparison as such correction would have been to 
our advantage. 
Standard deviation was analysed by fitting linear regression models to the 
standard deviation in reproduced TI against the level of ETU or actual TI duration for 
ETU and ITU, respectively. Regression coefficients were then tested against zero 
using one-sample t-tests. A positive slope would show an increase in standard 
deviation with increasing ETU or actual TI duration. The latter was expected (Gibbon, 
1977; John Gibbon & Allan, 1984; Lejeune & Wearden, 2006) and would allow us to 
verify that ITU does indeed increase with longer TIs. ETU, by contrast, should not 
affect the standard deviation in reproduced TIs. But participants might react to 
increased variability in the RI (high ETU) by increasing the variability in their 
responses in the attempt to try to “chase up” the RI. To exclude this possibility, we 
tested for such potential change in the variability with levels of ETU. 
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Finally, the percentage of obtained reward was analysed by fitting linear 
regression models y(x) = bx + a  to the percentage of obtained reward against ETU 
or TI duration. Regression coefficients were extracted and tested against zero using 
one-sample t-tests. A negative slope would reveal a decrease in the percentage of 
obtained reward with increasing ETU and ITU, respectively, which was expected. As 
such, these tests revealed whether our manipulations of ETU and ITU were indeed 
effective. 
Reward-based decision-making task 
The number of times that a particular combination of ETU and ITU was 
chosen was indicative about participants’ relative preference for all 16 combinations 
of ETU and ITU. We thus counted the number of times each combination was 
chosen by the participant during the experiment. We then determined whether ETU 
and / or ITU had any effect on participants’ choice by computing a 4 x 4 within-
subject repeated-measures ANOVA on preference. Subsequently, observed 
behaviour was compared to predicted optimal performance. Optimal performance 
was computed for each participant separately, to account for differences in ITU, 
following Equation (6.1): 
€ 
σTU = σ ITU
2 +σETU
2
                 (6.1) 
σ TU , σ ETU , and σ ITU  refer to the level of overall temporal uncertainty, ETU, 
and ITU, respectively. ETU was set by the experimenter, and ITU by participants’ 
accuracy in time perception measured during ETU and ITU training. We calculated 
the number of times that a given combination of ETU and ITU should have been 
chosen (i.e. optimal performance) separately for each participant. We then 
subtracted optimal from observed performance to test for deviation from optimal 
performance: negative values mean that a combination of ETU and ITU was chosen 
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less often that it should have been and vice versa for positive values. First, to test for 
mere presence of bias, difference scores were tested against zero for all four levels 
of ETU (collapsed across ITU) and for all four levels of ITU (collapsed across ETU). 
Then, to detect differences in bias between the different levels of ETU and / or ITU, 
and a possible interaction in bias between ETU and ITU, we analysed difference 
scores (% observed - % optimal) with a 4 x 4 within-subject repeated-measures 
ANOVA with ETU and ITU as factors. Significant effects were followed up by paired 
t-tests corrected for multiple comparisons using Bonferroni correction. Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was applied to degrees of freedom when sphericity assumptions 
were violated (Mauchly’s test). 
Results 
Four participants were excluded after the pre-screen; eleven participants 
were entered into the analysis. 
ETU and ITU training 
Participants showed no systematic bias in time interval reproduction for low 
(ETU0: t(10) = -0.39, p = 0.704), low intermediate (ETU133: t(10) = -0.18, p = 0.862), high 
intermediate (ETU267: t(10) = -0.18, p = 0.865), and high ETU (ETU400: t(10) = -0.75, p = 
0.470). There was no significant change in standard deviation in reproduced TIs with 
increasing ETU (t(10) = 0.72, p = 0.489). The percentage of obtained reward 
decreased with increasing ETU (t(10) = -18.44, p < 0.001; see Figure 6.3). 
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Similarly, participants showed no systematic bias in time interval reproduction 
for short (TI750: t(10) = -0.39, p = 0.704), short intermediate (TI1150: t(10) = 0.74, p = 
0.479), long intermediate (TI1550: t(10) = -1.55, p = 0.153), and long TIs (TI1950: t(10) = -
1.14, p = 0.281). The standard deviation in reproduced TIs increased with increasing 
TI duration (t(10) = 6.93, p < 0.001), which verified that ITU did indeed increase with 
increasing TI duration (Weber property). Consequently, the percentage of obtained 
reward decreased with increasing TI duration / ITU (t(10) = -7.58, p < 0.001; see 
Figure 6.3).  
Taken together, we found no evidence for bias in time interval reproduction 
for the four levels of ETU and ITU. Standard deviation in reproduced TIs increased 
with increasing TI duration, which confirms that ITU increases with increasing TI 
duration, while the standard deviation did not change for varying ETU. Finally, 
participants experienced changes in the probability of reward as a consequence of 
varying ETU or ITU. Our experimental manipulations were thus successful. 
 
Figure 6.3: Percentage of reward obtained during ETU and ITU training. Reward decreased 
with increasing ETU due to higher variability in reward timing. Reward also decreased with 
increasing ITU due to higher variability in reproduced target intervals (TI) with longer to-be-
reproduced TIs. Manipulations of ETU and ITU were thus successful.  
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Reward-based decision-making task 
ETU and ITU contributed independently towards participant’s choice (F(2.60, 
25.96) = 2.01, p = 0.132, ηp
2  = 0.173; see Figure 4). Choice was affected by ITU (F(1.14, 
25.96) = 26.58, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.727). Collapsed across ETU, preference decreased 
with increasing levels of ITU (ITU750 vs. ITU1150: t(10) = 4.15, p < 0.0167; ITU1150 vs. 
ITU1550: t(10) = 6.31, p < 0.0167; ITU1550 vs. ITU1950: t(10) = 4.02, p < 0.0167; see Figure 
6.4). Similarly, ETU had a significant effect on participants’ preference (F(1.37,25.97) = 
8.72, p = 0.007, ηp
2  = 0.466) Collapsed across ITU, participants avoided the highest 
level (ETU267 vs. ETU400: t(10) = 3.36, p < 0.0167). The data revealed a trend towards 
preferring the lowest level of ETU (ETU0 vs. ETU133: t(10) = 2.75, p = 0.021). By 
contrast, participants showed indifference towards the two intermediate levels of ETU 
(ETU133 vs. ETU267: t(10) = 0.59, p = 0.569; Figure 3). Taken together, participants’ 
behaviour was guided by a decrease in reward probability with increasing ITU and 
ETU except for an indifference towards the two intermediate levels of ETU. ETU and 
ITU had a clear effect on participants’ choice (see Figure 6.4). 
 
 	   195 
 
The four levels of ETU, as experimentally manipulated, and estimates of the 
four levels of ITU, extracted from participants’ training data, allowed us to compute 
indifference contours for all 16 combinations of ETU and ITU, see Figure 6.5A, as 
well as to predict optimal performance following Equation 6.1. Observed behaviour 
differed from optimal performance, see Figure 6.5B. In select cases, participants 
preferred combinations of ETU and ITU with overall higher temporal uncertainty (e.g. 
low ITU and high intermediate ETU) over combinations of ETU and ITU with overall 
lower temporal uncertainty (e.g. high intermediate ITU and low intermediate ETU; 
see Figure 6.5B). 
Figure 6.4: Choice behaviour on the reward-based decision making task. Participants’ 
preference decreased progressively with increasing ITU. Participants avoided high and preferred 
low ETU. They were indifferent towards intermediate values of ETU. Comparison between bold 
(observed) and dashed (optimal) lines reveals that observed deviates from optimal performance. 
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The analysis of the difference scores (% observed choice - % optimal choice) 
revealed that deviation from optimal performance was driven primarily by biased 
estimates of ETU (see Figure 6.6). Collapsed across ITU, participants were biased in 
their estimates of low intermediate ETU (t(10) = -7.52, p < 0.001) and high 
intermediate ETU (t(10) = 3.50, p = 0.023). The data furthermore revealed a trend 
towards a biased estimate for high ETU (t(10) = 2.87, p = 0.067). These biases were 
different for the four levels of ETU (F(1.29,12.91) = 8.35, p = 0.009, ηp
2  = 0.455). Bias 
was comparable for low and low intermediate ETU (t(10) = -0.24, p = 0.815) and high 
intermediate and high ETU (t(10) = -1.13, p = 0.284). However, whilst participants 
overestimated low and low intermediate ETU, they underestimated high intermediate 
and high ETU (ETU133 vs. ETU267: t(10) = -5.49, p < 0.001). A positive regression 
coefficient (mean = 0.095, SE = 0.032), extracted from a linear regression model 
fitted to the difference scores against ETU for each participant separately, confirmed 
Figure 6.5: Indifference contours, optimal and observed rank order. Indifference contour A. and 
optimal versus observed rank order B. modelled on experimentally manipulated ETU and ITU 
extracted from ETU and ITU training data for each participant separately. The observed rank order 
differs from the optimal rank order (values in yellow). In selected cases, combinations of ETU and 
ITU with associated higher temporal uncertainty (e.g. high intermediate ETU and low ITU) were 
preferred over stimuli with associated lower temporal uncertainty (e.g. low intermediate ETU and 
high intermediate ITU). Comparison of A. with Figure 6.1A illustrates that neither ETU nor ITU 
should strongly dominate participants’ choice.  
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this trend from over- to underestimation with increasing ETU (t(10) = 2.97, p = 0.014). 
As ETU increases, a significant overestimation turns into an underestimation of ETU. 
In contrast, we found no bias in the estimates of ITU (all p > 0.1) and no 
difference in bias between the estimates of the four levels of ITU (F(3,30) = 0.60, p = 
0.623, ηp
2  = 0.056). Similarly, regression coefficients, extracted from a linear 
regression model fitted to the difference scores against level of ITU computed for 
each participant separately, did not differ from zero (mean = -0.0044, SE = 0.0046; 
t(10) = -0.96, p = 0.358).  
 
Finally, we found a significant interaction between ETU and ITU (F(3.71, 37.11) = 
3.62, p = 0.016, ηp
2  = 0.266). Post-hoc t-tests revealed a more pronounced 
underestimation of high intermediate ETU at low versus high ITU (t(10) = -2.39, p = 
0.074). The data reveal a similar though not significant pattern for high ETU (t(10) = -
2.06, p = 0.13).  
Figure 6.6: Deviation from optimal performance in choice. Observed behaviour differed from 
optimal performance. This deviation was largely due to biased estimates of ETU (top right). 
Participants overestimated low intermediate ETU and underestimated high intermediate ETU. 
Estimates of ITU showed no such bias (bottom right). In addition, the underestimation of high 
intermediate ETU was more pronounced for low versus high ITU. A similar pattern was found for 
high ETU albeit not significant (left). 
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Taken together, while ETU and ITU influence participants’ choice, observed 
choice differs from predicted optimal performance. This difference was primarily 
caused by biased estimates of ETU but not ITU. Estimates of high intermediate ETU 
may depend on the level of ITU. 
Discussion 
At the moment of choice the outcome of actions is uncertain. This uncertainty 
is partly due to variability in the outside world (i.e. externally generated variability, 
here ETU) and partly due to sensorimotor noise (i.e. internally generated variability, 
here ITU). We assessed, using a novel experimental paradigm, whether participants 
can accurately estimate and combine external (ETU) and internal temporal 
uncertainty (ITU) in a reward-based decision making task that puts a premium on 
accurate action timing. 
ETU and ITU contributed independently towards participants’ choice. Choice 
decreased consistently with increasing ITU. Participants avoided the highest and 
preferred the lowest level of ETU but they were indifferent towards intermediate 
values. Thus, participants formed stable and independent estimates of both ITU and 
ETU during training, except for intermediate values of ETU. In choice, they combined 
these estimates to select one combination of ETU and ITU above another. These 
results demonstrate that the ETU and ITU training was effective. The paradigm 
presented in this study thus allows, for the first time, to study decision making under 
both external and internal temporal uncertainty. Second, it suggests that participants 
are better at forming reliable estimates of ITU compared to estimates of ETU. 
Optimal performance was modelled based on observed ITU (i.e. trial-by-trial 
accuracy in reproduced TIs) and experimentally manipulated ETU. Observed 
behaviour differed from optimal performance. In selected cases, participants 
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preferred options with comparatively high temporal uncertainty above options with 
comparatively low temporal uncertainty. In other words, participants preferred options 
with lower expected reward above options with higher expected reward. This sub-
optimal performance was largely due to biased estimates of ETU. Low values of ETU 
were overestimated. In other words, participants erroneously believed that options 
associated with low ETU were less good than they actually were. Conversely, 
participants underestimated high values of ETU: participants thought that options 
associated with high ETU were better than they actually were. In contrast, we 
observed no such biases for ITU. However, we found a small but significant 
interaction between biases in estimates of ETU and ITU. We found a trend towards a 
marginally more pronounced bias for high intermediate ETU for low versus high ITU. 
We found a comparable pattern for high ETU albeit not significant. 
Importance of the origin of uncertainty 
The data reveal that the origin of temporal uncertainty matters for choice. 
While participants can form accurate estimates of ITU (cf. Gepshtein et al., 2007; 
Trommershäuser et al., 2005, 2006), their estimates of ETU are biased (cf. 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Consequently, choice 
under conditions of ETU will be sub-optimal while performance will approach 
optimality under conditions of ITU. We suggest two alternative explanations for 
biased estimates of ETU. First, biases might reflect a strategic response towards 
uncertainty about the estimates of ETU (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010) but not ITU. 
Second, biases might be due to distortion of small probabilities (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) for ETU but not ITU. 
Uncertainty about ETU estimates 
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Participants may have experienced uncertainty about their estimates of ETU. 
This uncertainty may have caused a “regression towards the mean”, here expressed 
by an overestimation of low and an underestimation of high ETU. This regression 
towards the mean may constitute a strategic response towards the experienced 
uncertainty about ETU estimates. In a recent study, Jazayeri and Shadlen showed 
that regression towards the mean reflects prior expectation. They instructed 
participants to estimate time intervals in a ready-set-go procedure (Jazayeri & 
Shadlen, 2010). Participants systematically overestimated time intervals shorter than 
and underestimated time intervals longer than the mean target interval duration. 
Importantly, the degree of over- or underestimation was modulated by the temporal 
uncertainty that participants experienced regarding the true duration of the time 
interval that they were supposed to judge. Longer time intervals, associated with a 
higher level of ITU, were biased more strongly towards the mean than shorter time 
intervals. In other words, the influence of prior expectation grows with increasing 
uncertainty. 
Similarly, the overestimation of high and the underestimation of low ETU 
might reflect the influence of prior expectation established across trials (i.e. the mean 
of the four values of ETU). The indifference towards intermediate values of ETU 
might be a consequence of this influence of prior expectation. As estimates are 
regressed towards the mean, differences close to the mean decrease and may 
become too small to be detected by statistical tests.  
Interestingly, we did not find the same bias for estimates of ITU. Participants’ 
estimates of ITU are highly accurate (contrary to Mamassian, 2008), which may be 
due to a lifetime’s experience with one’s internally generated temporal uncertainty. 
Alternatively (or, in addition), the way participants learn about ITU might be superior 
to how it is that participants learn about ETU. Learning ETU is entirely dependent on 
feedback. In the present study, feedback was binary: either participants received the 
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reward or they did not. If participants did not receive the reward, then they had no 
means of telling how far off they were from the rewarded time interval (or indeed, 
how well they performed). In contrast, re-afferent information may provide 
participants with a better ‘error signal’. By comparing the efference copy (a prediction 
of re-afferent information generated during action selection and execution: Flanders, 
2011; Körding & Wolpert, 2004) with ensuing re-afferent information, participants 
might be able to estimate how far off they were in reproducing the target interval. 
This quantitative information might allow them to form more reliable and highly 
accurate estimates of ITU. But how does the brain access this information and how 
does it integrate the efference copy with feedback about reward? Answers to these 
questions have to await further studies. Importantly, the results point towards a clear 
difference between ETU and ITU, based on their origin and suggests a fundamental 
advantage of ITU. 
Distortion of small probabilities 
Alternatively, the bias in the estimates of ETU may be due to the distortion of 
small probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Participants are known to overestimate small 
probabilities, which is why we buy lottery tickets. Such overestimation may have 
caused stronger preference compared to optimal performance for options associated 
with high temporal uncertainty (low probability of reward). Conversely, options 
associated with low temporal uncertainty (high probability of reward) were chosen 
less often.  
Crucially, we do not find such bias for estimates of ITU. This suggests that 
distortion of probabilities happens for externally but not internally generated 
uncertainty. Again, these results reveal a fundamental difference between ETU and 
ITU and suggests that the origin of uncertainty, rather than how participants learn 
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about uncertainty, determines whether or not participants show patterned deviations 
from optimality. 
We speculate that these two alternative explanations for the observed biases 
in estimates of ETU are not exclusive. The distortion of small probabilities may be 
due to a regression towards the mean. Effectively, “distortion of small probabilities” 
describes a data-pattern that has been found previously. “Regression towards the 
mean” may explain why it is that participants distort small probabilities in the first 
place: participants may have experienced uncertainty about their estimates (here, 
ETU only). 
Conclusions 
This study introduces a novel paradigm to study the contribution of internally 
(ITU) and externally (ETU) generated temporal uncertainty towards choice in a 
reward-based decision task. Participants’ choices were guided by ETU and ITU but 
observed performance differed from predicted optimal performance. This deviation 
was driven primarily by biased estimates of ETU. We suggest that biased estimates 
of ETU reflect higher uncertainty about parameter estimates. This uncertainty leads 
to a “regression towards the mean” expressed as distortion of small probabilities. We 
did not find any such biases for ITU, although participants learned about both ETU 
and ITU by extensive sampling (i.e. experience). This study thus reveals a 
fundamental difference between ETU and ITU in choice. The origin of noise 
determines its effects on reward-based choice. 
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Chapter 7: Temporal cue integration to reduce internal 
temporal uncertainty 
Abstract: Time is a ubiquitous aspect of perception, cognition, and action but time 
perception is inaccurate. Temporal noise increases with the duration of time-intervals 
to-be-judged, and induces internal temporal uncertainty (ITU) about the timing of 
events or actions, with detrimental effects on performance. Combining information 
from multiple sources reduces sensory and motor noise which benefits performance. 
We asked whether participants can combine temporal information from multiple cues 
to reduce ITU. Participants reproduced a time-interval in a READY-SET-GO 
procedure. An additional temporal stimulus (AS) occurred at a fixed time before the 
correct time to respond, but after SET. Combining temporal information provided by 
both SET and AS should lead to more accurate time-interval reproduction than relying 
on either cue alone. Analysis of participants’ variability in time-interval reproduction 
did not show this improvement. Instead, participants relied on the more accurate cue 
(AS) to time their responses. Cue integration may require not only correlated percepts 
but correlation with temporal proximity, which suggests that cue combination is no 
general-purpose mechanism for sensory-motor noise reduction. Rather, it features in 
the inference from sensory percepts to common but hidden causes. The constraint of 
temporal proximity may aid us in correctly inferring the cause of sensory signals at the 
expense of timing accuracy. 
Keywords: cue integration, cue combination, timing, time interval reproduction, 
uncertainty, internal temporal uncertainty 
Motor performance often depends on the accurate perception of time (J. Coull 
& Nobre, 2008; Nobre et al., 2007). But accuracy in time perception is limited: 
“internal clocks” are noisy. We experience ITU about behaviourally relevant events, 
or appropriate timing for motor action (Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon & Allan, 1984; Lejeune 
& Wearden, 2006; Lewis & Miall, 2009). In this chapter we explore first, whether 
participants are able to extract temporal information from multiple temporal cues, and 
second, whether participants can combine this information to reduce ITU to improve 
performance. To date, this is the first study, as far as we know, on the reduction of 
internally generated temporal uncertainty (ITU) by temporal cue integration. 
There are many examples of successful cue integration in the literature. 
(Ernst & Banks, 2002; Girshick & Banks, 2009; Hillis, Ernst, Banks, & Landy, 2002; 
Hillis, Watt, Landy, & Banks, 2004; Johnston, Cumming, & Landy, 1994; Knill, 2007; 
Knill & Saunders, 2003). Localization of one’s own limbs (Sober & Sabes, 2005; van 
Beers, Wolpert, et al., 2002), or entire body (Fetsch et al., 2010, 2009) improves 
through the integration of visual and proprioceptive information. Finally, motor 
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performance improves through the integration of visual and proprioceptive 
information with the efference copy, a prediction about the sensorimotor 
consequences of motor actions (Bays & Wolpert, 2007; van Beers, Baraduc, et al., 
2002; Wolpert, 2007). 
We can compute the maximum possible improvement in performance as a 
result of the optimal integration of two separate cues in the following way: assume 
that these cues are independent Gaussian random variables Si, i =1,2  that signal a 
common property s = E[Si ] . The cues have variances σ i2, i =1,2  respectively. The 
maximum possible improvement in mean performance as a result of optimal cue 
integration is computed using Equation 1 by linearly combining the two cues into a 
single estimate (Oruç, Maloney, & Landy, 2003): 
 S = w1S1 +w2S2      (1) 






−2      (2) 
The resulting estimate S  is an unbiased estimate, E[Si ]= s , and, among 
unbiased estimates, it has the minimum variance (Oruç et al., 2003). The variance of 
the resulting estimate is:  





2     (3) 
 and it can be shown that the estimate S  has lower variance than either cue 
alone (Oruc et al, 2003). We will typically make use of the standard deviation rather 







2      (4) 
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In many tasks, participants integrate the information provided by multiple 
cues to achieve an observed accuracy in their final estimate that is close to the 
maximum possible (Ernst, 2007; Ernst & Banks, 2002; van Beers, Baraduc, et al., 
2002). Recently, two studies have reported a close to optimal improvement in 
performance on an implicit timing task (i.e. a finger tapping task) due to integration of 
sensory information (Elliott, Wing, & Welchman, 2010; Wing, Doumas, & Welchman, 
2010). In a unimodal condition, participants synchronised finger tapping with 
auditory, visual, or tactile events. In a bimodal condition, participants synchronised 
finger tapping with pairs of events taken from two different modalities presented 
either simultaneously or with a slight off-set. Variability in timing error (i.e. the 
variability in the asynchrony between stimulus presentation and the finger tap) 
decreased in the bimodal versus the unimodal condition as predicted by Equation 3. 
Cue integration can thus improve accuracy on an implicit timing task.  
Elliott et al., however, did not address whether cue integration can reduce 
internal temporal uncertainty (ITU). Rather, they assessed whether having better 
information about the timing of events (i.e. in the bimodal condition as the result of 
cue integration) increases the ability to synchronize movement with these events. In 
other words, they investigated the beneficial effects of reduced sensory uncertainty 
about the timing of sensory events in the bimodal condition (i.e. when these events 
happened) on rhythmic movements synchronised with these sensory events. By 
contrast, in the current study, we were specifically interested in cue integration in the 
temporal domain as a means to reduce ITU (i.e. the temporal uncertainty associated 
with the passage of time): can participants extract and integrate temporal information 
from multiple temporal cues to improve their accuracy in time perception?  
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Participants completed a time interval reproduction task with a ready-set-go 
procedure (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010). They were instructed to estimate and 
reproduce a time interval in between a READY and a SET cue (i.e. the target interval 
(TI) of 2262ms). After SET, participants received an additional stimulus (AS) at a 
fixed time interval before the correct time to respond.  
Formally, such an AS provides additional temporal information about the 
timing of the required response. The level of temporal information provided by the AS 
depends on the time interval in between the AS and the required response (i.e. the 
additional target interval: ATI). The longer the ATI, the less additional temporal 
information is provided by the AS because of the scalar property of interval timing 
(Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon & Allan, 1984; Lejeune & Wearden, 2006; Lewis & Miall, 
Figure 7.1: Schematic illustration of experimental design. A SET instructs participants to 
respond once the target interval (TI) has passed and thus acts as a cue for the timing of future 
action. The additional stimulus (AS) provides additional temporal information about when to respond 
as it occurs at a fixed time interval before the correct time to respond. B Relation between the timing 
of SET, the additional stimulus (AS), and internal temporal uncertainty (ITU). Variability in time 
interval reproduction  increases with increasing time interval duration. Because SET occurs 
before the AS, ITU associated with the additional target interval (ATI) is lower at the time of action 
compared to the ITU associated with the target interval (TI). The specific level of ITU associated 
with the ATI depends on the timing of the AS. Participants may use information provided by the AS 
and SET in conjunction to time future action. Alternatively, participants may use the SET or the AS 
only.  	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2009). We varied the level of temporal information provided by the AS by varying the 
ATI (412ms, 1037ms, or 1662ms) and assessed whether variability in time interval 
reproduction reduced in line with Equation 3. To compute predicted optimal 
performance for each participant individually, we measured variability in time interval 
reproduction for the TI and the three ATIs using a standard time interval reproduction 
task, again with a ready-set-go procedure, without the presentation of an AS. In other 
words, during this baseline, the ATI was presented like a regular target interval.  
We considered three alternative hypotheses about how participants might 
carry out the task with the two cues, SET and AS. First, participants might ignore the 
AS and use only SET for timing their responses (Hypothesis 1: SET only). 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a standard deviation in the response σ R  equal to the standard 
deviation for the TI (2262ms) as measured during baseline (i.e. without the AS) for all 
three experimental conditions (i.e. all three ATIs): 
 σ R =σ TI  (5) 
Second, participants might integrate the temporal information provided by 
SET and the temporal information provided by the AS in the optimal fashion 
prescribed by Equations 1 and 2 (Hypothesis 2: optimal integration). The standard 
deviation in the response σ R  should thus equal: 	  






2  (6) 
Further, the standard deviation σ R  should increase with increasing ATI 
duration due to an increase in σ ATI . Third, participants might ignore the SET cue and 
use the temporal information provided by the AS cue only (Hypothesis 3: AS only). 
In this case, the duration of the ATI alone should determine the standard deviation in 
TI reproduction: 
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 σ R =σ ATI  (7) 
and the standard deviation σ R  should increase linearly with increasing ATI 
duration due to increasing σ ATI . Both, Hypothesis 2 and 3 require that participants 
learn the ATI whereas Hypothesis 1 does not. To learn the ATI, participants have to 
first use SET to estimate the correct time for action to then estimate the ATI in 
between the correct time for action and the AS. Thus, being able to use the AS to 
improve performance entails that participants can use SET, but not vice versa. Thus, 
participants may use SET only, and ignore the AS, because they are unable to learn 
the ATI. If participants use the AS but ignore SET, then because they fail to integrate 
the information provided by the SET and the AS, although they can use both cues 
separately to time required responses. Finally, if participants integrate temporal 
information provided by the SET and the AS, then they are able to use the AS and 
the SET in conjunction for optimal improvement in timing accuracy.  
Given reports of near-optimal cue integration in the visual and motor domain 
(Elliott et al., 2010; Ernst & Banks, 2002; Fetsch et al., 2010; Hillis et al., 2004; Knill, 
2007; Muller, Brenner, & Smeets, 2009; Sober & Sabes, 2005; van Beers, Baraduc, 




Six participants (mean age: 27.2 years, age range: 24 – 32 years, all right 
handed, three males, normal or corrected-to-normal vision) took part in this study 
after having provided written informed consent. They received compensation for their 
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time and effort (£85). The study was approved by a local ethics committee and in line 
with the declaration of Helsinki. 
Procedure 
Participants were seated in front of a computer screen (approximately 60cm 
viewing distance) and wore noise-cancelling headphones to attenuate background 
noise and, in particular, the sound of participants pressing the response key. Their 
right index finger rested on the space-key of a standard QWERTY keyboard, which 
served as the response key.  
Task & design 
Participants completed a modified time interval reproduction task with a 
READY-SET-GO procedure (Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010). Trial start was signalled by 
presentation of a small white ring (1.5 degree visual angle) on dark grey background. 
The ring was presented centrally and participants were instructed to fixate. 300ms 
after trial-onset, participants saw a small red circle (READY; 1.5 degree visual 
angle), briefly flashing at the centre of the screen (100ms), followed by a second red 
circle (SET; 1.5 degree visual angle; 100ms), separated by the target interval (TI: 
2262ms). Participants were instructed to reproduce the TI by responding when the 
time interval after SET matched the time interval in between READY and SET. As 
such, SET acted as a cue for the timing of future action (Figure 7.1A). 
Participants received the AS before the correct time to respond, a small blue 
circle (1.5 degree visual angle) briefly flashing at the centre of the screen (100ms). 
The AS marked the onset of the ATI (412ms, 1037ms, or 1662ms). The timing of the 
AS was manipulated in a block-wise fashion (i.e. within each block, SET and AS 
were perfectly correlated).  
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Following the AS, the white ring disappeared after twice the TI (2 x 2262ms), 
as measured from SET. This long time interval ensured that participants could 
indicate their estimate of the TI even if they strongly overestimated the TI. In addition, 
the white ring stayed on for an additional time interval sampled from a truncated non-
aging exponential distribution (lower bound = 200ms, mean = 500ms, upper bound = 
800ms). This temporal jitter prevented participants from using the offset of the ring as 
a cue informative about the accuracy of their just provided TI estimate. The inter-trial 
interval was sampled from the same truncated non-ageing exponential distribution to 
prevent build-up of expectancy about trial onset. 
Participants completed the experiment in three sessions (650 trials each = 
2h), one for each ATI, separated by at least 24 hours. The order of experimental 
conditions (i.e. ATIs) was counterbalanced across participants. Summary feedback 
about average performance was given every 50 trials, and was informative about 
direction and magnitude of bias but not about trial-by-trial variability.  
Each session was preceded by a short training session. First, participants 
completed 10 trials with trial-by-trial feedback to get used to the duration of the TI, 
Figure 7.2: Experimental task. Modified time interval reproduction task with a READY-SET-GO 
procedure. Participants were instructed to respond when the time interval following SET matched 
the time interval in between READY and SET (2262ms). 412, 1037, or 1662ms before the end of the 
reference interval (GO), participants saw an additional stimulus (AS). The blue circle provided 
information about the right time for action, in addition to SET, as it occurred at a fixed time interval 
before the correct time to respond (i.e. the additional target interval: ATI). 
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followed by sets of 10 trials, each with summary feedback about performance upon 
completion of a set. Participants were allowed to proceed with the experiment once 
the mean of the reproduced TI did not deviate by more than 10% from the actual TI. 
This training was included to reduce existing biases in time perception (Lewis & Miall, 
2009a). Overall, participants showed little bias in time interval perception (median # 
of required training blocks = 1.25). 
Baseline performance in time interval reproduction 
During baseline, participants completed the time interval reproduction task, as 
described above, with two modifications: participants did not receive the AS, and 
they reproduced four different target intervals in different blocks (the TI: 2262ms and 
all three ATI: 412ms, 1037ms, 1662ms). 
Participants completed the baseline in two sessions. One session (4 blocks, 
one for each ATI and TI, of 150 trials each) took place before and the other after the 
experiment to capture any improvement in baseline performance due to completion 
of the experiment. The order of the blocks during baseline was randomised. Each 
block was preceded by 10 trials with trial-by-trial feedback and sets of 10 trials with 
summary feedback upon completion of a set. As before, participants showed little 
initial bias in time interval reproduction (median # of required training blocks = 1.25 
for both pre- and post-experiment baseline). 
Data analysis 
We specifically asked about precision and mean accuracy in time interval 
reproduction after prolonged training and exposure to the AS. To this end, we 
analysed the final 200 trials participants completed in each experimental condition, in 
particular to ensure that participants were given the opportunity to learn a block’s ATI 
across the 450 trials preceding these analysed 200 trials. Correspondingly, to ensure 
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that participants were sufficiently familiar with the TI and ATIs during baseline, we 
analysed the final 100 trials participants completed for each time interval in both the 
pre- and post-experiment baseline session (i.e. 200 baseline trials analysed in total 
for each time interval). 
Reproduced target interval duration was computed as the time interval in 
between SET (i.e. the centre of the 100ms visual stimulus) and participant’s 
response. All reproduced target intervals < 0ms (i.e. responses before SET) were 
excluded from further analysis (Baseline: 0.2%; Experiment: < 0.1%). Outliers were 
identified using Grubb’s test (α = 0.05) and excluded (Baseline: 0.7%; Experiment: 
1.6%). We acknowledge that exclusion of outliers in reproduced TIs affects the 
standard deviation. However, this effect will be limited due to the small number of 
excluded trials. We then analysed the standard deviation in reproduced TIs, as a 
measure of precision, and the mean of reproduced TIs, as a measure of bias. Before 
we computed the standard deviation, across all trials for each experimental condition 
separately, we removed any slow drifts from the data (Helmuth & Ivry, 1996). 
Removal of gradual changes in estimated target interval duration 
Gradual changes in the mean of the reproduced target interval over time 
affect the observed standard deviation but such changes are not an expression of 
participants’ “true variability” in time interval reproduction. Instead, they reflect slow 
drifts in the mean of the distribution of reproduced TIs. To get a better estimate of 
participants’ variability, we first removed such slow drifts before we computed the 
standard deviation across trials.  
Slow drifts were removed in two consecutive steps: first, we removed any 
linear trends from the data that suggest a linear in- or de-crease in the mean of 
reproduced TIs separately for each “mini-block” (i.e. 50 trials uninterrupted by 
feedback; 1st step). We fitted a linear regression model to the data (i.e. TI estimates) 
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separately for each mini-block. We then used this linear model to remove linear 
trends by subtracting the variance accounted for by the regression from the raw TI 
estimates. With this procedure, we effectively computed the variance that was not 
accounted for by the regression (i.e. the residuals). As such, this procedure accounts 
for slow gradual changes in mean reproduced TIs on trials uninterrupted by 
feedback.  
 
Second, we removed biases in time reproduction (2nd step), separately for 
each mini-block. Participants may systematically overestimate the TI on one mini-
block while systematically underestimating the TI on another or vice versa (perhaps 
in an attempt to compensate for bias revealed by feedback, which may then lead to 
acquisition of bias in the opposite direction on the subsequent block, i.e. 
overcompensation). We subtracted the difference between a mini-block’s mean 






before after linear trend mean TI





























Figure 7.3: Linear de-trending of data (1st step). Gradual acquisition, or attenuation, of bias in time 
interval reproduction may affect the observed standard deviation instead of originating from participants’ 
“true variability” in performance. To account for this bias, we removed linear trends from the data, 
separately for each mini-block (i.e. 50 trials uninterrupted by feedback) separately. TI: target interval; 
ATI: additional target interval. 
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reproduced TI and the median reproduced TI computed across all mini-blocks from 
the data, effectively centring the data on the median reproduced TI across mini-
blocks. The remaining variability reflects participants’ actual variability in time interval 
reproduction not contaminated by gradual acquisition or attenuation of bias in time 
reproduction. Analysis of the data without this de-trending procedure showed that our 
conclusions did not spuriously depend on this procedure. 
 
Analysis of variability and bias in target interval reproduction 
We used the data acquired during baseline as predictors in a multiple linear 
regression analysis to predict observer performance. If participants used both cues, 
the SET and AS, then both cues should be significant predictors of participants’ 
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Figure 7.4: Removal of median shifts from the data (2nd step of de-trending procedure). 
Participants received feedback upon completion of each mini-block (i.e. 50 trials), which was 
informative about bias in time reproduction. Participants may attempt to compensate for this 
indicated bias and, in doing so, acquire a bias in the opposite direction (i.e. overcompensation). This 
results in a shift in the mean of the distribution of reproduced target intervals, but may also affects 
the observed standard deviation. We therefore removed the difference between the mean of each 
mini-block and the overall median across mini-blocks from the data. 	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performance. If participants used one cue only, either the SET or the AS, then only 
one of the predictors of the linear regression will turn out significant. Bias in time 
interval reproduction was analysed by computing the mean reproduced TI across all 
trials. The actual TI (2262ms) was then subtracted from the mean reproduced TI.  
Analysis of baseline data 
After removal of gradual changes participants’ timing performance (de-
trending procedure), we first assessed whether participants’ performance was 
different after having completed the experiment compared to the pre-experiment 
measurement. As we found no change in participants’ mean or standard deviation of 
reproduced TIs, we then pooled the baseline data collected before and after the 
experiment. To probe for bias in time interval reproduction, the TI (2262ms) and the 
three ATIs (412ms, 1037ms, 1662ms) were subtracted from the corresponding mean 
reproduced TIs. We further tested whether bias in time interval reproduction was 
different during the experiment compared to baseline. We subtracted mean 
estimated TI during baseline from the mean estimates TI during the experiment. All 
difference scores were tested against zero using Wilcoxon’s signed rank test without 
correction for multiple comparison, as this would have worked to our advantage in 
the present case. 
Results 
Assessment of bias in time estimation 
There was no significant difference (all p > 0.1) in either the mean or the 
standard deviation for any of the four time intervals (the three ATIs or the TI) 
between the pre- and post-experiment baseline measurements (see Figure 7.5). We 
therefore pooled all analysed pre- and post-experiment baseline trials (= 200 trials) to 
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While participants exhibited no bias for the three ATIs during baseline (p > 
0.1), they underestimated the TI by 3.3% (median difference  = -74.7ms, range = -
129.2 - 4.2ms;  z = -1.992, p = 0.046, r = 0.813). This bias was reduced to 0.5% 
underestimation during the experiment for the short ATI only (median difference = -
15.0ms, range = -44.8 - 42.3ms; z = -1.992, p = 0.046, r = 0.813) while there was no 
reduction or increase for the intermediate (median difference = -73.6ms, range = -
161.7 - 232.2, p > 0.1) and long ATI (median difference  = -58.8ms, range = -205.5 - 
88.3ms, p > 0.1). On average, participants were therefore accurate in their timing. 
































































Figure 7.5: No difference in baseline before (pre-) and after (post-) the experiment. A. 
Participant’s mean accuracy in time interval reproduction was comparable before and after the 
experiment for all four time intervals (p > 0.1). B. There was no significant difference in the standard 
deviation of reproduced target time intervals before and after the experiment (p > 0.1). The linear 
trend shown here was computed for the pre- and post-experiment baseline measures combined. 
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Importantly, introducing the AS did not induce significant temporal bias. Instead, 
there was a removal of bias for the most reliable AS (see Figure 7.6). 
 
 
Sub-optimal improvement in timing accuracy 
The multiple linear regression was significant (Radj2 = 0.501, p < 0.001) but 
while the AS was a significant predictor of observed performance (betaAS = 0.798, SE 
= 0.239; t(15) = 3.339, p = 0.005), SET failed to reach significance (betaSET = 0.251, 
SE = 0.206; t(15) = 1.22, p = 0.242). We eliminated SET from the model by 
backwards elimination (Chatterjee & Hadi, 2006) and computed the reduced model, 
which again was significant (Radj2 = 0.486, p < 0.001). There was no significant drop 
in variance as a consequence of eliminating SET as a predictor (F(1,15) = 1.486, p > 
0.05). These results imply that participants used the SET cue to learn the duration of 

































Figure 7.6: Bias in time interval reproduction. Participants accurately reproduced the target 
interval during baseline except for a 3.3% underestimation of the longest target interval (TI, 
2262ms). This underestimation was reduced to 0.5% during the experiment for the shortest 
additional time interval (ATI: 412ms) while it remained comparable for the intermediate (1037ms) 
and long ATI (1662ms). Introducing the additional stimulus did not induce a bias in time 
reproduction. 	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the ATI but thereafter, participants relied exclusively on the AS to time their 
responses (see Figure 7.7). 
 
Increased accumulation of temporal error during ATI estimation 
Comparing observed to predicted performance for the winning hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 3: AS only), the data show an upwards bias in timing accuracy (see 
Figure 3). In other words, participants were less accurate in their timing than 
predicted by Hypothesis 3 for the short (median difference in SD = 10.8ms, range: -













































Figure 7.7: Participants do not integrate but rely on the more reliable temporal cue only (AS). 
Participants’ performance during the experiment was evaluated against their individual baseline 
performance. To illustrate participants’ improvement in time interval reproduction during the experiment, 
we subtracted their predicted performance based on from observed performance during the experiment 
for each participant and hypothesis separately. A Participants performed more accurately than predicted 
by Hypothesis 1 (SET only) for the short and intermediate ATI. B Participants performed less accurately 
than predicted by Hypothesis 2 (optimal integration) for all three ATIs. C Similarly, participants performed 
less accurately than predicted by Hypothesis 3 for all the ATIs. But the AS turned out to be the only 
significant predictor in the multiple regression analysis: participants rely on the AS exclusively in timing 
their motor responses. Red squares: median difference in standard deviation (predicted – observed 
performance) across participants for each additional target interval (ATI); coloured circles: single subject 
data. Dashed grey lines: linear trend across participants’ difference scores with ATI duration. 	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76.9ms), and long ATI (median difference in SD = 415ms, range: -0.1 – 54.4ms; see 
Figure 3). Interestingly, this offset was proportional to actual ATI duration (see Figure 
4). Such proportional bias may signal that temporal error accumulates more quickly 
for the ATI during the experiment than during baseline (i.e. a higher Weber fraction; 
see Figure 7.8). To quantify this bias, we fit the following model to the data: 
σ R =ασ ATI        (8) 
where α is a constant scaling factor that captures the proportional offset 
observed in the data. In fact, if the standard deviation associated with the three ATIs 
during the experiment (impossible to assess directly) were 132.1% (i.e. α = 1.321) of 
the observed standard deviation during baseline, performance predicted by 
Hypothesis 3 (AS only) closely matched median observed performance (averaged 
across participants; see Figure 4). Radj2 dropped to 0.370 (compared to Radj2 = 0.486 
from the linear regression with AS as the only predictor) as a consequence of 
eliminating the regression constant (cf. y
^
= β1X1 +β0  to Equation 8). Still, the simple 
model outlined in Equation 8 can account for a significant proportion of the variance 
in the data (p < 0.05). Temporal error may thus accumulate more quickly for the ATIs 
used during the experiment, when ATIs are marked by the onset of the AS only and 
not repeated immediately before reproduction, as during baseline. Importantly, no 
such constant increase in temporal error (for the ATI, TI, or both) could bring the 
observed timing accuracy in alignment with the timing accuracy predicted by both 
Hypothesis 1 (SET only) and 2 (optimal integration). 
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Discussion 
Whenever performance depends on accurate time perception, it is limited by 
ITU. We asked whether participants can extract temporal information from multiple 
cues, all informative about the time for future action, to reduce ITU. Such reduction in 
ITU would improve performance here by increasing participants’ accuracy in time 
interval reproduction. We found that participants relied exclusively on the AS, the 
more reliable of the two sensory timing cues, in timing their motor action. But 
participants have to use the SET to learn the information that the AS carries about 




















































Figure 7.8: Sub-optimal improvement in time reproduction with higher rate of accumulation 
of temporal error. Participants may ignore the additional stimulus (AS) in which case performance 
would equal baseline TI performance (black line labelled SET only). Alternatively, performance may 
improve in the presence of the AS (yellow: benefit of AS; green: cue integration; benefit of AS and 
SET). Performance cannot improve beyond participants’ best possible performance during the 
experiment given their baseline performance (i.e. below optimal integration). Observed performance 
falls in the yellow area, i.e. participants benefit from the AS. A Participants use the AS but the 
observed standard deviation is larger than the predicted standard deviation for Hypothesis 3 (AS 
only). B This offset on observed versus predicted standard deviation is proportional to ATI duration 
and may as such signal an increased rate in the accumulation of temporal error during the 
experiment compared to baseline. 
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temporal information from both sensory cues, they fail to integrate this information. 
Instead, they use the more reliable timing cue which leads to a sub-optimal 
improvement in timing accuracy compared to the maximum possible.  
In addition, temporal error seems to accumulate more quickly during the 
experiment compared to baseline. While participants relied on the AS for timing 
performance, timing accuracy was worse during the experiment compared to 
baseline. This offset was proportional to the performance during baseline and thus 
depends on the overall duration of the to-be-estimated time interval. This suggests a 
higher rate of accumulated temporal error. Distortion of time interval perception 
induced by changing the context in which the interval is presented has been found 
before (Droit-Volet & Gil, 2009; Orgs, Bestmann, Schuur, & Haggard, 2011). In the 
present case, however, the change in context did not lead to a change in clock speed 
(which would have led to either over- or underestimation, i.e. bias). Instead, there 
may have been an increase in the rate at which temporal error accumulates (i.e. 
higher Weber fraction), suggesting that the temporal context in which events occur 
can change the individual Weber Fraction, very much like context can change clock 
speed.  
A necessary prerequisite for temporal cue combination: multiple timers 
Failure of temporal cue combination to improve our sense of the passage of 
time to remove ITU about forthcoming events or actions, is remarkable given 
previous demonstrations of optimal cue integration in visual (Ernst & Banks, 2002; 
Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004; Hillis et al., 2004; Knill, 2007; Knill & Saunders, 2003; Oruç et 
al., 2003), spatial (Fetsch et al., 2010; van Beers, Wolpert, et al., 2002), motor (Bays 
& Wolpert, 2007; van Beers, Baraduc, et al., 2002; Wolpert, 2007), and even 
temporal (Elliott et al., 2010; Wing et al., 2010) processing. There are two possible 
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explanations for this failure of temporal cue integration, one relating to the number of 
“clocks in the brain”, and another relating to causal perception. 
With regard to the first possible explanation, temporal cue combination 
critically relies on being able to keep track of more than one time interval at once (TI 
and ATI). Tracking two time intervals simultaneously is difficult to accommodate with 
theories and models of time perception that postulate either one centralised timer 
(Treisman, 1963) or one timer for each sensory modality (Ivry & Schlerf, 2008) when 
all temporal cues are presented in the same sensory modality (here: vision). Failure 
of temporal cue combination may therefore be informative about the number of 
timers in the brain and would limit this number to one per sensory modality. Note that 
such a limit would make it harder for the participants to learn the ATI albeit not 
impossible (Meck & Church, 1984). 
Several studies, however, have shown that human and non-human animals 
can keep track of multiple time intervals simultaneously when stimuli are presented in 
either the same (Buhusi & Meck, 2009; Rule, 1986) and different sensory modalities 
(Leak & Gibbon, 1995; McAuley et al., 2010; Meck & Church, 1984). If, as suggested 
by these findings, there were indeed multiple timers within one sensory modality, 
then temporal cue combination should in principle be possible. If participants can 
measure the TI and ATI simultaneously, then all they need to do for optimal cue 
integration is to combine these two estimates. The observed failure to optimally 
combine temporal cues thus points towards a more fundamental limitation of 
temporal cue combination, which we discuss in the following. 
Temporal proximity, causal inference, and cue combination 
Alternatively, participants failed to integrate the temporal information provided 
by SET and AS because optimal integration may require that these two visual cues 
are perceived as manifestations of one single underlying (but hidden) object (Welch 
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& Warren, 1980). In depth perception, for example, visual and haptic information are 
both caused by the size and shape of one single object (Ernst & Banks, 2002). 
Similarly, visual and proprioceptive information are both caused by the position of 
one’s hand in space (van Beers, Wolpert, et al., 2002). Indeed, we know that explicit 
knowledge about a common cause promotes cue integration (Helbig & Ernst, 2007). 
In the present case, there was no obvious single object that could have caused the 
two visual percepts (i.e. SET and AS), suggesting that the failure of temporal cue 
integration resulted from the underlying failure to bind these two visual percepts to 
one single underlying but hidden object. If the case, cue combination is no general-
purpose mechanism for sensory-motor noise reduction but instead features in causal 
inference and object recognition. Conversely, cue combination itself may enable the 
perception of a common underlying object of sensory percepts. In other words, rather 
than regarding cue combination as the consequence of binding percepts to a 
common cause, the perception of a common cause may only be possible through 
successful cue combination. Percepts that are unlikely to have a common cause then 
limit cue combination, but in doing so prevent faulty inference (e.g. inferring the 
existence of a common cause of sensory percepts when there is none).  
Spatial (Meredith & Stein, 1996) and temporal proximity (Paul Bertelson & 
Aschersleben, 2003; Colonius & Diederich, 2010; Meredith, Nemitz, & Stein, 1987) 
are reliable cues for correctly inferring the existence of a common underlying object 
of separate sensory percepts (Körding et al., 2007). Recent work shows that 
temporal correlation also determines whether or not cue combination occurs (Parise, 
Spence, & Ernst, 2012). It may thus serve as yet another cue to infer the common 
cause of sensory percepts. In the present experiment, the SET and AS were 
perfectly correlated, but not temporally proximate (i.e. outside the “typical” window of 
integration; Bertelson & Aschersleben, 2003; Hartcher-O’Brien & Alais, 2011). 
Temporal proximity may therefore be a necessary requirement for cue combination 
 	   224 
to happen. But if temporal proximity is indeed a necessary requirement for cue 
combination and perception of a common cause, then participants will never 
integrate multiple cues that signal common action or event timing but are distributed 
over time. Our sense of the passage of time cannot be improved by multiple cues. 
Instead, we rely on the most reliable and informative cue. This does imply, however, 
that cue integration is best understood as a mechanism that features in causal 
inference and object recognition rather than a general-purpose mechanism for 
sensory-motor noise reduction. 
 Temporally distal sensory percepts, however, can originate from a single 
object. Just think about watching a lighthouse at night from afar: the sensory cue for 
its existence is the periodically re-occurring ray of light separated by a temporal 
interval. But even if two sensory percepts originate from two separate objects, they 
can still be informative about the same property (here: action timing). Integration of 
such percepts would lead to an improved estimate of this specific property. But if 
temporal proximity (or the inference to a common cause) is indeed a necessary 
requirement for cue combination, then information provided by separate objects 
about common properties is ignored to the detriment of performance. The cost of a 
faulty inference (e.g. inferring a common object when there is none) may outweigh 
the benefits of having more precise sensory estimates of external properties. And if 
sensory percepts are temporally distal, then a common cause may be unlikely 
(Weisswange, Rothkopf, Rodemann, & Triesch, 2011). This does imply, however, 
that cue combination is understood as a feature in causal inference and object 
recognition. If cue combination were a general-purpose mechanism for sensory-
motor noise reduction, then consideration about the cost of faulty inference should 
not matter. 
Finally, our limited capacity to integrate information provided by multiple cues 
distributed over time may also be dictated by the “architecture” of our brains. 
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Integration requires the interaction of neural activity that encodes the information of 
separate to-be-integrated cues (the neural activity has to “meet in the brain”; 
Meredith et al., 1987). The interactions between these neural representations then 
determine behaviour (e.g. cue integration). We know that timing cues can trigger 
sustained neural activity that relates to the to-be-timed intervals (Janssen & Shadlen, 
2005; Leon & Shadlen, 2003; Mita et al., 2009) (e.g. a gradual build-up in neural 
activity associated with the duration of to-be-timed intervals; Mita, Mushiake, Shima, 
Matsuzaka, & Tanji, 2009). The integration of temporally segregated cues then 
requires a superordinate “integrator” that integrates information encoded by multiple 
timers (i.e. their respective neural activity). Combined input into this integrator from 
the various timers should improve time estimation (i.e. the integrator’s output), 
compared to inputs from a single internal clock, which is the fundamental principle of 
cue integration: two noisy sensory signals lead to a better sensory estimate than one 
sensory signal only; Ernst & Banks, 2002; Oruç et al., 2003).  
Previous work has demonstrated such integrators for converging sensory 
inputs in the spatial domain (Meredith & Stein, 1983), and behavioural studies on bi- 
or tri-manual tapping suggest a mechanism that ensures the synchronisation of 
motor actions (Helmuth & Ivry, 1996; Ivry & Richardson, 2002), which effectively acts 
as an integrator. Assuming that multiple time intervals can be tracked simultaneously 
(Meck & Church, 1984; Rule, 1986; i.e. that there are multiple internal clocks that can 
encode different time intervals at the same time), the failure to reduce the rate of 
accumulation of temporal error through temporal cue combination shown here 
suggests lack of an integrator for time. 
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Conclusion 
We here report a striking failure of optimal cue integration in the temporal 
domain. Being provided with two sensory cues that both inform about the correct 
timing of a forthcoming action, participants fail to integrate these cues but instead 
rely on the more reliable cue only. This suggests that cue integration occurs only 
when sensory percepts are perceived as the manifestations of one single object or 
common cause. Temporal proximity of sensory percepts may be an essential 
prerequisite for inference of a common cause and sensory cue integration, and limits 
the use of multiple cues distributed across time to improve our sense of the passage 
of time. 
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Chapter 8: General Conclusions 
Abstract: A summary of the main findings presented in Chapter 2 – 7 clearly shows 
the fundamental difference between external (ETU) and internal temporal uncertainty 
(ITU) – two types of temporal uncertainty distinguished by origin. ETU and ITU differ 
in their effects on temporal preparation, their interaction with event preparation, and 
reward-based decision-making. Manipulation of ETU, as opposed to ITU, which had 
been manipulated previously, allowed us to distinguish between competing 
explanations for changes in cortico-spinal excitability (CSE) prior to imperative events 
measured by Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS). Having revealed the influence 
of ITU on behaviour, we explored whether participants could reduce ITU by extraction 
and combination of temporal information from multiple cues. While participants failed 
to combine information provided by multiple cues, they selected the temporally more 
reliable cue for action timing, which shows that they are clearly sensitive to 
differences in ITU. Taken together, this thesis presents an in depth exploration of 
behaviour under temporal uncertainty and reveals that the origin of uncertainty 
matters for its effects on behaviour. 
Keywords: action preparation, temporal preparation, event preparation, reward-based 
decision making, temporal uncertainty, ETU, ITU, event uncertainty, cue combination 
Temporal uncertainty affects preparation for imperative events (Chapter 2-5), 
accurate action timing in case such events are lacking (Chapter 6-7), and decisions 
between alternative actions if their outcome depends on accurate timing (Chapter 7). 
We here distinguished between two types of temporal uncertainty: external (ETU) 
and internal temporal uncertainty (ITU). External temporal uncertainty originates in 
the environment and arises if imperative events, or the appropriate time for action if 
such events are lacking, vary from one instance to the next. Internal temporal 
uncertainty is due to an organism’s limited accuracy in keeping track of the passage 
of time, which increases in direct proportion to the duration of time intervals to-be-
judged (Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon & Allan, 1984; Lewis & Miall, 2009; Rakitin et al., 
1998).  
We here demonstrated, for the first time, that the origin of temporal 
uncertainty, besides its level, determines how temporal uncertainty influences 
temporal preparation (Chapter 2), event preparation (Chapter 3), and decision-
making (Chapter 6). ETU and ITU interact in their effects on temporal preparation 
(Chapter 1). High levels of ITU may mask effects of ETU (Chapter 1). Effects of ETU 
and ITU on temporal preparation are under executive control and can be fully 
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removed by accurate, explicit information about the timing of imperative events 
(Chapter 1). The effects of ETU and ITU, however, may not be fully dissociable – we 
only observed a complete removal of effects of ETU and ITU on temporal preparation 
once accurate and explicit information about the timing of imperative events removed 
the need to keep track of the passage of time entirely (as opposed to selectively 
removing ITU: cf. Experiment 1 & 2 in Chapter 1). This finding may explain why 
others have reported residual effects of temporal uncertainty despite removal of ETU 
by accurate and explicit information (Los & van den Heuvel, 2001; Los & Heslenfeld, 
2005). If participants are not provided with continuous temporal information 
throughout the preparatory interval, they still experience ITU, which may lead to 
residual effects of temporal uncertainty (Los & van den Heuvel, 2001; Los & 
Heslenfeld, 2005). We conclude that effects of ETU and ITU are under executive 
control and not due to automatic conditioning processes, as previously suggested by 
Los and colleagues (Los, Knol, & Boers, 2001; but see Los & Horoufchin, 2011). 
While ETU and ITU have differential effects on temporal preparation, they are not 
fully dissociable and can only be removed fully in conjunction by taking away the 
necessity to keep track of time entirely. 
We further demonstrated that both ETU and ITU interact with event 
preparation. Crucially, the type of interaction differed for ETU versus ITU, thus 
revealing yet another important influence of the origin of temporal uncertainty on 
human cognitive motor control. When participants know what action to prepare for 
(i.e. low event uncertainty), then they maximally benefit from low ETU. When event 
uncertainty is high, then they fail to benefit from low ETU. By contrast, participants 
can compensate for high ITU but only when they know what action to prepare for. 
This interaction between temporal and event preparation had been overlooked so far, 
despite extensive research (Bertelson & Barzeele, 1965; Bertelson & Boons, 1960; 
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Sanders, 1990; Spijkers, 1990; Spijkers & Walter, 1985), due to lack of a distinction 
between ETU and ITU. 
Finally, in deciding between alternative actions, whose outcomes depend on 
accurate action timing, participants distort ETU but not ITU (Chapter 6). This shows 
the important distinction between ETU and ITU in yet another area in human 
information processing: decision-making. In addition, our findings build an important 
bridge between classic studies on decision making, with their focus on external risk 
and uncertainty (Allais, 1953; Daniel Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 2000; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992), and more recent studies on how participants cope with 
uncertainties inherent in motor performance (Hudson, Maloney, & Landy, 2007; 
Hudson et al., 2008; Trommershäuser, 2009; Trommershäuser et al., 2006, 2003). 
The difference in origin explains why participants distort probabilities under 
conditions of external but not internal uncertainty.  
In two studies, using Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) to probe 
cortico-spinal excitability (CSE; Chapter 4) and intracortical inhibitory circuits 
(Chapter 5), we further explored the nature of temporal and event preparation. More 
specifically, we aimed to distinguish between different proposals – in particular 
response competition, impulse control, and noise reduction – all aimed at explaining 
changes in CSE prior to imperative events. Whereas others have manipulated ITU to 
study the development of CSE prior to imperative events (Hasbroucq, Osman, et al., 
1999; Hasbroucq et al., 1997), we manipulated ETU (Chapter 4). We found that 
response competition in combination with impulse control can best explain changes 
in CSE prior to imperative events. Our attempts to further explore this modulation of 
CSE by selectively probing intracortical inhibitory circuits did not lead to conclusive 
results (Chapter 5). We speculate that short intracortical inhibition supports impulse 
control while long intracortical inhibition implements response competition. Further 
studies will have to verify our speculations. 
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Finally, having revealed the importance of distinguishing between ETU and 
ITU, and the potentially detrimental effects of high levels of ITU on temporal and 
event preparation, we turned towards exploring strategies to reduce ITU. In case 
participants lack precise, external time-keepers (such as stop-watches, cf. 
Experiment 3 in Chapter 1), they might potentially combine temporal information from 
multiple cues to reduce ITU. The beneficial effects of cue combination on sensory 
estimates have been shown in many other domains of human information processing 
(Ernst & Banks, 2002; Ernst & Bülthoff, 2004; Fetsch et al., 2009; Hillis et al., 2004; 
Oruç et al., 2003). In stark contrast to this literature, participants failed to combine 
temporal information from multiple cues. Instead, they selected the most reliable cue 
to time their actions. Participants are thus sensitive to differences in ITU but fail to 
combine temporal information from multiple cues. 
Taken together, this thesis presents an in depth exploration of the differential 
effects of two types of temporal uncertainty: ETU and ITU, which are distinguished by 
origin. Results show that the origin determines how temporal uncertainty affects 
human cognitive motor control and reward-based decision making. As such, this 
thesis makes an important contribution to the growing field of study of behaviour 
under uncertainty. Where uncertainty comes from matters for human cognitive motor 
control and reward-based decision making. As we typically experience uncertainty 
about almost every aspect in life (except, of course, analytical truths: 1 + 1 = 2), the 
study of behaviour under uncertainty is directly relevant to every day decisions and 
actions.  
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